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ABSTRACT 
 
After an introduction to CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) models and to 
Microsimulation techniques, this thesis wants to give an assessment and a detailed 
description of how CGE and MS models can be linked together, taking inspiration from 
the current literature, with a special focus concerning the literature on developing 
countries. The main goal for which these two models are linked together is to try to take 
into account full agents’ heterogeneity and the complexity of income distribution, while 
being able at the same time to consider the macroeconomic effects of the policy reforms. 
In current literature there are two main trends in the approach to linking: one that tries to 
fully integrate the two models, or better the CGE model and a micro dataset or survey 
(integrated model), while the other develops separately the CGE and the microsimulation 
models and then links them together through a set of equations and parameters (layered 
models). We will make a detailed comparison of the two approaches. 
In the last chapter, we build a CGE-microsimulation model for the economy of 
Nicaragua, following the Top-Down approach (see Bourguignon et al., 2003), that is, the 
reform is simulated first at the macro level with the CGE model, and then it is passed 
onto the microsimulation model through a vector of changes in some chosen variables, 
such as prices, wage rates, and unemployment levels. The main reason for this choice is 
that with such an approach, one can develop the two models (CGE and microsimulation) 
separately, thus being able to make use of behavioural micro-econometric equations, 
which are instead of more difficult introduction into a fully integrated model. Moreover, 
the so called top-down approach appears to be particularly suited to the policy reform we 
are willing to simulate with the model: the Free Trade Agreement of Central America 
with the USA is mainly a macroeconomic reform, which on the other hand can have 
important effects on the distribution of income. With such a model we try to study the 
possible changes in the distribution of income deriving from the Free Trade Agreement 
with USA. Our analysis finds only small changes both in the main macroeconomic 
variables and in the distribution of income and poverty indices. 
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RIASSUNTO 
 
Dopo aver introdotto i modelli CGE (Computable General Equilibrium, Equilibrio 
Generale Computazionale) e le tecniche di microsimulazione, questa tesi offre una 
descrizione dettagliata di come i modelli CGE ed i modelli di microsimulazione possano 
essere utilizzati congiuntamente, partendo dalla letteratura piú recente sull’argomento, e 
focalizzando in particolare l’attenzione sulla letteratura riguardante i paesi in via di 
sviluppo. Lo scopo principale dell’utilizzo di questi due modelli in maniera congiunta é 
quello di voler tenere in considerazione l’eterogeneitá degli agenti economici e la 
complessitá della distribuzione del reddito, e di essere in grado allo stesso tempo di 
valutare gli effetti macroeconomici delle riforme. 
Nella letteratura attuale troviamo due tendenze principali: la prima cerca di integrare 
completamente i due modelli, o meglio il modello CGE ed il dataset microeconomico 
(modello integrato), mentre la seconda sviluppa separatamente i due modelli per poi 
collegarli attraverso un insieme di equazioni e di parametri (modelli stratificati). 
Eseguiremo un confronto dettagliato dei due approcci sopra descritti. 
Nell’ultimo capitolo costruiremo un modello CGE-microsimulazione per l’economia del 
Nicaragua, seguendo l’approccio cosiddetto Top-Down (si veda Bourguinon et al., 2003) 
che simula la riforma dapprima ad un livello macro con il modello CGE, e poi passa i 
risultati di questo al modello di microsimulazione attraverso un vettore di variazioni di 
prezzi, salari e livello di disoccupazione. La ragione principale per la quale è stato scelto 
questo approccio è che grazie ad esso è possibile sviluppare i due modelli separatamente, 
potendo cosí fare libero uso di equazioni comportamentali che sarebbero invece di 
difficile implementazione in un modello pienamente integrato. Inoltre, l’approccio Top-
Down è particolarmente adatto alla riforma di politica economica che vogliamo simulare 
con il modello: l’accordo di libero scambio commerciale tra i paesi dell’America 
Centrale e gli Stati Uniti è una riforma di tipo macroeconomico, che potrebbe tuttavia 
avere effetti significativi sulla distribuzione del reddito. Con questo modello proveremo 
infatti ad analizzare gli effetti derivanti dall’accordo commerciale con gli Stati Uniti sulla 
distribuzione del reddito. I risultati dell’analisi dimostreranno che tale accordo 
commerciale porterá soltanto a piccole variazioni sia delle principali variabili 
macroeconomiche che della distribuzione del reddito e degli indici di povertá. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are multi-sector numerical models 
based on concepts associated with Walrasian general equilibrium theory. They are 
designed to analyze the effects of policy reforms or of economic shocks on the economy 
in a national, multi-national or global economy. Major fields of application include fiscal 
policy and optimal taxation, trade policy and international trade regimes, income 
distribution, sector development, and the economic impact of technological change. In 
addition, CGE models have been fruitfully used for analyses of environmental and 
natural resource problems and policies1. CGE models have proved to be useful 
instruments for studying the effects of a reform or of a shock on the whole economy, 
especially when a simultaneous change of more than one parameter is necessary. 
Anyway, one of the limits of CGE models is that, as they generally follow the 
representative household approach, they are often unable to capture within-group 
inequality and some specific individual agents’ behaviour. This is particularly important 
when we want to carry on income inequality and poverty analysis2. 
 
                                                 
1 The earliest CGE models of developing countries were designed to examine issues of income 
distribution. Adelman and Robinson (1978) analysed the case of South Korea, and Lysy and Taylor (1980) 
built a model for Brazil. For applications concerning optimal taxation, see for instance Ballard et al. (1985) 
and Ballard and Medema (1993). CGE models about trade policies are very numerous. For example, on the 
occasion of the negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico (1993), there appeared several studies relying on CGE models, surveyed by 
Brown (1992). CGE on environmental issues include measurements of intergenerational and multisectoral 
effects of policies such as cutting tolerated toxic emissions levels, raising green taxes, etc. See for example 
Bohringer and Rutherford (1997), Rutherford (2000) and Bohringer et al. (2000 and 2003).
2 After Mookherjee and Shorrocks’ (1982) study of UK, there are now other examples of “within/between” 
decomposition analysis of changes in inequality that indicate that changes in overall inequality are usually 
due at least as much to changes in within-group inequality as to changes in the between-group component. 
Among the applications to developing countries, see Ahuja et al. (1997), who applied this decomposition 
analysis to the case of Thailand, and Ferreira and Litchfield (2001) for Brazil.  
 1 
Microsimulation (MS) models are instead tools that allow the simulation of the effects of 
a policy on a sample of economic agents (individual, households, firms) at the individual 
level. Usually, MS models are based on two fundamental elements: a micro dataset 
containing the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of a sample of 
individuals or households (household surveys), and the rules of the policies to be 
simulated, and especially their impact on the budget constraint faced by each agent. Their 
field of application ranges among the ones included in the broader area of redistribution 
policies: indirect and direct taxation, social security system reforms, etc. 
Microsimulation (MS) techniques are accurate instruments for studying the effects on 
individual behaviour (such as labour supply or consumption) of a change in the tax-
benefit system at a very detailed level. In this respect, microsimulation models are very 
useful and precise when studying income distribution and poverty issues, as they work at 
the level of the individual or of the single household. However, the main drawback of 
these models is that they are just a partial equilibrium analysis, and they are not able to 
capture the general equilibrium impact of a reform. However this could be significant in 
the case we are analysing a reform or a shock that could have important effects on the 
structure of the economy under study. 
In principle, the idea of linking CGE and MS models looks as the best solution to 
overcome the limits of both models, as they are somehow complementary. The CGE 
model will provide the macro structure of the economy, while the MS model is providing 
a detailed micro dataset at the individual and household level. This way, the new 
modelling tool resulting from the link of the two models should be able to consider full 
agents’ heterogeneity and general equilibrium effects at the same time. In particular, 
recent literature has focused on the possibility of combining these two types of models in 
order to account simultaneously for structural changes of the economy, general 
equilibrium effects of economic policies, and for their impacts on households’ welfare, 
income distribution and poverty3. This way, the modeller will be able to implement 
                                                 
3 The literature that follows this approach is quite flourishing in recent years: there are, among others, the 
important contributions by Decaluwé et al. (1999a) and (1999b), Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), Agénor 
et al. (2001), Cockburn (2001), Cogneau (2001), Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003), 
Boccanfuso et al. (2003a) and Savard (2003). 
 2   
structural or macroeconomic policies/shocks while taking into account their effects on 
microeconomic behaviour (at the individual or household level). 
This thesis wants to give an assessment and a detailed description of how CGE and MS 
models can be linked together, taking inspiration from the current literature (with a 
special focus concerning the literature on developing countries). 
In particular, one could think of introducing thousands of individuals/households taken 
from a household survey directly into the CGE model. We will call this an integrated 
approach. Another way would be to develop the two models separately, and then link 
them in a layered fashion through a vector of changes in some important variables (prices 
and/or quantities). Of course the main disadvantage or drawback of this approach is that 
it requires much more time and effort in the building of the entire model, as one has to go 
through two completely different modelling techniques and two different databases, the 
national accounts and the household survey. 
But a question arises at this point: in which direction should go the link? Or better, 
should the link be in one direction only (for instance, from the macro onto the micro 
level of analysis), or the feedback effects (from the micro to the macro level) are also 
important for the final general equilibrium results? 
In this work we will make a first attempt in trying to answer to some of these questions, 
and we will compare the three main approaches used in the literature to link CGE and 
MS models: the integrated approach, which uses thousands of households as agents in a 
standard CGE framework; the so called Top-Down approach, which imposes the results 
of a CGE model onto the microsimulation model, and draws from the latter poverty and 
inequality analysis; the Top-Down/Bottom-Up (TD/BU) approach, as it was developed 
by Savard (2003). This approach, after the injection of macroeconomic changes from the 
CGE onto the MS model, tries to take into account also the feedback effects from the 
micro to the macro level of analysis. 
In linking these two types of models we encounter several difficulties, one of which is of 
course the problem of data inconsistency between the two datasets. This problem is 
openly faced by modellers that build integrated models, through the so-called “data 
reconciliation process”, but has not been treated so far in the other two approaches. This 
will be of particular relevance for the TD/BU approach. 
 3 
In general, however, when building such models one has also to take into account other 
possible advantages and drawbacks of the various approaches: for instance, the layered 
approach requires time and effort in the building of the entire model, as one has to go 
through two different modelling techniques and two different databases. On the other 
side, one of the main advantages of the integrated approach is its simplicity and easiness 
of implementation. Its easiness allows what is instead still missing in the framework of a 
layered approach: dynamics. Indeed, while with integrated models dynamics is already 
introduced in a few examples4, one of the main things still missing up to now in a 
layered framework is a dynamic featuring, which in the future will need further effort5. 
 
The work is organized as follows. 
In the first chapter, after an introduction to microsimulation techniques, we will give a 
technical and detailed overview on how to link CGE to microsimulation models, 
describing in detail the practical implementation of the three main approaches cited 
above. 
In the second chapter we investigate further the three approaches, and build three 
models for the same economy to compare and investigate results from the three different 
models. We will go in special detail with the TD/BU approach and draw some 
conclusions on its possible drawbacks. We will also propose an alternative way of taking 
into account feedback effects from the micro to the macro level of analysis. 
Finally, in the last chapter, we will apply the technique to a real economy: we will study 
the effects that the introduction of the Free Trade Agreement of Central America with 
USA will have on poverty and inequality in Nicaragua. For this we have built a CGE-MS 
model for the Nicaraguan economy using a Top-Down approach. We will analyse both 
the macroeconomic effects and the changes in poverty and inequality that will take place 
after the introduction of the Treaty in Nicaragua. 
 
 
                                                 
4 See for instance the integrated dynamic model of Annabi et al. (2005) for Senegal, and the model for 
Philippines developed by Corong (2005). Other information about this approach can be found in Cockburn 
and Decaluwé (2006). 
5 A first attempt in this direction was made by Bibi and Chatti (2006) with their dynamic layered model for 
Tunisia. 
 4   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the pioneering work by Adelman and Robinson (1978) for South Korea and Lysy 
and Taylor (1980) for Brazil1, many CGE models for developing countries combine a 
highly disaggregated representation of the economy within a consistent macroeconomic 
framework and a description of the distribution of income through a small number of 
representative households (RH) meant to represent the main sources of heterogeneity in 
the whole population with respect to the phenomena of the policies under study. Models 
were initially static and rigorously Walrasian. They now often are dynamic (in the sense 
of a sequence of temporary equilibria linked by asset accumulation, or recursively 
dynamic) and often depart from Walrasian assumptions so as to incorporate various 
macro-economic features or “closures” as well as imperfect competition features. 
Several “representative households” are necessary to account for heterogeneity among 
the main sources of household income (or among the changes in income) due to the 
phenomena or the policies being studied. Despite the need for variety, the number of RH 
is generally small in these models, however (usually less than 10). The chosen taxonomy 
and the level of disaggregation depend critically on the questions that the model is 
expected to answer: the household account is to be broken down into a number of 
relatively homogeneous household groups reflecting the socioeconomic characteristics of 
the country or region under consideration. The degree of homogeneity is crucial in the 
design of classifications, especially in a classification of household groups, where one 
would like to identify groups that are relatively homogeneous in terms of income sources 
and levels and expenditure patterns, and that may be able to reproduce the 
socioeconomic and structural stratification observed within the society and the economy 
under study. It is noteworthy that a household classification based on income or 
expenditure brackets does not satisfy any of these requirements – except perhaps the last 
one. Indeed, consider for instance the poorest segment of society (say the bottom decile 
of the income pyramid): it may include very different household heads, such as a landless 
                                                 
1 See also the work by Gunning (1983) for Kenya. Other significant examples are represented by the 
models built in connection with the OECD research program on “Structural Adjustment and Poverty”: 
Thorbecke (1991) for Indonesia, Morrisson (1991) for Morocco and Bourguignon et al. (1991) among 
others. 
 9 
agricultural worker and a urban informal sector worker, and policies aimed at improving 
conditions in the two cases are likely to be very different. 
There is no unique (standard) classification scheme or way of disaggregating the 
household data in a CGE model. The taxonomy used in any given model depends on the 
prevailing country or region specific characteristics and the objectives of the studies 
underlying the building of the model. Major criteria and sub-criteria used in the 
classification and disaggregation of the different household accounts are2: 
a) location (e.g. rural vs. urban); 
b) asset and productive factor ownership (particularly land ownership in the rural 
areas and human capital in urban areas); 
c) characteristics of the head or main earner, such as his/her employment status, 
occupation, branch of industry and educational attainment, skill level, sex, main 
language, race (tribal) kinship3. 
 
For what concerns the degree of heterogeneity among agents, the CGE/RH framework 
sometimes explicitly considers that households within a RH group are heterogeneous in a 
“constant” way. That is, in order to capture within-group inequality, it is often assumed 
that each RH group represents an aggregation of households in which the distribution of 
relative income follows an exogenously fixed statistical law4. However, if households 
within a group are different, why should they be affected in the same way by a policy or 
by a shock? The empirical analyses conducted on household surveys support this doubt: 
the within-group component of observed changes in income distribution generally is at 
least as important as the between-group component of these changes5. Thus, the RH 
                                                 
2 See Decaluwé et al. (1999a). 
3 For an interesting discussion of the importance of an appropriate households’ taxonomy, see Duchin 
(1996). 
4 For early applications of this type of models, see Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson (1982), who specified lognormal within-group distributions with exogenous variances. For a 
survey of CGE models applied to developing countries see Decaluwé and Martens (1988) and Robinson 
(1989). More recent examples of this kind of models can be found in de Janvry et al. (1991), Chia et al. 
(1994), Decaluwé et al. (1999a), Colatei and Round (2000) and Agénor et al. (2001). 
5 After Mookherjee and Shorrocks’ (1982) study of UK, there are now other examples of “within/between” 
decomposition analysis of changes in inequality that indicate that changes in overall inequality are usually 
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approach based on the assumption that relative incomes are constant within household 
groups may be misleading in several circumstances, and this is especially true when 
studying poverty. This argument may be better understood by presenting an example: 
consider a shock which reduces the world price of a specific commodity, say maize; 
under the small country assumption (that is, the country is price-taker on the world 
market), a country exporting this good will see a decrease in its exports and a domestic 
contraction of this sector. After the simulation of the shock with a CGE/RH model of this 
country, suppose that we find a little change in the mean income of a RH group, say 
workers in the agricultural sector; however, in this case, poverty might be increasing by 
much more than suggested by this drop in the income of this group: indeed, in some 
households there may be individuals that have lost their job after the shock, or there may 
be some households that encounter more difficulties to diversify their activity or their 
consumption than others. For these individuals or families, the relative fall in income is 
necessarily larger than for the whole group, and this fall in their income is not 
represented by the slight fall in the mean income of the whole group: the RH approach 
does not allow to catch the effects that a shock or a policy change may have on single 
individuals or households. Suppose moreover that the initial income of these individual 
was low; then poverty may be increasing by much more than what predicted by a simple 
RH model, which is based on the assumption of distribution neutral shocks. 
As it is explained in Savard (2003), another significant drawback in linking the intra-
group distribution change to a statistical law that is completely exogenous is that no 
economic behaviour is considered behind this change in within-group distribution6. 
                                                                                                                                                 
due at least as much to changes in within-group inequality as to changes in the between-group component. 
Among the applications to developing countries, see Ahuja et al. (1997), who applied this decomposition 
analysis to the case of Thailand, and Ferreira and Litchfield (2001) for Brazil. 
6 The intra-group distribution change is usually linked to a theoretical statistical relationship between 
average (μ) and variance (σ2) of the lognormal distribution. Savard (2003) also underlines the fact that the 
average behaviour of a specific group is biased towards the richest in the group. Standard CGE models, 
indeed, use household groupings that take into account the total income and expenditure of each group and 
the behavioural parameters which are generally calibrated at the base year. In most of the models these 
parameters reflect the aggregate and not necessarily the average behaviour. Thus, as the richest of a group 
are endowed with most of the factors, their behaviour will be dominant in the group. Moreover, keeping in 
mind that when doing poverty analysis is very important to consider the behaviour around the poverty line, 
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In order to overcome these problems, recent literature has tried to develop new modelling 
tools which should be able at the same time to account for heterogeneity and for the 
possible general equilibrium effects of the policy reform (or the exogenous shock) under 
study. In view of the fact that most of the available economic models have either a 
microeconomic or a macroeconomic focus7, and they do not address the question 
adequately, recent literature has focused on the possibility of combining two different 
types of models. Since most of the economic policies (structural adjustment programs or 
trade liberalizations, for example) and exogenous shocks commonly analyzed for 
developing countries (such as fluctuations in the world price of raw materials and 
agricultural exports) are often macroeconomic phenomena (or may have, at least, some 
structural effects on the economy), while poverty and inequality are mainly 
microeconomic issues, this approach, which takes into account important micro-macro 
linkages, seems to be the right answer to the problem. In particular, some authors have 
tried to link microsimulation models to CGE models8, in order to account simultaneously 
for structural changes of the economy and general equilibrium effects of economic 
policies, and for their impacts on households’ welfare, income distribution and poverty. 
The literature that follows this approach is quite flourishing in recent years: there are, 
among others, the important contributions by Decaluwé et al. (1999a) and (1999b), 
Cogneau and Robilliard (2000), Agénor et al. (2001), Cockburn (2001), Cogneau (2001), 
Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003), Boccanfuso et al. (2003a) and Savard 
(2003). 
 
In this chapter, after a functional introduction to microsimulation modelling techniques, 
we’ll go into the details of the different approaches used in literature to model the data 
coming from household surveys into a general equilibrium framework: in particular, we 
will analyze, respectively, the integrated approach, the Top-Down or Sequential 
                                                                                                                                                 
nothing really demonstrates that the average of aggregated behaviour will be representative of the 
households around the poverty line. 
7 These models include macro models, microsimulation models, multiplier models and computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. 
8 More generally, this current of the literature develops the use of micro-data drawn from household 
surveys in the context of a general equilibrium setting, which is usually but not necessarily a CGE model.  
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approach and the approach developed by Savard, known also as Top-Down/Bottom-Up 
approach. Finally, in the last section, we will see in detail how to build a behavioural 
microsimulation model, and how to link it to a CGE model. 
 
 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTION TO MICROSIMULATION MODELS 
 
Guy Orcutt is known as the originator of microsimulation as an instrument for economic 
analysis9, but it is only since early 1980s that the use of microsimulation models 
developed, undoubtedly as a consequence of the increasing availability of large and 
detailed datasets on individual agents and the continuous increase in, and falling cost of, 
computing power; in fact, during the last twenty years, this kind of models have been 
increasingly applied in qualitative and quantitative analysis of public policies10. Their 
field of application ranges among the ones included in the broader area of redistribution 
policies: indirect and direct taxation, social security system reforms, etc. 
Microsimulation (MS) models are tools that allow the simulation of the effects of a 
policy on a sample of economic agents (individual, households, firms) at the individual 
level. Usually, MS models are based on two fundamental elements: a micro dataset 
containing the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of a sample of 
individuals or households (household surveys), and the rules of the policies to be 
simulated, and especially their impact on the budget constraint faced by each agent. 
Consider for instance a simple MS model which aims at computing the disposable 
income of a sample of households, given a tax-benefit system; in general, the disposable 
income of household h, which is made up of m individuals at working age, will be 
computed as follows: 
( )τ,,, 0
1
0
hhihih
m
i
hihihh zyLwNTyLwYD ++⋅= ∑
=
, 
                                                 
9 See Orcutt (1957), Orcutt et al. (1961) and Orcutt et al. (1976). 
10 For the history and developments of microsimulation in economic analysis see, among others, Harding 
(1996) and Gupta and Kapur (2000). 
 13 
where wih is the wage rate received by individual i, Lih is individual i’s labour supply,  
is the non-labour income (for example, rent from capital), and NT(·) is the tax-benefit 
system function, or “net tax” rule, which computes the net taxes to be paid given gross 
incomes ( ). Taxes and benefits depend on the characteristics of the household 
represented by the vector z
0
ihy
0, hihih yLw
h (which may contain variables such as the number of 
individuals and the number of kids living in the household, the region/province of 
residence, the number of dependents, etc.), on the labour and non-labour incomes 
received by each agent belonging to that household, while τ stands for the parameters of 
the tax-benefit system (various tax rates, means-testing of benefits, etc.). In order to see 
how this function NT(·) may work in practice, consider a very simple tax-benefit system, 
and a household composed by two adults and a child, in which only one individual (i) 
works, while the other (j) is unemployed; the household receives also an income from a 
capital asset Kh, and a cash transfer from the welfare system (an unemployment benefit 
for the non-working adult, for example): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] jhhhihihhihihh TFDKrLwKrLwYD +−⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−⋅−⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−= δσγδσ 1111 , 
where σ is the social contribution rate, δ is the tax rate on capital income, r is the interest 
rate, γ is the direct income tax rate for the income class to which household h’s income 
level belongs, Dh is the deduction for the presence of two dependents, and TFjh is the 
unemployment benefit received by the non-working individual (transfers from the 
government are supposed to be tax free). It is easy to see that, in this simplified world, a 
reform of the tax-benefit system may influence the disposable income of household h in 
different ways: a reform of the income tax rates or a reform of the deduction system will 
directly affect its disposable income, a reform of the social security contributions will 
influence the labour income, directly or through a change in the labour supply of the 
individuals, and a reform of capital taxation may affect the non-labour income of the 
household, while a reform of the unemployment benefit system will affect the amount of 
transfers received by the household (see Figure 1). 
In the real world, there are many possible measures which may have an influence upon 
the disposable income of the households and individuals in a country, either directly or 
through a change in the economic behaviour of individuals (labour supply, consumption 
behaviour, savings and income allocation, tax evasion, etc.): all these policy and fiscal 
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reforms are thus expected to have an effect on the distribution of income of the 
population under study, and consequently on poverty and inequality indices. The main 
task for which most of MS models are built is in fact that of capturing this expected 
change in income distribution, trying to evaluate it by using the microdata coming from a 
sample survey of the population, enlightening who are the gainers and losers of the 
reform, while computing at the same time what are the costs or the gains of the reform in 
terms of revenue for the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]hh
hi
ihh
hi
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Figure 1 – An Arithmetical Model of a Tax-Benefit System 
 
 
As said before, models simulating the household sector typically begin with a microdata 
file. Such a file may be based upon administrative data (such as tax or social security 
records) or upon a sample survey of the population. In both cases, the microdata usually 
contain thousands of individual or family records, with a list of variables describing the 
demographic, labour force, income and other characteristics of each individual or family. 
These data usually come from a sample of the population; nonetheless, it is possible to 
obtain also the values for the entire population by using “ad hoc” weights, which allow to 
know how many households of the population are represented by each observation in the 
survey. These sampling weights (also known as expansion or raising factors) simply 
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depend on the selection probabilities of each observation in the sample (and, thus, the 
sample design11); they are usually reported in the surveys, so that it is always possible to 
pass from sample to population data. 
Different stages are in general included in sampling methodology: typically, they are 
stratification and sampling. Stratification involves the division of the population into sub-
groups, or strata, from which independent samples are taken (there may be a need to 
adapt these categories according to the local context)12. This ensures that a representative 
sample will be drawn with respect to the stratifiers (i.e. the proportions of units sampled 
from any particular stratum will equal the proportion in the population with that 
characteristic: stratification ensures that proportions of the sample falling into each group 
reflect those of the population). A separate random sample can thus be selected from 
each group. Some adjustments should be done for particularly small or large groups: the 
desired sample size will be determined by the expected variation in the data. The more 
varied the data are, the larger the sample size needs to be to obtain an adequate level of 
accuracy in generalizing the results. Using group sampling will ensure a balanced 
representation of the different household categories. Stratification of a sample can lead to 
substantial improvements in the precision of survey estimates. Optimal precision is 
achieved where the factors used as strata are those that correlate most highly with the 
survey variables13. 
                                                 
11 Sample design is about choosing how many households to include in a survey in order to provide a good 
basis for measuring economic and social phenomena in the whole population. 
12 For example, the 1997-98 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) for Great Britain is a voluntary sample 
survey of private households. The FES sample for Great Britain is a multi-stage stratified random sample 
with clustering. It is drawn from the Small Users file of the Postcode Address File – the Post Office’s list 
of addresses. Postal sectors (ward size) are the primary sample unit. 672 postal sectors are randomly 
selected during the year after being arranged in strata defined by standard regions (subdivided into 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas) and two 1991 Census variables – socio-economic group and 
ownership of cars. See the website of the UK Office for National Statistics www.statistics.gov.uk, and 
some documentation about UK Family Expenditure Surveys at www.data-
archive.ac.uk/findingData/fesTitles.asp
13 For a more detailed treatment of sampling procedures and on how to build a household survey, one can 
turn to the Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) manual, which is specifically designed to guide 
the many collaborators involved in planning surveys through the process of planning and implementing an 
LSMS survey. The manual provides practical information about, among other topics, questionnaire 
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We can make a very simple example in order to clarify this procedure. Suppose that in a 
given country there are 10,000 households from census data, and we have to select a 
representative sample from this population. We can start by stratifying the population 
into different regional areas, say North-East (2300 households from census data, 23% of 
household national population), North-West (1000 households, 10% of the whole 
population), South-East (4000 households, 40%) and South-West (2700 households, 
27%). We can further stratify the population by the sub-division of these regions into 
rural and urban areas, for instance, thus obtaining 8 sub-groups in total. After this 
stratification, we can select a sample from each of these groups (we will draw a 10% 
sample from each sub-group, except for the urban North-Western sub-group, from which 
we take a 30% sample, given the small size of this sub-group with respect to the others). 
In this way, we get a sample of 1024 households (See Table 1). Once we will have the 
data (on income, expenditure, etc.) from the survey corresponding to each household in 
our sample, in order to get the corresponding population values we have to multiply each 
value by the weight corresponding to that representative household. In this case, to get 
these weights we must divide each sample size by the total sample size, and multiply this 
number by the household population. Now, for instance, each household in the first 
group is representative of 351 households in the whole population, each household in the 
second group is representative of 859 population households, and so on (see Table 1 and 
Figure 2). We can thus say that we have a representative sample of the given 
population14. 
The fundamental information contained in the weighting factors is that every family in 
the survey represents a given number of households of the population; only in this case 
we can say that we are dealing with a representative sample survey of the population. 
These particular numbers are usually supplied by the original data providers, and they 
                                                                                                                                                 
formatting and development, sample design, and data management. One can also have a look at the LSMS 
website: www.worldbank.org/lsms. 
14 In a real household survey, however, one has to take into account also the fact that some of the 
households in the selected sample could not be reached, some others will not co-operate, or will not give 
full response to the questionnaire. Obviously, the weights need to be adjusted to take into account also this 
kind of problems. For a complete description of the techniques and full methodology used to build a real 
household survey, see for example the General Household Survey for Great Britain conducted by the 
Office for National Statistics, http://www.statistics.gov.uk
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can be modified by the model builder only to account for possible socio-demographic or 
economic changes occurred since the time of the survey (this procedure is also known as 
reweighting or grossing-up procedure, see below). 
Apart from this, the data frequently require further amendment by central statistical 
agencies or microsimulation modellers before they can be used. For example, this may 
include adjustment for under-reporting or misreporting of income or expenditure, the 
imputation of missing values, and the adjustment of weights for non-response. 
Microsimulation thus involves a set of distinct processes, which include data cleaning 
and validation, imputation of missing data required for particular policy simulations, 
updating and re-weighting the data in order that they represent the desired population as 
closely as possible, applying detailed rule-modelling to simulate different policy regimes, 
and designing methods of presenting the results. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Stratification and Sampling: an Example 
Geographic 
Area (GA) 
Number of 
Households 
(population) 
% w.r.t. 
the 
whole 
pop. 
Region 
Number of 
Households 
(population) 
% w.r.t. 
House-
holds in 
GA 
Sample Sample size 
Group 
sample 
size/Total 
sample 
size 
Weight 
Urban 120 12 % 30 % 36 0.0352 351.56 North-West 1000 10 % 
Rural 880 88 % 10 % 88 0.0859 859.38 
Urban 460 20 % 10 % 46 0.0449 449.22 North-East 2300 23 % 
Rural 1840 80 % 10 % 184 0.1797 1796.88 
Urban 1890 70 % 10 % 189 0.1846 1845.70 South-West 2700 27 % 
Rural 810 30 % 10 % 81 0.0791 791.02 
Urban 2400 60 % 10 % 240 0.2344 2343.75 South-East 4000 40 % 
Rural 1600 40 % 10 % 160 0.1563 1562.50 
Total 10000 100 %  10000   1024 1.0000 10000.00 
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Figure 2 – Stratification and Sampling 
 
 
 
Uprating and reweighting procedures are also known as static “ageing” techniques15; 
they are defined as methods attempting to align the available micro-data with other 
known information (such as changes in population aggregates, age distributions or 
unemployment rates), without modelling the processes that drive these changes (e.g., 
migration, fertility, or economic downturn), which is instead the intention of dynamic 
MS models (for more details on the differences between static and dynamic models see 
sub-section 1.3). There are several reasons why these procedures may be considered as 
necessary before using the data, but the most common one is that tax-benefit models are 
used to analyse the effects of social and fiscal policies in a period t*, while the most 
recent data which are available usually come from some earlier period t. The micro-data 
from some previous period may thus need to be adjusted (“aged”) to approximate the 
                                                 
15 For this part on static data “ageing” techniques and their evaluation, see Immervoll et al. (2005). 
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population in period t*. It is of course possible that, for the purpose of achieving a “good” 
approximation of taxes and benefits payable in period t*, data from period t are already 
sufficiently close to period t* population. But it is useful to ask whether we can improve 
on this to any meaningful extent by further enhancing the degree to which data available 
for modelling describe the target population in period t*. 
In thinking about the correlation between period t data and period t* population, it is 
useful to separate the factors that determine how representative sample St (taken in 
period t) will be of population Pt*. 
One can, for this purpose, look separately at: 
1. the degree to which St is representative of Pt, and 
2. the processes causing Pt to differ from Pt*. 
With regard to the first point, we have already mentioned the fact that each observation 
in the sample represents a certain number of population members in the sense that the 
variable values recorded for a given observation approximate the characteristics of a 
certain fraction of the population. We will denote the group in the population represented 
by observation i in sample St as Gti. The changes in the population (point 2) can then be 
broken down further into: 
2a. Processes altering the average value of a variable in group Gti: given the 
conceptualization of each observation i in the sample as representing Gti, this 
translates into changing the value of the relevant variable of observation i in 
sample St. 
2b. Processes causing the composition of Gti to change. That is, some population 
members who have fitted into group Gti may, due to changes in the population 
structure, be better represented by another group in population Pt* (or may no 
longer be part of the population in time period t* at all). Similarly, group Gt*i may 
encompass population members which were not part of Gti before. 
Each of these factors will be discussed in turn. 
 
2a. Adjusting variable values of individual observations (“uprating”) 
A common reason why we would consider a procedure of “ageing” (that is, an 
adjustment to the original data) as necessary is that our tax-benefit model will be used to 
analyse the effects of a fiscal reform in period t*, while the most recent data that are 
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available come from some earlier period t. For instance, let us suppose that we observe in 
some national statistics referred to period t* that the average value v  of a variable 
observed in a given group Gti has changed between t and t*. Then, for observation i to 
still be representative of Gt*i in period t*, this change will need to be reflected in the 
variable value recorded for that observation. For monetary variables, this can be achieved 
by “uprating” (i.e. inflating or deflating) each value by an appropriate index (such as 
price indices or indices based on income growth) describing how the value of the 
variable, averaged across the population group represented by i, has behaved between t 
and t*. In doing so, it is important to separate changes in the average value of the variable 
averaged across members of Gti from changes in the number of population members with 
certain variable values. To illustrate, let us consider an example. Let us suppose that in 
our sample St, which is representative of population Pt, in region “South” we have a 
certain number of observations and for all of them the registered wage level is zero, with 
the exception of observation i, whose wage level is 100. If we observe in the statistics for 
period t* that the average wage level in this region has raised of 10% and, at the same 
time, the occupational level between t and t* has been stable in that region, then we 
would want the wage of observation i to be “uprated” by the observed change in the 
average wage (+10%), rather than an “uprating” of all the wages earned in region 
“South”. 
Of course, indices capturing the change in variable values separately for each group Gti 
will often not be available. One will, for instance, usually see more than one observation 
with non-zero wages in a given region and if there is only one index of average earnings 
available for the region as a whole, then the same index will need to be applied to all 
wage earners of that region in the sample. In other words, we cannot hope to perfectly 
replicate the distribution of all relevant variable changes occurring between t and t*. 
Moreover, it is often a common choice among MS modellers to assume that the 
distribution of the variables among households remains constant, and therefore they just 
“uprate” average variables by multiplying them by a constant term (such as the inflation 
rate or the real growth rate of income). 
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2b. Adjusting the relative sizes of sub-populations (“re-weighting”) 
“Re-weighting” (that is, altering the “weights” of different observations in the data) can 
be used to align weighted frequencies of subgroups in sample St with external control 
totals (the true number of population members with certain characteristics) related to 
time period t*; that is, the original weights can be forced to correspond to these new 
numbers. While the process of “uprating” discussed above aims at correcting the 
information of observations in sample St, so that they are still approximately 
representative of equivalent population members in Pt*, re-weighting sample St can be 
used to correct for the difference in probabilities of drawing an observation i (which is 
already part of St) if another sample were to be taken of population Pt*. When moving 
from period t to t*, it is possible and, indeed, likely that both the probability of drawing 
observation i and the average values of variables in the group represented by this 
observation will have changed. To exploit all available information, it will generally be 
desirable to use both uprating and re-weighting. 
Clearly, there are many ways in which a sample could be weighted in order to match a 
given set of control totals. How then should the weights be re-computed? Since no exact 
solution exists to the re-weighting problem and since the original weights provided in the 
dataset prior to any re-weighting contain a great deal of information about the 
population, a natural approach is to achieve the control totals by changing the existing 
weights as little as possible. 
Indeed, adding information about the target population by altering the statistical weights 
in a dataset comes at the cost of potentially distorting information that the original 
weights represent. The likelihood of such distortions grows with the number of 
dimensions used for re-weighting as well as with the magnitude of the change along each 
individual dimension. If the size or number of relevant changes becomes very sizable, 
then forcing the data to correspond to the observed values in the target period can 
compromise the representativity along several dimensions. In such a situation, ageing 
techniques do not provide a reliable approximation of the population of interest (clearly, 
large changes will also render the “unadjusted” data non-representative of the target 
population). 
 
 22   
For what concerns the process of validation, it includes a range of internal and external 
checks on the reliability of model inputs, model procedures, and model outputs16: 
- Model inputs: validation of the reliability of the underlying microdata, which could 
involve internal checks such as an assessment of the degree of the estimation and 
imputation in responses to individual questions, or external checks such as the 
comparison of grossed up aggregates or distributions with official data. 
- Model procedures: validation of the reliability of the simulations; this could 
involve internal case-by-case testing of simulated entitlements and liabilities 
against legally correct outcomes, or it could involve external comparisons which 
compare the taxes and benefits simulated for the same individuals and families by 
two models of the same country. 
- Model outputs: the results of the simulations could be validated internally by 
comparison with recorded entitlement or liability taken directly from the microdata, 
or they could be validated externally. This could entail a comparison of the 
simulated aggregates and distributions for actual policy in force with official 
statistics or forecasts; alternatively, validation of model outputs could involve a 
study of the effect of sampling error on the reliability of outputs, or sensitivity 
testing of key assumptions17. 
However, there are several reasons why one should not expect model outputs to match 
exactly estimates from alternative sources. For instance, there may be structural changes 
between the survey year and the modelled year that are not captured by the methods that 
are used to gross up survey respondents to represent the population as a whole in the 
modelled year. There may, for example, be a change in unemployment rates or in 
patterns of households’ expenditures, or structural changes in the volume of some 
income streams. However sophisticated the grossing-up technique that is used, the 
method will be unable to capture all the complexity of structural shifts that occur. Other 
reasons for which model outputs may be in disagreement with other sources may depend 
on the quality and completeness (miscoding and misreporting of information is always 
possible) of collected data, and on how much representative they are. 
                                                 
16 For this part on validation techniques see Redmond et al. (1998), chapter 9. 
17 For a discussion about validating procedures of model outputs, see, among others, Pudney and 
Sutherland (1994) and Lambert et al. (1994). 
 23 
MS models are called behavioural when they include a theoretical model of the 
behavioural response of agents to changes in their budget constraint18: these models 
allow individuals to adjust their behaviour in response to the simulated policy change. 
The behaviours which are most frequently taken into account are consumption and 
labour supply. In order to compute the optimal consumption and labour supply of each 
agent, a model of consumption and labour supply must be estimated (or “calibrated”) and 
incorporated into the microsimulation framework. There is then a choice between the 
popular “reduced form” approach and the more challenging and problematic structural 
approach. The latter requires making assumptions about the functional forms of 
preferences and specifying constraints facing households and individuals carefully, in a 
world where these steps may be arbitrary and difficult. We will focus on all these 
procedures and, more in general, on the setting up of a behavioural MS model in the 
following sub-section. 
MS models that do not include behavioural responses are called arithmetical (or 
accounting) models, because they simply derive in an arithmetical way the disposable 
income and net tax payments of each agent, given the rules for the computation of taxes 
and benefits in the simulated policy: for each household in the database, information on 
income, expenditure and personal and family characteristics are used to perform the 
arithmetic necessary to calculate liability for personal taxes and entitlement to social 
security benefits under a given tax-benefit system (or some other default policy)19. These 
are contrasted with parallel sets of calculations for an alternative regime. From these 
calculations, the distribution of changes in income resulting from the alternative policy 
regime can be established. From the government’s point of view, the sum of these 
changes represents the impact of the alternative policy on revenue. Viewed from the 
                                                 
18 Behavioural responses that may be quite relevant when dealing with redistributional issues are, for 
example, labour supply, savings and household family composition (i.e. marriage, fertility, ...). We will see 
in more detail how to build a behavioural model that allows for labour supply responses in the next sub-
section. 
19 There is an extensive literature on the application of arithmetical MS models to the analysis of reforms 
of tax-benefit systems. Atkinson and Sutherland (1988), Harding (1996), Sutherland (1998) and Gupta and 
Kapur (2000), among others, offer surveys of MS models and their use in Europe and United States. On tax 
incidence and on the incidence of public spending in areas like education or health see for instance Creedy 
(1999) and Demery (2003). 
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perspective of households, instead, it is the impact on the total tax burden, net of social 
security benefits. Throughout all these calculations, no change in behaviour is modelled 
following a policy change: the estimates computed are of the immediate (or “morning 
after”) effect of the change, before individuals, households and the economy adjust in 
response20. Thus, in this kind of models, one takes detailed account of taxes and transfers 
to model household income distribution and consumption, leaving household behaviour 
exogenous. Better said, this kind of models is limited to “first round effects” and 
disregards second round effects due to the behavioural responses of agents. This 
approach is particularly useful for the analysis of the “morning after” effects of a policy 
change; that is, when the individual behaviour is assumed to remain the same as before 
the change. 
For a practical application of a simple arithmetical MS model to a household survey, see 
in particular the section dedicated to the description of the Top-Down approach (the 
equations of the MS model are reported in Table 10, while the description of the model is 
at page 41; one can find instead the household survey on which the model is based in the 
preceding sub-section, Table 2, page 34) in the next paragraph about the linking methods 
of MS and CGE models. 
 
The primary outputs of tax-benefit models are estimates of the revenue impact of a 
policy reform and of the distribution of associated income gains and losses across 
households. 
Arithmetical MS models that are representative of the population allow the revenue and 
distributional impacts to be estimated together, taking full account of the interactions of 
different policy components and, at the same time, considering the range of all possible 
                                                 
20 For a detailed description of an arithmetical tax-benefit model, see for instance POLIMOD, an 
arithmetical MS model for UK, which is described in detail in Redmond et al. (1998). A lot of material 
about this topic can also be found on the website of EUROMOD, a tax-benefit MS model that estimates the 
effects of changes in social and fiscal policies on measures of personal income and household welfare; it is 
an integrated model covering all 15 European Union countries. See: 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emod.htm. Another good description of an arithmetical model is given 
in Oliver and Spadaro (2004), who describe GLADHISPANIA, a MS model for the study of the effects of 
the 1999-2003 Spanish income tax reforms and other hypothetical scenarios based on the adoption of 
proportional tax rates. See also the website: http://www.gladhispania.es
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circumstances in which families find themselves. The simultaneous generation of these 
estimates provides a powerful aid to policy design, allowing the policy maker to consider 
how expenditure aimed at achieving a particular distributional objective is to be paid for, 
or alternatively, how the impact of a measure aimed at raising a particular amount of 
revenue is distributed and how unintended losers might be compensated21. 
However, taking into account behavioural responses may be of great importance for 
poverty incidence analysis, since they may increase or, on the contrary, mitigate the first 
round effects revealed by the accounting approach. The difficulty of course is to identify 
this behavioural response and to understand its determinants properly in order to 
integrate it into the analysis. To have an idea of the possible applications of behavioural 
MS models, consider for example the “conditional cash transfers programs”, a policy 
adopted in several developing countries: it consists of a cash transfer to households 
whose income per capita is below a certain threshold, conditionally on their effective 
keeping to some particular behaviour, such as sending their kids to school or carrying out 
regular visits to health care facilities22. 
 
 
 
2.1. Behavioural Models23
 
As arithmetical models, behavioural MS models rely on micro household databases. 
Nevertheless, they add an important component to the analysis: the point is not only to 
count how much more, or less, everyone is receiving or paying because of a reform in 
his/her budget constraints, but to take into account the behavioural response of the agents 
to this change in the budget constraint. This may be done through the estimation of a 
structural econometric model on the cross-section of households available in the survey 
being used, and/or through the calibration of a behavioural model with some 
                                                 
21 See Redmond et al. (1998). 
22 For an application of this type, see for instance Bourguignon et al. (2003c) with their simulations of the 
Bolsa Escola program in Brazil. To have an idea of the potential of behavioural MS models for the 
evaluation of public policies, see also Labeaga et al. (2005). 
23 The source from which part of this paragraph is taken is Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006). 
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predetermined structure so as to make it consistent with behaviour actually observed in 
the survey, and meant to correspond to the status quo (see below). 
Tax-benefit models with labour supply response are the archetypical example of 
behavioural MS models. Because of the recurring importance placed on labour supply 
responses to tax and benefit reforms24, we will mainly focus our attention on the 
modelling of labour supply behaviour, the understanding of which continues nowadays 
to attract considerable research interest25. Changes in the tax-benefit system in these 
models affect the budget constraint of households. They modify their disposable income 
with unchanged labour supply, but through the corresponding income effects, and also 
through the changes in the after tax price of labour, they also modify labour supply 
decisions. By how much is determined through simulating a model of labour supply 
behaviour and factor. 
The behavioural MS model approach comprises three main steps: specifying the logical 
economic structure of the model being used, estimating or calibrating the model and 
simulating it with alternative reforms of the tax-benefit system. 
There are two main trends in the literature on behavioural models of labour supply: the 
traditional continuous approach pioneered by Hausman (1980 and 1985), and the discrete 
choice approach, developed by Van Soest (1995) and Aaberge et al. (1995). 
 
 
The standard continuous approach 
The logical economic structure is that of the textbook maximizing utility of the 
consumers. An economic agent, i, with characteristics zi chooses his/her volume of 
consumption, ci, and his/her labour supply, Li, so as to maximize his/her preferences 
represented by the utility function u(·) under a budget constraint that incorporates the 
whole tax-benefit system26. Formally, this is represented by: 
                                                 
24 Here we would like to remark the fact that labour supply strongly depends on structural factors and 
institutional features, and not only on individual choices and preferences. 
25 Blundell and MaCurdy (2000) present a detailed state of the art. 
26 For simplicity, we suppose that no savings are possible and all the disposable (after tax) income is spent 
for consumption. 
 27 
( )
( )
0
;;,,..
,;;,
00
≥
++≤
i
iiiiiiiii
iiii
L
zyLLwNTLwycts
zLcuMax
γ
εβ
             (1) 
In the budget constraint, y0i stands for (exogenous) non-labour income, wi for the wage 
rate and NT(·) for the tax-benefit or “net tax” schedule, which represents the way in 
which the tax-benefit system transforms gross income into disposable income. This 
function actually stands for a fairly complex set of rules for the computation of taxes and 
benefits, which depend on the characteristics of the agent zi, his/her non-labour income 
and his/her labour income, wiLi. It may also depend directly on the quantity of labour 
being supplied, as in workfare programs. γ stands for the parameters of the tax-benefit 
system (various tax rates, means-testing of benefits, etc.). Likewise, β and εi are 
coefficients that parameterise preferences, the latter being idiosyncratic. The solution of 
that program yields the following labour supply function: 
( )γεβ ;,;;, 0 iiiii zywFL =  
This function is non-linear. In particular, it is equal to zero in some subset of the space of 
its arguments, i.e. the non-participation solution. 
Suppose now that a sample of agents is observed in some household survey. The problem 
is to estimate the function F(·) above, or, equivalently, the preference parameters, β and 
εi, since all the other individual-specific variables or tax-benefit parameters are actually 
observed. To do so, preference parameters are broken down into a set of coefficients β 
common to all agents, and a set εi that is idiosyncratic. The latter plays the usual role of 
the random term in standard regressions. 
Estimation proceeds as with standard models, minimizing the role of the idiosyncratic 
preference term in explaining cross-sectional differences in labour supply. This leads to a 
set of estimates  for the common preference parameters and βˆ iεˆ  for the idiosyncratic 
preference terms. By definition of the latter, it is true for each observation in the sample 
that: 
( )γεβ ;ˆ,ˆ;;, 0 iiiii zywFL =                 (2) 
It is now possible to simulate alternative tax-benefit systems. This simply requires 
modifying the set of parameters γ. In absence of general equilibrium effects on wages 
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and labour demand, the change in labour supply due to moving to the set of parameters γs 
is given by: 
( ) ( )γεβγεβ ;ˆ,ˆ;;,;ˆ,ˆ;;, 00 iiiisiiiiisi zywFzywFLL −=−  
The change in the disposable income (which, in our case, corresponds to the 
consumption level, as we do not have the possibility of saving, see note 26) may also be 
computed for each agent. It is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )γγ ;;,,;;,, 00 iiiiisiisisiiisiiisi zyLLwNTzyLLwNTLLwCC −+−=− . 
Then, one may also derive changes in any measure of individual welfare. 
Several difficulties in the preceding model must be emphasized. Its estimation generally 
is uneasy. It is highly non-linear because of the non-linearity of the budget constraint and 
possibly its non-convexity due to the tax-benefit schedule, NT(·), and corner solutions at 
Li=0. Functional forms must be chosen for preferences27, which may introduce some 
arbitrariness in the whole procedure. Finally, it may be feared that imposing full 
economic rationality and a functional form for preferences severely restrict the estimates 
that are obtained. 
Moreover, the labour supply model based on the traditional continuous approach has 
been recognized to suffer from several problems. First, it works well with convex budget 
sets (i.e. those generated by progressive taxation) and a two-good application (e.g. ci and 
Li in the individual labour supply application), but it tends to become computationally 
cumbersome when the agents face non-convex budget sets and when more than two 
goods are object to choice (e.g. when the agent is a many-person household). Second, in 
view of the computational problems, the above approach essentially forces the researcher 
to choose relatively simple specifications for the utility function or the labour supply 
                                                 
27 Without specifying a functional form for preferences, we might still be able to characterize the optimal 
solution as a function of wi and y0i: ( )γεβ ;,;;, 0* iiiiNTi zywFL =  and estimate FNT(·). However, FNT(·) 
depends on the current tax-benefit rule NT(·) and therefore it cannot be used to simulate policies that 
introduce a different tax rule, say NT'(·). The problem is that the behavioural function FNT(·) in general 
mixes up preferences and constraints. More generally, the opportunity set might be defined by complicated 
budget and quantity constraints that do not even allow recovering a closed form solution for . What we 
really need is the estimate of the utility function u(c
*
iL
i, Li) itself. Once preferences are estimated, in principle 
we are able to simulate the effect of any policy by solving  Max u(ci, Li) subject to the appropriate 
constraints.  
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functions (see MaCurdy et al., 1990). However, the principal inconvenience of using this 
methodology is that the behavioural restrictions it imposes are too strong, requiring that 
the labour supply function globally satisfies the Slutsky conditions28. As a result, the 
estimation results suffer from a lack of robustness, which reduces their usefulness for 
policy evaluation (see MaCurdy et al., 1990, and MaCurdy, 1992)29. 
Such weaknesses have pushed researchers towards the estimation of total income 
elasticities or the estimation of direct utility functions by a discretisation of the labour 
supply alternatives (Van Soest, 1995, Aaberge et al., 1995, Hoynes, 1996, Keane and 
Moffit, 1998, and Blundell et al., 2000). This second approach has been heavily 
employed in the recent analysis of tax reforms. Since behavioural changes probably 
occur at the corner or kink points of the labour supply function, this method has the 
advantage of capturing them, providing the analyst with an estimation of the elasticity at 
the extensive margin. Moreover, this methodology allows us to avoid the computational 
and analytical difficulties associated with utility maximization under non-linear and non-
convex budget constraints. This is because the budget constraint is now directly modelled 
in the utility function. It also enables to consider fixed costs, simultaneous participation 
and the intensity of work choices, as well as spouses’ joint labour supply decisions30. 
                                                 
28 Computational and statistical consistency of Maximum Likelihood estimation of the model requires 
imposing a priori quasi-convexity of preferences (see Aaberge et al., 2006). The Slutsky equation, which 
gives the scomposition of the price effect (the effect of a change in the price of good k on the demand for 
good l) into substitution and income effect: 
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where h(p, u) is the Hicksian demand function, which is derived from the dual problem of utility 
maximization, i.e. the expenditure minimization problem: {min p·x  s.t. u(x) ≤ ū}, where ū is a given level 
of utility, while x(p, w) is the Marshallian demand function, derived from the utility maximization problem 
(see Note 30), and w > 0 is the wealth level of individual i. The satisfaction of the Slutsky equation 
requires a continuous utility function u(·) representing a locally nonsatiated and strictly convex preference 
relation.  
29 Other problems presented by this approach are the lack of identification of the responses of hours to 
marginal changes in taxes (see, for instance, Van Soest, 1995), and the under-identification of wage effects 
due to misspecification of dynamic components (see MaCurdy, 1992). 
30 An excellent application of behavioural MS based on discrete choice models, which illustrates very well 
the potential of this approach, is that of Blundell et al. (2000), which evaluates the likely effect of the 
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Discrete choice models of labour supply 
Specifications used in recent work consider labour supply as a discrete variable that may 
take only a few alternative values, and evaluate the utility of the agent for each of these 
values and the corresponding disposable income given by the budget constraint. As 
before, the behavioural rule is then simply that agents choose the value that leads to the 
highest level of utility. However, the utility function may be specified in a very general 
way, with practically no restriction. Such a representation is therefore as close as possible 
to what is revealed by the data. 
The approach essentially consists in representing the budget set with a set of discrete 
“points”. Let [0, D] be the (continuous) range of possible values for hours of work Dj. 
Let us pick J points d1, d2, …, ds to represent [0, D]. The utility level attained by 
individual i at point j is ( )jjiji dcU , , where  is obtained through some budget rule such 
as in (1). 
j
ic
Formally, a specification that generalizes what is most often found in the recent tax and 
benefit labour supply literature is the following: 
( ) ( )kikkiiikijijjiiijiji cwzfUcwzfUifdL εβεβ ,;,;,;,; =≥==  for all k ≠ j,  (3) 
where dj is the duration of work in the jth alternative and  the utility associated with 
that alternative,  being the disposable income given by the budget constraint in (1): 
j
iU
j
ic
( )γ;;,, 00 iijjiiiiji zyddwNTLwyc ++= . 
This problem is discretized in the sense that the choice of working hours is supposed to 
be made between few alternatives. This approach is computationally very convenient 
when compared to the continuous one, since it does not require going through 
complicated Kuhn-Tucker conditions involving derivatives of the utility function and of 
the budget constraint. As a consequence, it is not affected by how complex it is the rule 
that defines the budget set or by how many goods are contained in the utility function. 
When the function f(·) is linear with respect to its common preference parameters, βj, 
additive with respect to the idiosyncratic terms, , and when those terms are iid with a jiε
                                                                                                                                                 
introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit (WTFC) in the UK. They estimate, separately, a discrete 
labour supply model for married couples and single parents on a sample of UK households in the Family 
Resources Survey for 1995 and 1996. 
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double exponential distribution, this model is the standard multinomial logit. It may also 
be noted that it encompasses the initial model (1). It is sufficient to make the following 
substitution: 
( ) ( )jijijjijijjiii zdcucwzf εβεβ ,;;,,;,; = .              (4) 
This specification, which involves restrictions across the various duration alternatives, is 
actually the one that is most often used. The idea is that there generally are commonly 
agreed durations of work in the labour market – full-time, ¾ full-time, half-time, etc. – so 
that employees have indeed a limited finite set of options, including the possibility not to 
work at all. Thus, the set of alternatives (j = 1, 2, …, J) now corresponds to J work 
durations or to J combinations of spouses’ labour supplies in the case of joint decisions 
by a couple31. 
Within the literature adopting this approach there are however two potentially important 
issues. A first issue concerns the procedure by which the discrete alternatives are chosen. 
For example, Van Soest (1995) and Blundell et al. (2000) choose (non probabilistically) 
a set of fixed points identical for every individual. This is by far the most widely adopted 
method. By contrast, Aaberge et al. (1995) adopt a sampling procedure and also assume 
that the choice set may differ across the households. 
A second issue concerns the availability of the alternatives. Most authors assume all the 
values of hours-of-work in [0, D] are equally available. At the other extreme, some 
authors assume only two or three alternatives (e.g. non-participation, part-time and full-
time) are available for everyone. Aaberge et al. (1995) assume instead that not all the 
hour opportunities in [0, D]  are equally available to everyone; they specify a probability 
density function of opportunities for each individual and the discrete choice set used in 
the estimation is built by sampling from that individual-specific density function32. 
 
Even under its more general form, the preceding specification of discrete choice models 
might be still found to be restrictive because it relies on some utility maximizing 
assumption. Two remarks are important at this respect. First, it must be clear that ex-ante 
incidence analysis of tax-benefit systems cannot dispense with such a basic assumption: 
                                                 
31 For an extensive discussion of these specifications, see Bargain (2005). 
32 For more details on the implications of alternative methods of representing the choice set within the 
discrete choice approach, see Aaberge et al. (2006). 
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the ex-ante nature of the analysis requires some assumption to be made about the way 
agents choose between alternatives. The assumption that agents maximize some criterion 
defined in the most flexible way across alternatives is not really restrictive. Second, it 
must be clear that, if no restriction is imposed across alternatives, then the utility 
maximizing assumption is compatible with the most flexible representation of the way in 
which labour supply choices observed in a survey are related to individual 
characteristics, including the wage rate and the disposable income defined by the tax-
benefit system, NT(·). 
One important thing is that model (3) fits the data as closely as possible: the only 
restriction with respect to that objective in the general expression (3) is the assumption 
that the utility associated with each alternative depends on the wage rate and on the non-
labour income of an individual only through , that is the disposable income given by 
the budget constraint and the tax-benefit schedule, NT(·)
j
ic
33. The economic structure of 
this model thus lies essentially in the way in which the income effect is specified. If it 
were not for that property, it would be simply be a reduced form model aimed at fitting 
the data as well as possible. 
The recent literature on tax policy analysis relies heavily on discrete choice modelling 
that permits escaping the computational and analytical difficulties linked to utility 
maximization in a continuous setting. Discrete models still rely on an explicit 
parameterization of consumption-leisure preferences. Yet, reducing maximization to 
choosing the optimal alternative among a discrete set of possibilities considerably 
simplifies the problem and allows to rather easily account for the nonconvexities implied 
by actual tax-benefit systems or by fixed costs of work. In addition, it simultaneously 
explains participation decision and choice in work hours and enables joint labour supply 
decisions of spouses to be dealt with in a straightforward way. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 It is also necessary to check that utility is monotonically increasing with disposable income for this 
general specification to make any sense. 
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Conclusions about the behavioural approach 
The role of the idiosyncratic terms, iεˆ  or  in the whole approach must not be 
downplayed: they represent the unobserved heterogeneity of agents’ labour supply 
behaviour. Thus, they may be responsible for some heterogeneity in response to a reform 
of taxes and benefits. It may be seen in (4) that agents who are otherwise identical might 
react differently to a change in disposable incomes, despite the fact that these changes are 
the same for all of them. For this, it is sufficient for the idiosyncratic terms, , to be 
different enough. 
j
iεˆ
j
iεˆ
Estimates of the idiosyncratic terms result directly from the econometric estimation of 
the common preference parameters,  in the continuous specification (2) or  in the 
discrete model (3). These are standard regression residuals in the former case and so-
called “pseudo-residuals” in the latter. However, one may also opt for a “calibration” 
rather than an econometric estimation approach. With the former, some of the 
coefficients are not estimated but given arbitrary values deemed reasonable by the 
analyst. Then, as in the standard estimation procedure, estimates of the idiosyncratic 
terms are obtained by imposing that predicted choices, under the status quo, coincide 
with actual choices. 
βˆ jβˆ
It is important to emphasize that there is some ambiguity about who the “agents” behind 
the standard labour supply model (1) should be. Traditionally, the literature considers 
individual agents, even though the welfare implications of the analysis concern 
households. Extending the model to households requires considering simultaneously the 
labour supply decision of all members at working age. This makes the analysis more 
complex. It becomes practically intractable with the continuous representation (see, for 
instance, Hausman and Ruud, 1994) but only lengthens computation time with the 
discrete approach. 
Applications of the preceding models now are numerous. They are surveyed in Blundell 
and MaCurdy (2000) and in Creedy and Duncan (2002a). The discrete approach 
underlined above is best illustrated by Van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996) or Keane and 
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Moffit (1998)34. An application of the “calibration” approach may be found in Spadaro 
(2005). 
 
In addition to labour supply and consumption patterns35, there are other dimensions of 
household behaviour mattering from a welfare point of view and that may be affected by 
tax-benefit systems. Oportunidades in Mexico36, Bolsa Familia in Brazil37 and similar 
“conditional cash transfer programs” in several other countries, offer a clear example of 
policies in developing countries that can be evaluated ex ante by behavioural 
microsimulation models. 
However, some limitations of the behavioural approach to MS modelling must be 
stressed. First, it has to be recognized that this approach is difficult to implement because 
it generally requires the estimation of an original behavioural model that fits the policy to 
be evaluated or designed, and of course the corresponding micro data. Because of this, it 
is unlikely that an analysis conducted in a given country for a particular policy can be 
applied without substantial modification to another country or in the same country to 
another type of policy. The methodological investment behind this approach may thus be 
important. This justifies applying first a pure arithmetical MS approach or a simpler 
behavioural model based on calibration. Second, the fact that the behavioural approach 
relies necessarily on a structural model that requires some minimal set of assumptions is 
to be emphasized. In general, there is no way these assumptions may be tested. In the 
labour supply model with a discrete choice representation, the basic assumption is that 
wage and non-labour income variables matter for occupational decisions only through 
the net disposable income they command, as given by the tax-benefit system. On the 
contrary, a reduced form model would be based independently on wage and non-labour 
income. Econometrically, the difference may be tenuous, but the implications in terms of 
                                                 
34 An interesting example of discrete choice models of labour supply applied to the Spanish tax reforms 
can also be found in Labeaga et al. (2005). In particular, it can be of great interest the comparison between 
the results obtained from an arithmetical model such as GLADHISPANIA (see note 19), and those from a 
behavioural model applied to the same country and simulating a similar scenario. 
35 See Symons and Warren (1996). 
36 For more detailed information, see the website of the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI): http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm
37 See Bourguignon et al. (2003c). 
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microsimulation results of specific policies may be huge. Finally, the strongest 
assumption is that cross-sectional income effects, as estimated on the basis of a standard 
household survey, coincide with the income effects that will be produced by the program 
or the reforms under study. In other words, time income effects for a given agent are 
assumed to coincide with observed cross-sectional income differences. Here again, this is 
an hypothesis that is hard to test, and yet absolutely necessary for ex-ante analysis: 
nothing is possible without it. The only test one can think of would be to combine ex-
ante and ex-post analysis: coincidence between the results obtained in the two 
evaluations of a given program would support the assumption that cross-sectional and 
time individual specific income effects are identical38. 
Some other general issues about the modelling of behavioural responses may be taken 
into account. First of all, it is important to have in mind the fact that modelling human 
behaviour is extraordinary difficult: there are too many dimensions in which rationality 
may exist, too many interrelated factors involved for the task to be straightforward. Nor 
is it clear that the effort involved is justified by an improvement in reliability39. 
Furthermore, the advantages of transparency should not be forgotten. The greater the 
choice of inputs in the form of estimates of behavioural effects, the larger the scope for 
manipulation of model results. 
 
Because of some possibly strong assumptions there unavoidably is some uncertainty 
about the prediction that comes out of ex-ante incidence analysis based on behavioural 
MS models. This being said, such a tool is absolutely necessary in order to reflect on the 
optimal design of policies that are most likely to generate strong behavioural responses. 
However, modelling the labour-supply response to policy changes within a model that 
only addresses the household sector raises the question of the supply of jobs and how this 
is affected, in the first place by the policy change and in the second place by the shift in 
labour supply. Similar problems arise in the detailed modelling of other household 
                                                 
38 Rather satisfactory results have been obtained in that direction by Todd and Wolpin (2002) and 
Attanasio et al. (2003). 
39 For example, Pudney and Sutherland (1996) show that incorporating a typical simulation of female 
labour supply into POLIMOD, an arithmetical microsimulation model for UK (see Redmond et al., 1998), 
can greatly increase the uncertainty with which some of POLIMOD’s estimates are made. 
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responses to policy changes. Modelling the full or equilibrium effect of any policy 
change requires a model of the whole economy. 
 
 
Behavioural MS models and applied optimal redistribution theory 
Including behavioural response in a MS framework allows for an explicit analysis of the 
equity-efficiency trade-off in the spirit of standard optimal redistribution analysis. In 
arithmetical models, that analysis could be performed only in a very indirect way, for 
instance comparing social welfare indicators and the distribution of marginal effective 
rates across alternative tax-benefit systems, the latter being taken as an indicator of the 
disincentives and distortions caused by these systems. A more rigorous treatment can be 
used once a behavioural model has been specified. This is discussed below in the case 
where the behaviour of interest is labour supply. 
The specification of labour supply behaviour implicitly refers to preferences represented 
by some utility function, as in model (1) above. With the same notations, let V(wi, y0i; zi; 
β, εi; γ) be the corresponding indirect utility function for individual i40. The social 
welfare function corresponding to a tax-benefit system with parameters γ may then be 
defined as: 
( )[ ]∑
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=
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where n is the number of agents in the population and G[·] is the social valuation of 
individual welfare. G[·] is an increasing and concave function, its concavity being an 
indicator of the level of aversion towards inequality of the redistribution authority. 
Following a methodology proposed by King (1983), it is often convenient to replace the 
indirect utility function V(·) by a money metric, ye, defined as the non-labour income that 
must be given to the agent in some benchmark situation to raise his/her utility to the level 
actually achieved with a given policy. More precisely, one may use as a benchmark the 
                                                 
40 Given the utility maximization problem budget constraint for individual i, under his/her budget 
constraint, as: {Max u(x)  s.t. p⋅x ≤ w}, where w > 0 is the wealth level of individual i and p > 0 the vector 
of good prices, the solution to this problem is the Marshallian demand function x(p,w), which is a function 
of prices and wealth level. For each (p,w)>0, the utility value of the problem is denoted v(p,w) ∈ℜ, and it 
is equal to u(x*) for any x* ∈ x(p,w). The function v(p, w) is called the indirect utility function. 
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case where the individual does not work because his/her productivity is too low, say 
zero, and the tax-benefit system is defined by the set of parameters γ0. Let Vi = V(wi, y0i; 
zi; β, εi; γ) be the utility actually achieved by individual i when the parameters of the tax-
benefit system are γ. Then, a money metric ye(Vi) of Vi using the tax-benefit system γ0 
and the case  wi = 0  as a benchmark, is given by the solution to the equation: 
[ ] iiiie VzVyV =0;,;);(,0 γεβ .                (5) 
The social welfare function may then be defined on the money metric of utility, rather 
than on the utilities themselves: 
( )[ ]{ }∑
=
Γ=
n
i
iiiie zywVySWF
1
0 ;,;;,)( γεβγ , 
where Γ(·) may now be given the usual interpretation of the social utility of individual 
“income”. The obvious advantage of that transformation of the initial expression of 
social welfare is that it does not depend any more on the cardinalisation of the utility 
function used to represent individual preferences. 
Within such a framework, it is possible to perform comparative social evaluation of 
alternative redistribution policies, as summarized by sets of parameters γA and γB. This 
only requires being able to compute the indirect utility functions for each individual i in 
the population, inverting it as in (5) thanks to some numerical algorithm, and evaluating 
the social welfare function associated to each system. 
Behavioural MS models and the computation of social welfare according to the equations 
above make possible some simple application of the optimal taxation literature. The 
simplest application consists of comparing two tax-benefit systems, as characterized for 
instance by two sets of parameters, γA and γB, and to determine which system leads to the 
highest level of social welfare. Of course, the comparison makes sense only if the budget 
of the redistribution authority is the same in the two systems, that is if tax receipts net of 
transfers are the same with γA and γB 41. This corresponds to the standard “government 
budget constraint” in optimal taxation models. 
A very similar type of application consists of investigating the effects of modifying some 
subset of the parameters, γ, of a tax-benefit system and to see whether this improves the 
                                                 
41 An example of this approach is provided by Spadaro (2005), where the 1995 French and British tax-
benefit systems are micro-simulated respectively on samples of French and UK households in order to find 
which system is the “best” for a given level of social aversion to inequality and for each population. 
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social welfare function, allowing, of course, for constant government budget. If this 
exercise is repeated for a broad enough set of alternative definitions of the social welfare 
function, this is equivalent to investigating “Pareto-improving” reforms of the initial tax-
benefit system42. 
 
 
 
2.2. Static vs Dynamic Models 
 
The data on which MS models usually rely on are based upon administrative data or 
upon a sample survey of the population. In both cases, the microdata usually contain 
thousands of individual or family records, with a host of variables describing the 
demographic, labour force, income and other characteristics of each individual or family. 
As a consequence of the fact that there is frequently a lag of several years between the 
collection of microdata and its public release by an agency, the data have to be “aged” to 
simulate the impact of current (or future) government policy. Whether the data are aged 
“statically” or “dynamically” is a major difference between the various types of MS 
models43. 
In a static framework, the size and demographic characteristics of the population are 
fixed; these models are most frequently used to provide estimates of the immediate 
distributional impact of policy changes. On the other hand, dynamic settings consider in 
an endogenous way the demographic phenomena that affect the original population, such 
as changes in the mortality and fertility rates, in the intertemporal consumption 
allocation, in retirement or in the time taken out for education44. 
The ageing in static MS models involves two basic steps: reweighting and uprating. The 
first one, sometimes also called grossing-up, as outlined previously, implies changing the 
weight attached to each individual record in the microdata, to reflect economic and social 
change since the data were collected. For example, when a survey was originally 
                                                 
42 Ahmad and Stern (1984) have pioneered this type of application of MS models in the case of indirect 
taxation. 
43 See the introductory chapter to Harding’s (1996) book on MS. 
44 For a detailed literature review on dynamic MS modelling see O’Donoghue (2001). 
 39 
conducted, the central statistical agency might have decided that there were 400 people 
in a particular country with similar characteristics to the first person on a particular 
microdata file. Four years later, due to an increase in, say, unemployment or the 
incidence of sole parenthood, more recent data might suggest that there are now 450 
people with similar characteristics to the first person in the microdata file. The weight of 
the first person would thus be increased to reflect this, while the weights of other records 
in the file might be decreased. Reweighting has typically been used to age sample 
surveys by a few years, in order to bring them up to date, but in general they have not 
been used for exploring some decades into the future. 
The principal aim of the other key technique, uprating, is instead to adjust monetary 
values within the original microdata to account for estimated movements since the time 
of the survey. For example, earnings or rent paid are typically increased to account for 
growth since the survey, although there are different possible approaches of uprating 
procedures. 
After these two steps, static modellers typically impute the receipt of social security and 
other benefits and/or income tax or other liabilities, by applying the rules for eligibility or 
liability to each of the microunits. At this point, a baseline data file has been generated; 
most static models allow then the analyst to vary these rules, and produce output showing 
the gains or losses, and the cost to revenues and the government budget from the policy 
change. In this case we have an arithmetical or accounting model as described before; 
when instead the modeller attempts to simulate the changes in the behaviour of the 
individuals directly affected by a policy shock (for example, by allowing the labour 
supply and consumption patterns to vary in response to a tax change), we have a 
behavioural model. 
The time dimension of MS models depends on the object of the analysis and the kind of 
behavioural response that is incorporated in the model. For instance, evaluating the 
effects of a reform of the income tax that would modify the treatment of children will 
have little effects on household composition in the short-run; however, long-run effects 
require simulating the impact on fertility decisions of the tax reform, and a dynamic 
framework may then become necessary. Likewise, changes in the parameters of the tax-
benefit system that affect intertemporal consumption allocation, retirement, training, 
schooling, etc., must be analysed with dynamic MS models rather than static models. 
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Dynamic MS models applied to economics were first introduced in the United States at 
the end of the 1960’s. Since the 1980’s, they have been rapidly developing due to the 
increase in computational capabilities and to the availability of longitudinal data (or 
“panel data”). However, such data frequently are not easily accessible and, moreover, 
they necessarily are historically dated and consequently may not be of very much 
relevance for simulating the forward-looking effects of a change in policy. Rather than 
relying on actual panel data, thus, dynamic MS models often start from the same cross-
section sample surveys as static models. However, the individuals within the original 
microdata are then progressively moved forward through time by making major life 
events – such as death, marriage, divorce, fertility, education, labour force participation, 
etc. – happen to each individual according to the probabilities of such events happening 
to real people within a particular country. In such a way, the characteristics of each 
individual are recalculated for each time period. Transition probabilities themselves are 
obtained from different sources – for example from comprehensive longitudinal or panel 
surveys which would allow one to set such probabilities with some confidence; they are 
assumed to be constant45, so that the society is supposed to be in some kind of steady 
state, and they are supposed to be independent of the policy being analyzed. Thus, this 
kind of models age each person in the microdata file from one year to the next by 
probabilistically deciding whether or not that person will get married, get divorced, have 
a child, drop out of school, get a job, change jobs, become unemployed, retire, or die. 
There are two major types of dynamic MS models. Dynamic population models involve 
ageing a sample of an entire population, and typically begin with a cross-section sample 
survey for a particular point in time. Such dynamic models have been used for different 
purposes, such as the analysis of retirement incomes, future health status, the long-term 
impact of social security amendments, and the lifetime redistributive impact of the social 
security system. 
Dynamic cohort models use exactly the same type of ageing procedures, but usually age 
only one cohort rather than the many cohorts represented in an entire population. 
Typically, one cohort is aged from birth to death, so that the entire lifecycle is simulated. 
                                                 
45 In a dynamic behavioural MS model, transition probabilities should partly become endogenous and 
reactive to the intertemporal budget constraint faced by agents. Browning et al. (1999) and Blundell and 
MaCurdy (2000) contain an excellent discussion about these problems. 
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For some applications, such models are more cost-efficient than ageing an entire 
population in terms of computational costs. Such models have been used to analyse 
lifetime income redistribution, lifetime rates of return to education, and repayment 
patterns for student income-contingent loans46. 
 
 
 
2.3. Conclusions 
 
One of the peculiarities of MS models is that they allow to identify precisely who are the 
gainers and losers of a reform, as they provide information on the way every individual 
or household in a sample is affected by the reform. However, in order to obtain some 
significant information at the policy level, the changes in disposable income due to the 
reform are usually given for groups, which are derived from the aggregation of 
individuals or households according to their socio-demographic characteristics. Most 
models also provide changes in several welfare indicators computed on the whole 
population: these include, among others, the mean disposable income per adult 
equivalent, a number of inequality indices (Gini, Theil and Atkinson’s measures), several 
poverty indicators (FGT indices47, for instance), and the application of relative or 
absolute Lorenz dominance criteria48. 
The importance and usefulness of microsimulation techniques in the analysis of public 
policies come essentially from two aspects: first of all, microsimulation models allow the 
explicit accounting for the heterogeneity of economic agents as they are observed in 
micro-data sets; the second aspect concerns the possibility of accurately evaluating the 
aggregate financial cost/benefit of a reform: indeed, the results obtained with a MS 
model at the level of individual agents can be aggregated at the macro level allowing the 
analyst to evaluate the effect of the policy on the government budget constraint. Because 
                                                 
46 For instance, Baldini (1997) analyses the redistributive impact of the Italian tax-benefit system over the 
life cycle utilizing a dynamic cohort model. 
47 It’s the commonly used Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of indices for the measurement of poverty. 
See Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). 
48 For a complete survey on welfare dominance theory, see Lambert (1993). 
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of these strong advantages over the representative agent approach, and also because of 
continuing progresses in data availability and computing facility, the microsimulation 
approach to economic policy analysis is bound to intensify and to deepen in next future. 
One of the principal limits of MS models is that they are usually partial equilibrium 
models with a particular focus on the household side of the economy: the explanatory 
power of MS models generally ends with the determination of changes to disposable 
income. They do not simulate the response of the production side of the economy and 
further economic activity thereby generated, missing out a significant part of the 
economic process: the possible general equilibrium effects of a policy reform. In 
particular, when dealing with substantial policy changes, it is essential to take into 
account their macroeconomic effects because they are likely to influence the 
microeconomic outcomes49. 
This is one of the reasons why, in last years, a growing group of works is focusing on the 
introduction of heterogeneous consumers and workers, whose characteristics are 
specified by reference to micro data (and especially to household surveys), in general 
equilibrium models. 
 
 
 
 
3. LINKING MICROSIMULATION AND CGE MODELS50
 
The idea of linking the two approaches appeared for the first time in the work by Dervis, 
de Melo and Robinson (1982). Nonetheless, their idea had to wait until the end of the 
1990s to see its first realizations by Decaluwé et al. (1999b) and Cogneau (1999). It’s 
only from then on that the literature on this subject has been flourishing51. The aim of 
                                                 
49 For example, consider the case of a reform of the tax system which generates large enough labour supply 
effects: then, changes in the structure of wages and prices may be expected to take place. 
50 Parts of this paragraph draw on Savard (2003) and on Bourguignon et al. (2003b). 
51 See for instance Bourguignon et al. (2003b) with their model for Indonesia, Cogneau and Robilliard 
(2004) who built a model for Madagascar, and, among the most recent works, see Hérault (2005) with a 
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combining these models is to exploit the advantages of CGE and MS models and to 
offset their main drawbacks, which are essentially the limitations arising from the 
representative household assumptions for CGE models and the lack of general 
equilibrium effects for MS models. The existing literature on this subject has followed 
different ways in the attempt of linking the two types of models52. We present an 
analysis of the advantages and drawbacks of the various approaches that are nowadays 
implemented in the literature. The main advantages of all the approaches, compared to 
the RH approach, are that they allow for intra-group distribution analysis and that it is 
not necessary to adopt any prior grouping of households or individuals. This way, all the 
approaches leave the modeller free from pre-selecting households grouping or 
aggregation, and thus able to investigate the sensitivity of results to different policy 
reforms. 
 
 
 
3.1. The Integrated Approach 
 
The first and most immediate possibility of linking CGE and MS models consists in 
moving from representative to “real” households within the CGE approach: it suffices to 
replace the small number of RHs by the full sample in the household survey in order to 
capture the heterogeneity of households’ characteristics53. With such a model, one can 
explore how household heterogeneity combines with market mechanisms to produce 
more or less inequality in economic welfare as a consequence of shocks or policy 
changes. With the fast development of computing efficiency over the last few years, 
                                                                                                                                                 
study on South Africa, Cororaton and Cockburn (2005) on Philippines, and Chitiga et al. (2005) on 
Zimbabwe. 
52 See Savard (2003 and 2004), Davies (2004) and Cororaton and Cockburn (2005) for a more extensive 
survey of the different approaches. 
53 The first attempt in this direction was made by Decaluwé et al. (1999b). Among the models following 
this approach there are the works by Cockburn (2001) for Nepal, by Cogneau and Robilliard (2001) for 
Malagasy economy, by Boccanfuso et al. (2003a) for Senegal, and the more recent work by Cororaton and 
Cockburn (2005), who studied the case of Philippine economy. 
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these so-called integrated CGE-MS models can incorporate as many households as found 
in household surveys. The logic according to which this approach of linking a household 
survey with a CGE model does work is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Integrated CGE-MS Models 
 
 
The main disadvantages of this approach are the limits it imposes in terms of 
microeconomic behaviour54 and the fact that the size of the model can quickly become 
problematic, thus making the data reconciliation process relatively difficult. Indeed, a 
procedure for reconciling household survey data (incomes and expenditures) and their 
adjustment with the social accounting matrix (SAM) must be adopted to balance out both 
accounts. The literature on data reconciliation offers different alternatives. One may keep 
the structure of the SAM and adjust the household survey. This method has the 
advantage to save the structure of the economy but it is likely to change the structure of 
income and expenditure in the household survey. The other alternative is to adjust the 
SAM to meet the totals of the household survey, loosing in this way some information 
                                                 
54 Certain types of equations that are commonly included in a behavioural model, and especially switching 
regime equations, are not easily modelled within standard CGE modelling softwares (to this regard, see 
Savard’s discussion about the limits and advantages of the various approaches of linking, 2003), so that 
CGE-MS models that follow the fully integrated approach are not always able to capture the behavioural 
responses of the agents to the policy reforms that are implemented. 
• Firms 
• Representative Households 
• Government 
• Rest of the World 
CGE model Real Households 
observed in the survey 
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contained in the structure of national accounts55. Another alternative may be that of using 
an intermediate approach. For example, one may keep the initial structure of 
consumption from the household survey and adjust the corresponding accounts in the 
SAM, and with regards to income one can adjust the household survey to meet the 
national data based on the SAM56. Whatever the method used, however, it is clearly best 
to adjust least those estimates in which researchers have greatest confidence. 
After these changes in the initial SAM, one has also the problem of re-balancing it (row 
totals must be equal to column totals). In order to do this, one can use a SAM balancing 
program designed for this purpose. These programs can be based on different principles, 
such as on the “Row and Sum”, or RAS, method (see Bacharach, 1971), on a least 
squares minimization principle, known also as Stone-Byron method57, or on the cross-
entropy approach proposed by Robinson et al. (2001) and Robilliard and Robinson 
(2003). 
A practical example may be useful to understand better the problem of data 
reconciliation. We will consider a very simple survey with a sample of five households, 
who are supposed to be representative of the whole population. Of course, this is only a 
simplified example; household surveys are usually made up of samples containing 
thousands of observations. Moreover, as this is a simplified example, we do not consider 
the procedure of stratification which is normally used to draw a sample (this procedure is 
anyway described in detail in section 2). The population is composed of 1000 families, in 
which live 2500 adults and 2900 children as a whole. The household survey is reported 
in Table 2. The economy considered here is a very simple one: households’ income is 
obtained by the employment of two factors, labour and capital, plus some public 
transfers, and the only tax levied by government is a direct income tax; the monetary data 
may be, for instance, in ten thousands of a given monetary unit. Now, in order to carry 
the micro-data (which are referred to a single household) forward to population data, we 
have to use an equivalence scale. Indeed, it is obvious that a family composed of one 
                                                 
55 The first alternative of modifying the structure of the household survey may be preferred to the latter in 
some cases, due to the fact that one will often find some under or over reporting for items in the household 
surveys. 
56 See for example Annabi et al. (2005). 
57 See Stone (1977) and Byron (1978). 
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individual who perceives an income of one thousand monetary units has not the same 
purchasing power as could have a family receiving the same income with four children 
dependent. One solution could be that of dividing the household income by the number 
of family members. However, one should also consider the fact that some scale 
economies are likely to arise when people live in the same house (for instance, the 
electricity consumed by a two-members family is not double of that consumed by one 
individual), and in special way when there are some children living in the family (in the 
common meaning, children are considered to consume less than what can spend an 
adult). There are different measures one can adopt. We have chosen the following 
equivalence scale: 
ES = 1 + 0.7· (Adults − 1) + 0.5·Children 
Thus, given our population, we can build an “average” family with 2.5 adults and 2.9 
children: 
ES = 1 + 0.7· (2.5 − 1) + 0.5·(2.9) = 3.5 Adult Equivalents 
Thus, in our economy there are in total 3500 adult equivalents. We can now compute the 
sample weights ωh for each of the families in the survey: after having calculated the 
number of adult equivalents for each household (for example, in H1 there are 2.2 adult 
equivalents), it is sufficient to divide it by the total number of adult equivalents of our 
representative sample (15.2). The results are reported in Table 3 below. Now, we know 
that the adult equivalents of the first household in the survey, H1, represent the 14.47 % 
of all the adult equivalents in the population, the 22.37 % of population adult equivalents 
are represented by the adult equivalents in the second family of the sample, H2, and so 
on. This way, by multiplying these weights by the total number of adult equivalents in 
the population, we obtain the number of population adult equivalents living in that type 
of representative household (H1, H2, etc.). Thus, after having computed the per-capita per 
adult equivalent values of the variables in the survey (for this, it is sufficient to divide 
income, consumption expenditure, labour and capital income, public transfers, etc. of 
each household in the survey by the corresponding number of sample adult equivalents; 
see Table 4), and multiplying them by the number of population adult equivalents, we 
can find the population values corresponding to each household type. The results for our 
sample are reported in Table 5. 
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Table 2 – Household Survey, an Example 
 CE1 CE2 S Y LY KY TF TY 
H1 0.4343 0.7817 -  1.2160 0.5646 0.4343 0.2171 - 
H2 1.0423 1.0857 0.0751  2.5623 1.3029 1.1726 0.0869 0.3592 
H3 0.8686 1.1726 0.0560 2.3886 1.1726 1.0857 0.1303 0.3348 
H4 1.3029 2.1714 0.8056  5.8629 2.1714 3.6914 - 1.5830 
H5 1.7371 2.1714 0.4095 5.2983 3.0400 2.2583 - 0.9802 
 
CEi: consumption expenditure for commodity i; S: savings; Y: income; LY: labour income; KY: 
income from capital; TF: transfers received from government; TY: amount of income taxes paid to 
government (direct taxes). 
 
 
Table 3 – Adult Equivalents and Sample Weights 
 
Number 
of 
Adults 
Number 
of 
Children
Sample 
Adult 
Equivalents 
Sample 
Weights (ω)
Population 
Adult 
Equivalents 
H1 2 1 2.2 14.474% 506.579 
H2 3 2 3.4 22.368% 782.895 
H3 1 3 2.5 16.447% 575.658 
H4 2 3 3.2 21.053% 736.842 
H5 3 3 3.9 25.658% 898.026 
Total 11 12 15.2 100.000% 3500.000 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Per-capita Per Adult Equivalent Values 
 CE1 CE2 S Y LY KY TF TY 
H1 0.1974 0.3553 - 0.5527 0.2566 0.1974 0.0987 - 
H2 0.3066 0.3193 0.0221 0.7536 0.3832 0.3449 0.0255 0.1056 
H3 0.3474 0.4690 0.0224 0.9554 0.4690 0.4343 0.0521 0.1339 
H4 0.4071 0.6786 0.2518 1.8321 0.6786 1.1536 - 0.4947 
H5 0.4454 0.5568 0.1050 1.3585 0.7795 0.5790 - 0.2513 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Weighted (Population Values) Household Survey 
 CBUD CE1 CE2 S YD Y LY KY TF TY ty
H1 280 100 180 0.0 280.0 280 130 100 50 0.0 0
H2 490 240 250 17.3 507.3 590 300 270 20 82.7 14.0%
H3 470 200 270 12.9 472.9 550 270 250 30 77.1 14.0%
H4 800 300 500 185.5 985.5 1350 500 850 0 364.5 27.0%
H5 900 400 500 94.3 994.3 1220 700 520 0 225.7 18.5%
Total 2940 1240 1700 310.0 3240.0 3990 1900 1990 100 750.0 
 
See Table 2. CBUD: consumption expenditure; YD: disposable income; ty: direct income tax rate. 
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Table 6 – Original SAM of the Economy 
 C1 C2 S1 S2 K L G H SI ROW Total
C1   300 900   50 1200 250 100 2800
C2   500 1000   250 1700 50 400 3900
S1 2800          2800
S2  3900         3900
K   1475 425   50    1950
L   175 1425   300    1900
G        750   750
H     1950 1900 100    3950
SI        300   300
ROW   350 150       500
Total 2800 3900 2800 3900 1950 1900 750 3950 300 500  
 
Ci: consumption of commodity i; Si: sector i; K: capital account; L: labour account; G: public sector 
account; H: representative household account; SI: savings-investment account; ROW: foreign sector 
account. 
 
 
The data presented in Table 5 can now be compared to the national accounts that we 
observe in the SAM for this economy, in Table 6. As we can easily see, however, the 
aggregated data observed in the survey do not coincide with those presented in the SAM. 
One may think that there is some under or over reporting in survey data and adjust them 
to national accounts, or choose to save the structure of the household survey and adjust 
the national data of the SAM. Here, we want to keep fixed the consumption and income 
data from the survey; thus, we run an appropriate program that minimizes least squares in 
order to re-balance the SAM, after having introduced into it the data from the survey, and 
in particular the five household accounts. This way, of course, we will loose part of the 
original structure of the national accounts. The new balanced SAM is reported in Table 
7. 
Thus, it must be stressed as one of the main disadvantages of the integrated approach the 
fact that the data reconciliation process will necessarily lead to changes in structure of 
either the micro-data on income and expenditures of the household survey, or the 
national accounts’ data contained in the SAM. 
Another difficulty of this approach is the problem of identifying the heterogeneity of 
factor endowments or preferences at the level of a single household or individual. Indeed, 
as this approach treats with every single household observed in the survey, it 
automatically loses any possibility of characterization of the socio-economic structure in 
the model. 
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We can build a little CGE model for our archetypical economy, using the new SAM 
containing the data from the household survey (Table 7), in order to fully understand 
how this approach really works in practice. The CGE designed for this aim has the 
following characteristics: 
- five households with a Cobb-Douglas utility function; 
- two commodities, used in production and consumption; 
- four production factors: capital, labour and both commodities; 
- two firms with Leontief technology in value added and intermediate aggregate 
inputs; 
- Cobb-Douglas aggregator function for capital and labour; 
- Leontief aggregator function in intermediate inputs; 
- capital and labour are mobile among sectors and exogenously fixed; 
- public sector: government maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function, buys 
consumption goods, uses labour and capital, raises taxes on income and pays 
transfers to households; 
- savings and investments (investments are savings-driven); 
- open economy, with Armington assumption for the composite good aggregation, 
and exports demand depending on the world price. 
The equations relative to this CGE model, called CGE_HH, are presented in Table 8. 
With this model calibrated on the SAM with five households (Table 7), we simulate an 
exogenous shock: a 30% increase in the price of imports of the good imported by sector 
1. We report in Tables 10 and 11 the resulting changes in some of the variables and the 
inequality indices (Gini, Atkinson’s, Theil, etc.) computed after the shock. We used 
disposable income per Adult Equivalent (the variable YDh in the model divided by the 
number of Adult Equivalents) as reference variable for these computations. 
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Table 8 – CGE Model Equations 
Consumption demand hhihii CBUDHCP ⋅=⋅ α          i = 1,2  and   h = 1,2,3,4,5 
Savings ( ) hhhh YtympsS ⋅−⋅= 1  
Production function ( )ii FiFiii LKaFXD αα −⋅⋅= 1  
Tangency condition ( ) i
i
i
i
K
L
F
F
PL
PK ⋅−= α
α
1
 
Investment demand ∑
=
⋅=⋅
5
1h
hiii SIIP α  
Price of exports (local currency) ERPWEPE ii ⋅=  
Price of imports (local currency) ERPWMPM ii ⋅=  
Armington function ( ) ( )111 1 −−− ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅−+⋅⋅= i
i
i
i
i
i A
A
A
A
ii
A
A
iiii XDDAMAaAX
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
γγ  
Imports demand 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )iiiiii
i
A
A
A
i
A
i
A
i
A
i
A
i
i
i
i
i
XDDAMA
PM
A
aA
X
M
σ
σ
σσσσ
σ
γγ
γ
−−− ⋅−+⋅
⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅=
111 1
 
Exports demand 
i
i
i
ii PWEZ
PWEEZE
η
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅=  
Market clearing condition for labour ∑∑
==
=+
5
1
2
1 h
h
i
i LSLGL  
Market clearing condition for capital ∑∑
==
=+
5
1
2
1 h
h
i
i KSKGK  
Market clearing condition for commodity i ii
h
hii
j
jijii EICCGXDioMXD ++++⋅=+ ∑∑
==
5
1
2
1
 
Income definition hhhh TFPLLSPLKSPKY ⋅+⋅+⋅=  
Disposable income ( ) hhhh SYCBUD −⋅−= γ1  
Zero profit condition in production ∑
=
⋅⋅+⋅+⋅=⋅
2
1j
jijiiiii PDXDioLPLKPKXDPD  
Zero profit condition in Armington function iiiiii XDDPDMPMXP ⋅+⋅=⋅  
Zero profit condition in exports supply iiiiii XDDPDEPEXDPD ⋅+⋅=⋅  
Demand of commodity i by government ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅=⋅ ∑
=
5
1h
hiii TFPLTAXREVCGCGP α  
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Demand of capital by government ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅=⋅ ∑
=
5
1h
hTFPLTAXREVKGKGPK α  
Demand of labour by government ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅=⋅ ∑
=
5
1h
hTFPLTAXREVLGLGPL α  
Tax revenues ∑
=
⋅=
5
1h
hh YtyTAXREV  
Number of variables: 76 
Number of equations: 56 
Number of exogenous variables: 20 
Walras’ Law is satisfied 
Exogenous variables: 
- exogenous capital endowment (KSh) 
- exogenous labour supply (LSh) 
- exogenous public transfers (TFh) 
- exogenous world prices (PWEi, PWMi) 
- fixing the numeraire (wage rate, PL) 
Variables: 
PK     return to capital 
PL     wage rate 
ER     exchange rate 
Pi       Armington composite good prices 
PDi    production prices 
PEi     imports prices (local currency) 
PMi    exports prices (local currency) 
KSh    capital endowment (exogenous) 
LSh     labour endowment (exogenous) 
XDi     gross domestic output 
Xi       sales on the domestic market 
Ei       exports 
Mi      imports 
Ki       capital demand by firms 
KG     capital demand by government 
Li        labour demand by firms 
LG      labour demand by government 
Ii         investment demand 
Chi      consumer commodity demand 
CGi     government commodity demand 
Yh        household h's income 
Sh        household h’s savings 
PWEi         imports world prices (exogenous) 
PWMi        exports world prices (exogenous) 
XDDi         internal production for the domestic market 
CBUDh      disposable income of household h 
TAXREV    tax revenues 
TFh             real public transfers to household h  
 
Parameters: 
tyh      direct income tax rate for household h 
mpsh   marginal propensity to save of household h 
ioij      technical coefficients 
aFi     efficiency parameter in production function of firm i 
αFi     C-D power of capital in production function of firm i 
αIi      C-D power in bank’s utility function 
αHhi   C-D power of commodity i in household h utility f. 
αCGi  C-D power of commodity i in government utility f. 
αKG   C-D power of capital in government utility function 
αLG    C-D power of labour in government utility function 
aAi      efficiency parameter in Armington function 
γAi      share parameter in Armington function 
σAi      elasticity of substitution in Armington function 
ηi        price elasticity of exports demand 
 
 
 
With respect to the limit to microeconomic behaviour, note that CGE modelling imposes 
that behavioural functions respect certain conditions: for example, modelling switching 
regimes is not easy to introduce with current CGE modelling softwares, as the equation 
system of the model cannot change as the iteration process moves along. Indeed, 
integrated models often rely on relatively simple microsimulation models focusing on 
only one or two dimensions of household (or individual) behaviour. Yet, it is not clear 
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that this type of model may be convincingly used to describe the full complexity of 
household income inequality and the way it may be affected by macroeconomic policies. 
To this extent, micro-econometric modelling provides much more flexibility in terms of 
the modelling structure used. 
Moreover, when the size of the model becomes problematic, the modeller may be forced 
to impose some simplifications either on the complexity of microeconomic household 
behaviours or on the size of the CGE model in terms of the number of sectors and factors 
of production. 
 
 
 
3.2. The Top-Down Approach 
 
The idea of this approach is to develop separately a MS model and then to run the 
simulation on the basis of changes in consumer/producer prices, wages, and sectoral 
employment levels as predicted by some macro model, a CGE model in this case. This 
approach does not try to integrate the two models, but uses instead a CGE and a MS 
model in a sequential way: first, the policy reform is simulated with the CGE model, and 
the second step consists of passing the simulated changes in some variables (usually 
prices, wage rates, self-employment incomes and possibly employment levels58) down to 
                                                 
58 When the assumption of imperfect labour market is adopted, or when the presence of a formal and an 
informal sector is predicted, the rationing in the labour market is usually carried out in the macro or CGE 
model, while the main use of the MS module is to select those households or individuals who will actually 
be barred out of, or let in, employment, or the formal sector. 
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the MS module59. The logical scheme followed by this approach is illustrated in Figure 
460. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
Figure 4 – The Top-Down Approach 
 
 
 
 
Input 
CGE 
59 This CGE-MS approach was developed by Bourguignon et al. (2001) in a model that simulated the 
effects of the 1997 crisis in Indonesia. However, there are preceding examples of models designed in this 
two-layered fashion: see for instance Meagher (1993): a dynamic applied general equilibrium model (the 
well-known MONASH model) for Australia is used together with the 1990 Australian income survey to 
bear on a forecast of the incomes of various groups of individuals. Another example of linkage between a 
macro model and a MS model is the analysis of the distributional consequences of China’s accession to 
WTO by Chen and Ravallion (2003). 
60 In principle, one should also mention the possibility of a “Bottom-Up” approach. That is, a framework in 
which the link between the two models goes in the opposite direction: from the micro to the macro level of 
analysis. For instance, one could think of implementing a reform of the tax-benefit system with the 
microsimulation model, then to pass the changes in some relevant variables (such as labour supply, 
disposable income or consumption levels, for instance) onto the CGE model, and finally to run the CGE 
model to check the general equilibrium effect of the reform. Anyway, the use of a Top-Down approach is 
more common, at least in the literature on developing countries. 
model A vector of changes in: 
- Prices, wage rates and interest rates 
- Quantities (for ex. occupational levels) 
MS 
model 
New income levels 
after simulation 
Output 
Output 
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The basic difficulty of this approach is to ensure consistency between the micro and 
macro levels of analysis. For this reason, one may introduce a system of micro-macro 
consistency equations that ensure the achievement of consistency between the two 
levels61. Thus, what happens in the MS module can be made consistent with the CGE 
modelling by judiciously adjusting parameters in the MS model, but, from a theoretical 
point of view, it would be more satisfying to obtain consistency by modelling behaviour 
identically in the two models. 
 
We will build a simple CGE-MS model following this approach, in order to make clear 
the passages of variable changes from one model to the other and the problem of the so-
called consistency equations. Let’s consider the economy described in the previous 
section: the CGE model will be very similar to that one, except for the number of 
households. In this case, in fact, we will have only one representative household in the 
CGE model, while the household survey of Table 2 will be used to set up an arithmetical 
(accounting) MS framework, and will stay out of the CGE model. The SAM on which 
the CGE is calibrated is the one presented in Table 6, while the equations are the same 
equations described in Table 8 for the previous model, except for the index h, referred to 
households, which disappears in this model (there is only one representative household). 
We have now 36 equations and 44 variables; having fixed 8 exogenous variables, we 
have that the model is fully determined and a redundant equation according to Walras’ 
law. 
The MS module is very simple, and it is derived from the micro-data on income and 
expenditure observed in the survey (Table 2): households’ income is obtained by the 
employment of two factors, labour and capital, plus some public transfers; the only tax 
levied by government is a direct income tax (to make the model more realistic, one could 
add also indirect taxes on consumption, social security contributions, capital taxation, 
etc.). The equations of the MS model are reported in Table 9; they are simple 
                                                 
61 This way, at the micro level, one adjusts all individual wage rates and all self-employment incomes by 
the same percentage as obtained in the CGE simulation, and, similarly, the utility from working or being 
self-employed is adjusted in such a way as to produce employment changes in the MS module equal to 
those found in the CGE calculations. When the functions involved are not linear, the parameter 
adjustments needed to achieve consistency with the CGE results are more complicated. 
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arithmetical computations, as the only behavioural parameters in the model are the 
marginal propensity to save, mpsh, and the shares of consumption expenditure, ηhi, which 
are fixed on the basis of survey data, and kept constant after simulations. We also assume 
for simplicity that both prices, the wage rate and the return on capital are all equal to one 
in the base year, in both the CGE and MS models. This way, in the MS model, we have 
the same amounts to indicate initial monetary values, CEhi, LYh, KYh, and quantities, 
respectively, Chi, Lh, Kh. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 – MS Model Equations 
Exogenous variables: 
  TFh: public transfers received by household h 
  Lh: labour supply of household h 
  Kh: capital endowment of household h  
Parameters derived from the survey: 
Share of consumption expenditure for commodity i ηhi = CEhi/CBUDh
Income tax rate for household h tyh = TYh/Yh
Marginal propensity to save of household h mpsh = Sh/YDh
Equations of the model: 
Household h’s income Yh = LYh + KYh + TFh
Household h’s disposable income YDh = (1 − tyh)·Yh
Household h’s savings Sh = mpsh⋅YDh
Household h’s consumption expenditure CBUDh = YDh – Sh
Consumption expenditure for commodity i CEhi = ηhi·CBUDh
Amount of taxes paid to government TYh = tyh·Yh
Consumption levels ( )i
hi
hi P
CE
C Δ+= 1  
Labour supply of household h ( )PL
LYL hh Δ+= 1  
Capital endowment of household h ( )PK
KYK hh Δ+= 1  
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We will apply to this model the same policy simulation described in the previous section: 
a positive shock to the price of the good imported by sector 1. First, we run the CGE and 
obtain some percentage changes in all the variables of the model; however, we are 
interested only in the variation that we observe in prices, wage rate and capital return (if 
the model were more complicated, we could also be interested in the variation of 
employment levels, for instance, or we could observe different wage rates if the model 
showed the presence of a segmented labour market). In our model we have chosen the 
wage rate as the numeraire, so that we observe a change only in the two prices, Pi, and in 
the capital return, PK: 
%058.31 =Δ CGEP , 
%054.02 −=Δ CGEP , 
%559.0=Δ CGEPK . 
We take these percentage changes and pass them onto the MS module; we can do this 
easily, as the MS schedule exhibits exogenous prices and return to capital (equal to one 
in the base year). Things get a bit more complicated when the variables in the household 
model are endogenous, and especially when the MS model is a behavioural one. For 
example, consider a MS model with labour supply response, with the possibility of non-
participation (i.e. unemployment). In this case, the unemployment level in the household 
model is no longer an exogenous variable, but it is determined by the labour supply 
function; however, changes in the number of workers in the MS model must match those 
same changes in the CGE model. Thus, a choice may be to impose these variable 
changes from the CGE model onto the micro level of analysis (and this is obtained by 
modifying some specific coefficients of the labour supply function). This particular 
choice implies that the MS model is allowed to determine which individuals, amongst the 
entire population, will fill the need for more workers if their number is to increase in the 
CGE model (on the contrary, if the number of workers is found to decrease, then the MS 
model will choose the individuals with the highest probability to lose their job). For a 
more detailed description of these methods, see Bourguignon et al. (2003b) and Hérault 
(2005). We will describe this procedure in more detail in the second chapter, where we 
will link a behavioural MS model to a CGE. 
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In order to transfer these changes onto the MS framework, we need the following 
“linking equations”: 
 
Consumption of commodity i by household h ( )CGEihihi P
CEC Δ+= 1
*  
Labour income of household h hh LLY =*  
Capital income of household h ( )CGEhh PKKKY Δ+⋅= 1*  
Notes: - the wage rate is the numeraire in our CGE model 
- the variables with the star are the values referred to the simulation runs 
 
At this point, we can run the MS model (as our model is quite simple and just an 
arithmetical one, we use an Excel sheet with the appropriate computations to run the 
model) and obtain a new vector of disposable incomes, from which we compute the 
inequality indices that are reported in Table 11 (computed on disposable income per 
Adult Equivalent). The results for the main macroeconomic variables resulting from the 
CGE model are instead reported in Table 10. 
One more thing about the sequential Top-Down approach must be said: with this 
approach, possible economy-wide feedback effects of the distributional consequences of 
a given policy are not taken into account. There is indeed complete absence of feedback 
from the micro to the macro level. «…The cost of adopting this approach is that the 
causal chain from macroeconomic policies to poverty is in one direction only: we do not 
capture the feedback effect of changes in the composition of demand (due to shifts in the 
distribution of income) on macroeconomic balances…»62. 
The main advantage of this approach is instead that it provides richness in household 
behaviour modelling, while remaining extremely flexible in terms of specific behaviours 
that can be modelled. 
It is also true that, by emphasizing changes in relative prices and in the sectoral structure 
of the economy, this approach is more adapted to developing than developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 From Devarajan and Go (2003). 
 59 
3.3. The Top-Down/Bottom-Up (TD/BU) Approach 
 
This method has been recently developed by Savard (2003). It allows to overcome the 
problem of the lack of consistency between the micro and macro levels of the “top-
down” approach by introducing a bi-directional link between the two models: this is the 
reason why this approach is also called “Top-Down/Bottom-Up”. According to this 
method, indeed, aggregate results from the MS model (for example consumption levels) 
are incorporated into the CGE model, and a loop is used to run both models iteratively 
until the two produce convergent results. However, the existence of a converging 
solution is not guaranteed. 
The value added of this approach comes from the fact that feedback effects provided by 
the MS model do not correspond to the aggregate behaviours of the representative 
households used in the CGE model. It is interesting to take these feedback effects of the 
MS model back in the CGE to insure coherence between the two models. The main 
difficulty in this type of exercise is related to aggregation and coherence between the two 
models. A scheme of the way in which this approach of linking the two models works is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 – The Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach 
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Figure 6 – The Top-Down/Bottom-Up Approach 
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We will build a little MS-CGE model for our archetypical economy following this 
approach, believing that illustrating it through a practical example is the most direct way 
of understanding quickly how it works. The CGE and MS models we will use are the 
ones we have already described for the sequential Top-Down approach, and again we 
will run the same policy simulation previously described (increase in the price of the 
imported good 1). We will follow the indications proposed by Savard (2003)63. Anyway, 
as our simulation is a macroeconomic one, we can run directly the CGE model at first. 
This means that our model will follow a simplified scheme with respect to the one 
presented in Figure 5. The new simplified scheme is shown in Figure 6. We follow this 
scheme because our simulation (shock to the price of the imported good for sector 1) 
cannot be run in the microsimulation framework only. 
 
So, we will start running first the CGE model. Thus, we will pass the resulting changes in 
prices , and in capital return, 1iPΔ 1PKΔ  onto the microsimulation model, as it is 
described in the previous section. After this, running the microsimulation model, we can 
compute the new consumption levels, ;1hiC
64 then, in order to obtain the corresponding 
aggregate consumption levels, , each of these values has first to be divided by the 
number of adult equivalents in that household (see Table 3), then weighted for its relative 
sample weight, ω
1
iAC
h, and multiplied by the total number of adult equivalents in the 
population (3500), and finally aggregated by sector: 
3500
5
1
11 ⋅⋅= ∑
=h
hihi CAC ω . 
Now, the aggregate consumption vector obtained from the MS model, , is imported 
into the CGE model. To do this, we have to change the hypothesis of the model to allow 
it to be fully determined, as now we have exogenous consumption levels for the 
1
iAC
                                                 
63 Savard will use household consumption as communicating variable from the micro to the macro level. 
There are other approaches using different variables: for instance, Müller (2004) in his model for 
Switzerland, and the CGE-microsimulation model for Germany described in Arntz et al. (2006), use the 
labour supply level resulting from the microsimulation model as communicating variable from the micro to 
the macro level. 
64 This allows us to obtain a matrix of two goods by five households; aggregating over all the households, 
produces a single vector (2x1) of aggregate consumption levels. 
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representative household. Therefore, we need to change some of the equations and 
exogenous variables of the model: first, we will remove the equations determining 
consumption demand by the representative household, substituting it with the following: 
∑
=
⋅=
2
1i
ii CPCBUD . 
 
In the initial hypothesis (endogenous consumption) we had 2 endogenous variables (Ci) 
and 2 equations. Now we have 2 exogenous variables and one equation. As we need to 
insure the balancing of the household’s budget constraint, a variable needs then to be 
endogenized in the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( TFLSPLKSPKtympsCBUD )+⋅+⋅⋅−⋅−= 11 . 
Following Savard, we choose to endogenize the marginal propensity to save, mps, which 
is now a variable that changes in order to satisfy the budget constraint. 
From this CGE model we will obtain other variations in commodity prices and in capital 
return,  and 2iPΔ 2PKΔ . Using the consistency equations described for the sequential 
model in the previous section, we can introduce these changes into the MS module. This 
way, we obtain other consumption levels  for each household, and in the same way as 
before we can compute the aggregate consumption levels,  to be again imported into 
the CGE model, from which we will get  and 
2
hiC
2
iAC
3
iPΔ 3PKΔ . In the same way, we take these 
changes and introduce them into the MS model through the consistency equations, 
obtaining the vector . 3iAC
We go on in this way until the two models will produce the same values in the aggregate 
consumption vector. We obtain convergence at 3 decimals at the 3rd iteration (4th run of 
the model). 
We can now compute the inequality indices for disposable income levels obtained in the 
last run of the MS model (see Table 11). The macroeconomic variables are reported in 
Table 10. 
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The main advantages of this approach are: 
1. there is no obligation of scaling the household data to national accounts and no 
need to balance income and expenditure. Consequently, it allows the modeller to 
use the exact income and expenditure structure found in the household surveys; 
2. there is no limit to the level of desegregation in terms of production sectors or 
number of factors of production and households to be included in the model; 
3. the degree of freedom in choices of functional forms used to reflect micro-
economic household behaviour is much higher in this approach; 
4. the converging solution, if it exists, produces a numerical validation of the 
coherence between the CGE and the MS models. 
It is however important to note that nothing guarantees a converging solution to be 
found; therefore, it must be validated and numerically checked for the introduction of 
each new hypothesis. 
 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
 
Observing the results of the previous models that are reported in Table 11, we can see 
that there is no substantial difference in the indices calculated from the same simulation 
with the three types of models. However, it must be taken into account the fact that these 
models are really simple, and that there are only five households in the survey. Imagine 
what would happen with thousands of households surveyed in a sample, and if the model 
is complicated by the introduction of unemployment, of other fundamental variables such 
as savings and investments, or of other agents such as the foreign sector, or the 
introduction of the hypothesis of imperfect competition, and so on. Moreover, in a real 
economy the taxation system is much more complex than the very simple one that we 
have implemented in the previous models. 
However, even under the extreme minimalism of the three models we have implemented, 
one can notice that there are some slight differences in the resulting indices reported in 
Table 11. We can observe, indeed, that the first model, the one following the integrated 
approach, is the one that leads to the greatest change under the same simulation scenario, 
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and that it brings about the highest (even if not very different from that of the other 
models) reduction in all the inequality indices. 
However, in general, we can see that the three models lead to very similar results in the 
values of all inequality indices. The reason for this is to be sought mainly in the fact that 
the MS model is an arithmetical one, that is, all the variables of the model are derived 
only by simply computing some arithmetical relations, without providing for a reaction 
in the behaviour of the agents. This way, the results obtained through such a MS model 
are not that different from those one can obtain by using a standard CGE model. We will 
see in the next section that things may change with the use of a behavioural MS model, 
that is, a model that assumes the possibility of a change in the behaviour of the agents 
following a policy change. The main reason for this is that some of the behavioural 
responses that could be modelled into a MS framework cannot be included at all into a 
CGE model. For instance, it is very difficult to model switching regimes such as 
occupational choices with current CGE modelling softwares, as the equation system of 
the model cannot change as the iteration process moves along. For this reason, integrated 
models often rely on relatively simple microsimulation models focusing on only one or 
two dimensions of household (or individual) behaviour, while the so-called layered 
approaches (the Top-Down and the TD/BU ones) are able to include more complex 
equations in their MS module. To this extent, micro-econometric behavioural modelling 
provides much more flexibility in terms of the modelling structure used, and is much 
more suitable to describe the complexity of household and individual behaviour, and the 
way it may be affected by macroeconomic policies. 
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Table 10 – Changes in Some Macroeconomic Variables 
 Integrated Model Top-Down Model TD/BU Model 
Return to capital 0.530 0.559  0.848
Consumer price index 1.236 1.222  1.402
Labour demand by gov. 0.327 0.318  0.483
Capital demand by gov. -0.202 -0.239  -0.362
Tax revenues 0.282 0.276  0.419
Exchange rate -5.852 -6.070  -5.711
Income* 0.246 0.276  0.419
Disposable income* 0.246 0.276  0.419
Consumption expenditure* 0.246 0.276  1.846
Savings* 0.261 0.276  -13.380
  
 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Commodity prices 3.033 -0.055 3.058 -0.054 3.311 0.076
Domestic sales -1.520 0.823 -1.490 0.852 -1.369 0.637
Domestic production 0.255 -0.279 0.274 -0.290 0.415 -0.440
Labour demand by firms 0.731 -0.158 0.775 -0.162 1.176 -0.246
Capital demand by firms 0.200 -0.684 0.215 -0.717 0.325 -1.085
Consumption* -2.704 0.302 -2.699 0.330 0.476 0.389
Investments -2.660 0.347 -2.699 0.330 -16.156 -13.445
Price of imports (local currency) 22.392 -5.852 22.109 -6.070 22.576 -5.711
Price of exports (local currency) -5.852 -5.852 -6.070 -6.070 -5.711 -5.711
Imports -14.193 10.277 -13.991 10.696 -13.978 10.042
 
* For the integrated model these values are computed as average percentage changes. 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 – Some Inequality Indices on Disposable Income per Adult Equivalent 
After Simulation*
 Benchmark Situation Integrated 
Model 
Top-Down 
Model 
TD/BU 
Model 
Gini index 18.17 -0.63% 0.13% 0.20% 
Atkinson’s index, ε = 0.5 2.62 -1.23% 0.24% 0.37% 
Coefficient of Variation 32.61 -0.91% 0.13% 0.20% 
Generalized entropy measures:     
I(c), c = 2 5.32 -1.82% 0.27% 0.40% 
Mean logarithmic deviation, I(0) 5.34 -1.04% 0.24% 0.37% 
Theil coefficient, I(1) 5.26 -1.43% 0.25% 0.38% 
 
* Percentage changes with respect to the benchmark situation. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
In all the applications presented here, we have worked mainly with fictitious data and 
small samples of observations. However, the choice of the modelling structure usually 
depends on the data that are available for the economy under study, then on the objective 
of the study one is willing to implement, and thus on the kind of policy simulation to be 
realized. 
For what concerns the different types of possible linkages between microsimulation and 
CGE models, we have seen that most of the differences in the results coming out from 
the three main approaches arise when working with layered models (Top-Down and 
TD/BU approaches) rather than with integrated models. 
Indeed, if we observe the results reported in Tables 10 an 11, we find that at a 
macroeconomic level (changes in the main macro variables, Table 10) all the models 
show very similar results (especially the integrated model and the Top-Down model 
predict almost identical results), making an exception for the TD/BU approach, in which 
we obtained different results for what concerns consumption and savings levels. The 
reason for this lays in the fact that we changed some of the initial assumptions of the 
CGE model in order to be able to introduce an exogenous vector of consumption levels 
from the microsimulation model (see section 3.3 for more details). 
However, if we take a look at the change in inequality (Table 11, indices computed on 
disposable income per Adult Equivalent), we can see that the integrated model predicts 
inequality to decrease, while according to the two layered models inequality is observed 
to increase, even if of a very small amount. This difference could be of great importance 
when modelling real economies and it is probably due to the fact that with a layered 
model we are able to develop separately the microsimulation model, so that we can 
achieve a higher precision and a more detailed framework for the computations of the 
tax-benefit system. 
We will see in more detail in the next chapter that the possibility of including 
behavioural responses into the microsimulation framework can lead to even stronger 
differences in the microeconomic results (and especially for what concerns the changes 
in poverty). 
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Bourguignon et al. (2001) and Bourguignon et al. (2003b) also provide strong arguments 
for working with layered rather than integrated models. These arguments are most 
persuasive when, as in their work for Indonesia, it is regarded as very important to 
simulate realistically variation in labour supply and occupational choice responses to 
changing prices, wages and employment conditions. 
A reasonable conclusion may be that integrated models are best for some purposes and 
layered models for others. The integrated models, indeed, appear cleaner and more 
transparent, and they show a better reliability under the point of view of the theoretical 
consistency between the two levels of analysis. They may have however the drawback of 
not being able to fully capture even the direction and the relative magnitude of 
distributional and of other effects in terms of a full microeconomic analysis. 
Layered models, in contrast, perhaps have an advantage where the concern is about 
short-term distributional impacts in a setting where realism is at a premium and 
theoretical niceties are not so important. In analyzing the impacts of a serious crisis, as in 
Indonesia, a layered approach may get the job done best. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the literature that studies income inequality and poverty, we can observe a recent 
development of models that link together a macroeconomic model (usually a CGE 
model) and a microsimulation model1. The reason for this lays in the fact that poverty 
and inequality are typically microeconomic issues, while the policy reforms or the shocks 
that are simulated have often a strong macroeconomic impact on the economy under 
study. Thus, an approach that takes into account both aspects of the economy through the 
use of some micro-macro linkages seems to be the right answer to the problem. The main 
aim for which CGE and microsimulation (MS) models are linked is indeed to try to take 
into account full agents’ heterogeneity and the complexity of income distribution on one 
side, while being able at the same time to consider the macroeconomic effects of the 
policy reforms or of the shocks under study. 
As we have already seen in the introduction to the previous chapter, indeed, CGE models 
following the representative household approach fail in capturing agents’ heterogeneity 
and especially the changes in the distribution within the representative households’ 
groups. On the other side, if we conduct the analysis only in the context of a 
microsimulation framework, we will just be able to perform a partial equilibrium 
analysis, thus disregarding all the possible general equilibrium effects of the reform 
under study on the entire economy. 
In order to overcome these problems, the recent literature has tried to develop new 
modelling tools which should be able at the same time to account for heterogeneity and 
for the possible general equilibrium effects of the policy reform (or the exogenous shock) 
under study. In view of the fact that most of the available economic models have either a 
microeconomic or a macroeconomic focus, and they do not address the question 
adequately, the recent literature has focused on the possibility of combining two different 
types of models. In particular, some authors have tried to link microsimulation models to 
CGE models in order to account simultaneously for structural changes, for general 
equilibrium effects of the economic policies, and for their impacts on households’ 
                                                 
1 More generally, this current of the literature develops the use of micro-data drawn from household 
surveys in the context of a general equilibrium setting, which is usually but not necessarily a CGE model. 
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welfare, income distribution and poverty. The literature that follows this approach is 
quite flourishing in recent years: there are, among others, the important contributions by 
Decaluwé et al. (1999a) and (1999b), Cogneau and Robilliard (2001 and 2004), 
Cockburn (2001), Cogneau (2001), Bourguignon, Robilliard and Robinson (2003b), 
Boccanfuso et al. (2003) and Savard (2003). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to give an assessment of recent developments in this field, with 
a special concern for the different types of linking that are currently used in the literature. 
In particular, we will link the micro-data from a survey to a CGE model in three different 
ways: through a full integration of the survey data into a CGE framework, as it is done 
for instance in Cockburn (2001); by linking a behavioural microsimulation model to a 
CGE through a set of specific equations, which is the so called Top-Down method, as it 
is developed in Bourguignon et al. (2003b), and finally through a method which was 
developed by Savard (2003), also known as Top-Down/Bottom-Up model. 
We will build all the three types of models using the same data from a fictitious 
economy. After this, by running an identical policy reform in the three models, we will 
analyse the different outcomes deriving from different types of linking. We will see that, 
even with the same economy and under the same policy simulation, we can obtain quite 
different results, especially in terms of income distribution and poverty change. 
The choice for the use of fictitious data describing a simple economy is made with the 
aim of being able to understand better the differences that are observed in the results of 
the models, and to try to “go behind” these differences and look for the causes that 
generate them. Of course, this is of more difficult realization when using true data of a 
real and thus more complex economy, which naturally shows more a complex structure 
in its economic relationships. The main difference that distinguishes the microsimulation 
model we are going to use in this chapter from the one described in the previous one is 
that we will now allow for individual behavioural responses by the agents, with a special 
concern for labour supply responses. 
In particular, we will analyse in more detail the TD/BU approach as developed by Savard 
(2003) and propose an alternative way of taking into account feedback effects from the 
micro level of analysis into the CGE model (see paragraph 5.1). 
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2. THE INTEGRATED APPROACH 
 
The main intuition behind this approach is to simply substitute the Representative 
Household Groups inside a standard CGE model with the real households that are found 
in the survey2. This way, one passes from a model with, for instance, ten representative 
agents to a model with thousands of agents, thus increasing the computational effort, but 
leaving substantially unchanged the modelling hypothesis of a standard CGE model. 
Basically, this approach does not include a true microsimulation module in the modelling 
framework, but it tries to incorporate the data from the household survey into the CGE 
model. 
The first step to build such a model is to pass from the representative households’ data of 
the survey to population values; to do this, one should weight each variable at the 
household level with the weights usually given in the survey, thus obtaining population 
values for each variable. 
After this, we need a procedure to reconcile these population data coming from the 
survey (incomes and expenditures) with the accounts contained in the social accounting 
matrix (SAM). The literature on data reconciliation offers different alternatives. One may 
choose to keep fixed the structure of the SAM and adjust the household survey, or 
otherwise to adjust the SAM in order to meet the totals of the household survey. Another 
alternative would be that of using an intermediate approach. Whatever the method used, 
however, one necessarily loses the structure of the original data, which is one of the main 
drawbacks of the integrated approach. Our choice was for the alternative of keeping the 
original composition of households’ incomes and expenditures unchanged. 
After these changes in the SAM, one encounters the problem of re-balancing it (row 
totals must be equal to column totals). To do this, we used an appropriate program that 
minimizes least squares3. 
                                                 
2 The first attempt in this direction was made by Decaluwé et al. (1999b). Among the models following 
this approach there are the works by Cockburn (2001) for Nepal, by Boccanfuso et al. (2003) for Senegal, 
and by Cororaton and Cockburn (2005), who studied the case of Philippine economy. 
3 There exist different principles on which SAM-balancing programs can be based, such as the “Row and 
Sum” or RAS method (see Bacharach, 1971), least squares minimization principles, known also as Stone-
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The CGE model is the one described in section 3.2, except for the fact that we have 
added an index which refers to households4. 
A thing should be noted at this point: certain types of equations that are commonly 
included in a behavioural model, such as switching regime equations, like occupational 
choice equations, are not easily modelled within the standard CGE modelling softwares5. 
Instead, micro-econometric behavioural modelling provides much more flexibility in 
terms of the modelling structure used, and it is more suitable to describe the complexity 
of household and individual behaviour, and the way this may be affected by the changes 
in the macroeconomic framework that are subsequent to a policy reform or an external 
shock. 
For instance, with a CGE model like the one used for the integrated approach here, we 
are not able to predict which particular individual will enjoy the reduction (or will suffer 
from the rise) of the unemployment level on the basis of some characteristics of the 
individual or of the household that can be observed; this instead can be done with the use 
of a behavioural microsimulation model. Indeed, the main feature that differentiates a 
microsimulation model from a standard CGE framework (not only one with 
representative agents, but even one with thousands of households from a survey, as we 
have seen) is that it works at the individual level, selecting those individuals that show 
the highest probability of changing their labour market status, on the basis of their 
personal or family characteristics. This fact could bring above significant differences in 
the results between the two types of models, even after the same policy simulation, as we 
will see below. 
To this extent it is important to underline a fact about the treatment of involuntary 
unemployment. In a common CGE model it is possible to introduce involuntary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Byron methods (see Stone (1977) and Byron (1978)), or the more recent cross-entropy approach proposed 
by Robinson et al. (2001) and Robilliard and Robinson (2003). 
4 For instance, the consumption demand function in Table 6 becomes: mmqmqq CBUDHCP ⋅=⋅ α , 
where m is now the index for households. 
5 For instance, a discrete labour supply choice model in which individuals change their labour market 
status is not of easy implementation in a system of simultaneous equations like a CGE model. To this 
regard, see Savard’s (2003) discussion about the limits and advantages of the various approaches of 
linking. 
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unemployment due to structural characteristics of the labour market. If we have 
representative household groups, we can model the unemployment at the macro level (for 
instance with a Phillips curve) and then “distribute” the after-reform change in the 
unemployment level to the various groups, according to some proportional law, for 
instance. But if we have, like in the integrated approach, thousands of individual 
households, which are not even grouped according to any socio-economic characteristic, 
it is not clear how we can distribute the change in unemployment at the macro level to 
the single households. To do it in a proportional way would be inaccurate, because this is 
not what we observe in reality (we usually observe a person that loses her job, and not a 
proportional decrease in the worked hours of all the households, especially if the effect 
we are treating comes from involuntary unemployment and not from labour supply). 
 
 
 
 
3. THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH 
 
We apply now the sequential or Top-Down approach as described in Bourguignon et al. 
(2003b). 
The basic idea is to develop separately a MS model and then to run the simulation on the 
basis of changes in consumer/producer prices, wages, and sectoral employment levels as 
predicted by the CGE model. This approach thus uses the two frameworks in a sequential 
way: first, the policy reform is simulated with the CGE model, and the second step 
consists of passing the simulated changes in some variables such as prices, wage rates, 
and employment levels6 down to the MS module, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Chapter 1, 
page 53). 
 
                                                 
6 When the assumption of imperfect labour market is adopted, or when the presence of a formal and an 
informal sector is predicted, the rationing in the labour market is usually carried out in the macro or CGE 
model, while the main use of the MS module is to select those households or individuals who will actually 
be barred out of, or let in, employment, or the formal sector. We will see this in more detail in the 
simulation section. 
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3.1. The Microsimulation Module 
 
The main role of the microsimulation module in the linked framework is to provide a 
detailed computation of net incomes at the household level, through a detailed 
description of the tax-benefit system of the economy, and to estimate individual 
behavioural responses to the policy change. For instance, through the use of 
microeconometric equations, we can model behaviours such as labour supply or 
consumption. 
Behavioural Microsimulation (MS) models are developed to capture the possible 
reactions of the agents to the simulated policies, so that what happens after a reform can 
be very different from what is predicted by the simple arithmetical computations 
included in an accounting model. 
In this section we will describe in detail a simple behavioural model, following quite 
closely the discrete labour supply choice model used in Bourguignon et al. (2003b). 
Another description of a similar MS model for labour supply can be found in Bussolo 
and Lay (2003) with their model for Colombia, and in Hérault (2005), who built a model 
for the South African economy. 
For the building of the model we will use fictitious data describing a very simple 
economy. In the household survey we have information about some individual 
characteristics, such as age, sex, level of qualification, education, labour and capital 
income, the eventual receipt of public transfers, and the activity status. For the sake of 
simplicity, we have stated that each individual at working age (16-64) can be allocated 
according to two alternatives: being a full-time wage worker, or being inactive. There are 
other variables in the survey that are referred to households rather than to individuals, for 
example the area of residence, the number of household components, the number of 
adults (over 18 years old) and children (under 18), and so on. 
All consumption goods of the economy are grouped in two main categories7. 
We derive income variables referring to households from initial individual data by 
summing up individual values for each household member; this way, we obtain 
                                                 
7 The focus of our distribution and poverty analysis will be on disposable income, even if an inequality and 
poverty analysis could also be conducted on expenditure rather than on income levels. 
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households’ labour and capital incomes, households’ public transfers and households’ 
total income: 
 
 
where YLmi is labour income of individual i member of household m, YKmi his/her capital 
income, and TFmi are the public transfers he/she receives from government. All these 
quantities are summed up for each family over all the individuals belonging to the family 
(NCm is the number of components of household m); then, household m’s total income, 
Ym, is the sum of all incomes received by the family: labour income, capital income, and 
public transfers. 
For the benchmark situation, we assume all initial prices normalized at one. 
Household m’s labour income: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim YLYL
1
 
Household m’s capital income: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim YKYK
1
 
Public transfers to household m: ∑
=
= m
NC
i
mim TFTF
1
 
Household m’s total income: mmmm TFYKYLY ++=
 
 
The Model 
The core of the behavioural model is represented by the following two equations: 
 
( ) mimimimi vcxbaYLLog +⋅+⋅+= λ  (B.1)Regression model for log-wage earnings: 
“Choice” of labour market status: [ ]0>+⋅+⋅+= mimimimi rwzIndW εγβα  (B.2)
 
The rest of the MS module is made up by simple arithmetical computations of price 
indices, incomes, savings and consumption levels. As the parameters entering the 
following equations (marginal propensity to save , income tax rates γ, and budget 
shares 
mmps
mqη ) are constant, this part of the model may be regarded as purely accounting, as 
it does not contain any possible behavioural response to policy simulations. 
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Household m’s income generation model: mm
NC
i
mimim TFYKWYLY
m ++⋅= ∑
=1
 (B.3)
Household disposable (after tax) income: ( ) mm YYD ⋅−= γ1  (B.4)
Household specific consumer price index: ∑
=
⋅=
2
1q
qmqm PCPI η  (B.5)
Real disposable income: mmm CPIYDYDR /=  (B.6)
Savings: mmm YDmpsS ⋅=  (B.7)
Household consumption budget: mmm SYDCEBUD −=  (B.8)
Consumption expenditure for commodity q: mmqmq CEBUDCE ⋅=η  (B.9)
q
mq
mq P
CE
C =  (B.10) Consumption level of commodity q: 
Household m’s capital income: mm KSPKYK ⋅=  (B.11) 
 
Description of the subscripts: 
m Households m = 1, 2, …, 24  
i Individuals belonging to household m  i = 1, …, NCm NCm: number of components of household m 
q q = 1,2 Goods  
 
 
The first equation of the model, (B.1), computes the logarithm of labour income (wage) 
of member i of household m as a linear function of his/her personal characteristics 
(vector  includes the logarithm of age, sex, skill level and educational attainment) and 
of 
mix
miλ , which represents the inverse Mills ratio estimated for the selection model (for 
more details on the estimation process see below in the section “Estimation of the 
Model”). The residual term  describes the effects of unobserved components on wage 
earnings. 
miv
The second equation represents the “choice” of the labour status made by household 
members8. Each individual at working age has to “choose” between two alternatives: 
                                                 
8 In the literature this kind of equation is known as occupational choice model, or selection model (and also 
discrete choice model of labour supply). However, it must be specified that in our modelling context this 
equation is not really intended to explain the individual choice between being occupied and unemployed, 
but rather it tries to find out which characteristics strengthen the probability of being in one condition 
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being a wage worker, or being inactive. The variable  is a dichotomic variable taking 
value one if individual i of household m is a wage worker, and zero otherwise. The 
allocation of each individual is made according to some criterion, the value of which is 
specific to the alternative, and the alternative with the highest criterion value is selected. 
A natural economic interpretation of this criterion value is utility: each individual is 
assigned to the alternative with the highest associated utility. Indeed, we will estimate the 
selection model using a binomial logit specification, which assigns each individual to the 
alternative with the highest associated probability
miW
9. In our model we have arbitrarily set 
to zero the utility of being inactive. Function “Ind” is an indicator function taking value 
one if the condition is verified, and zero otherwise. Vector  of explanatory variables 
includes some personal characteristics of individual i of household m, that is: age, sex, 
skill and educational level, the area of residence and the number of children under 6 
living in the household. Variable rw
miz
mi is the logarithm of real labour income. The 
equation is defined only for individuals at working age. 
The third equation is an accounting identity that defines total household income, Ym, as 
the sum of the wage income of its members YLmi, of the exogenous household capital 
income YKm, and of the total amount of public transfers received by household m, TFm. 
In this equation, variable Wmi stands for a dummy variable that takes value one if 
member i is a wage worker and zero otherwise. 
The fourth equation computes household disposable (after tax) income by applying 
income tax rates according to the rule reported in Table 1. In order to simplify 
computations, we have assumed that in this economy direct income taxes are imposed on 
households’ total income Ym, and not on individual incomes. 
Equation (B.5) computes an household specific consumer price index through the 
consumption shares mqη . Real disposable income is then obtained by dividing 
households’ disposable income by this index (equation (B.6)). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
rather than in the other one for each individual, as it is described in more detail in the estimation section 
below. This is the reason why in the rest of the chapter we will use the word “choice” in quotation marks. 
9 See the next sub-section for more details on economic interpretation of logit models. 
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Table 1 – Direct Income Tax Rates 
Income brackets: Tax rate
Up to 10,000 0%
Up to 15,000 15%
Up to 26,000 24%
Up to 70,000 32%
Over 70,000 39%
 
 
Then, to find out household m’s savings level, equation (B.7) multiplies this disposable 
income by the marginal propensity to save of each household, . The assumption 
underlying this equation is that household savings behaviour is unvarying, as the savings 
level is a fixed fraction of household disposable income. Then, subtracting savings from 
disposable income one obtains the budget that each household spends for consumption 
(
mmps
equation (B.8)), which is spent on the two goods of the model according to the budget 
shares mqη  by equation (B.9). Again, the assumption in this equation is that consumption 
behaviour is not flexible, that is, households spend a constant fraction of their 
consumption budget for each of the two goods. 
To get the values of these exogenous parameters (marginal propensity to save  and 
budget shares 
mmps
mqη ), we use the initial data from the survey in the following way: 
 
m
m
m YD
Smps =  Household m’s marginal propensity to save: 
Household m’s consumption budget shares: 
m
mq
mq CEBUD
CE=η
 
Equation (B.10) derives then the consumption levels for each household by dividing the 
expenditure for each good by its price. 
Finally, income from capital is obtained by multiplying capital endowment of each 
family, KSm, by the return to capital, PK (equation (B.11)). 
The initial values of the variables Cmq and KSm (consumption levels and capital 
endowments, respectively) are derived from the initial data of the survey by making use 
of the assumption that in the benchmark situation all prices and returns are equal to one: 
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mqmq CEC =  (B.12)Household m’s consumption level of commodity q: 
mm YKKS =  (B.13)Household m’s capital endowment: 
 
Moreover, we assume that public transfers paid to households and household capital 
endowments are exogenously given. They are fixed at the level reported in the survey, 
for public transfers, and at the level as computed in equation (B.13), for capital 
endowment, respectively. 
 
 
Economic Interpretation of a Binomial Logit Model 
This model can be interpreted as follows. Suppose an individual i assigns utility  to 
the alternative of being a wage worker (in order to simplify the analysis, we drop 
subscript m referred to the household), on the basis of his/her personal characteristics , 
and that he/she assigns utility  to the alternative of being unoccupied. Furthermore, 
suppose that these utilities are linear functions of , that is: 
WiU
iz
BiU
iz
WiiWWWi zU εβα +⋅+=                  (B.14) 
BiiBBBi zU εβα +⋅+= .            (B.15) 
One may now define that an individual i selects the alternative of being a wage worker if 
the utility of being a wage worker exceeds that of being unemployed, that is: 
[ ] [ ]
( )[ ]
[ ],|Pr
|Pr
|Pr|1Pr
iii
iWiBiiBWBW
iBiWiii
Zz
Zz
ZUUZOCS
⋅+<=
−>⋅−+−=
>==
βαε
εεββαα        (B.16) 
where OCSmi is the occupational status of individual i of household m, which takes value 
one if individual i is a wage worker, and zero otherwise, while iε  is equal to ( )WiBi εε − , 
β equals ( )BW ββ − , and α is ( )BW αα − . This shows that one cannot identify the 
individual parameters in (B.16); one can only identify the difference between the 
parameters. Hence, one way to look at the parameters α and β is to see these as 
measuring the effect of  on the “choice” for being wage worker relative to that of 
being inactive
iz
10. 
                                                 
10 For more details on this interpretation of a binomial model, see Franses and Paap (2001). 
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In this sense, equation (B.2) can be seen as expressing in an implicit way the utility 
associated with each of the two labour market alternatives. 
In our model we have arbitrarily set to zero the utility of being unemployed, which 
means setting to zero the coefficients Bα  and Bβ  of equation (B.15). Thanks to this, the 
error term iε  in (B.16) corresponds now to the error term of equation (B.14), Wiε , the 
coefficient β of equation (B.16) equals Wβ , and the intercept parameter α  is now Wα . 
This way, equation (B.16) becomes: 
[ ] [ ]
[
[ ],|0Pr
|Pr
|0Pr|1Pr
iii
iWiiWW
iWiii
Zz
Zz
ZUZOCS
>+⋅+=
−>⋅+=
>==
εβα
εβα ]         (B.17) 
which is substantially what we have in the equation of the model, (B.2), except for the 
missing household subscript m, which has been dropped before, for simplicity. 
 
 
Estimation of the Model 
The only two equations in the MS module that need to be estimated are equations (B.1) 
and (B.2). 
The former, which expresses the logarithm of wage earnings as a linear function of some 
individual characteristics and of λmi, the inverse Mills ratio, was estimated using a 
Heckman two-step model (see Heckman (1976) and (1979)). We follow this approach to 
correct for the selection bias which is implicit in a wage regression, that is, the fact that 
we observe a positive wage only for those individuals that are actually employed at the 
moment of the survey. As we cannot assume that the decision of participating in the 
labour market is made randomly, but rather it is based, among others, on the level of 
wage that is offered in the market, the estimate made only on the sub-sample of 
individuals who have a positive wage will be biased. Indeed, individuals who have low 
wages are more unlikely to choose to work (as they have a reservation wage that is 
greater than the wage offered by employers), and thus the sample of observed wages 
would probably be biased upward. 
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A solution can be found if there are some variables that strongly affect the chances for 
observing the reservation wage but not the outcome under study (the offer wage), such as 
the number of children living in the household, for example. 
In this case, one has to estimate two equations: one, the wage regression equation, which 
expresses the wage as a function of individual characteristics such as age or education (in 
our case, the logarithm of wage is a function of the logarithm of age, of the skill level 
and of the educational attainment), and the other one, the selection equation, which 
measures the likelihood of observing the wage (i.e. the likelihood of working) as a 
function of some individual characteristics. In the estimation of our selection equation, 
we used as explanatory variables sex and the logarithm of age, which is in turn supposed 
to determine the wage too. 
With the two-step procedure, the selection equation is estimated through a probit model, 
and then the estimated parameters are used to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio. The 
value of the latter is included as an additional explanatory variable in the wage equation, 
which is then estimated with a simple OLS procedure. The results are reported in Table 2 
below. The estimation was conducted on the sub-sample of individuals at working age 
(16-64). 
 
 
Table 2 – Heckman Selection Model, Two-Step Estimates 
Dependent variable: logarithm of wage  
 Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
constant 7.032117 0.3145104 22.36 0.000 
ln(age) 0.697818 0.0833084 8.38 0.000 
sex -0.466210 0.1018222 -4.58 0.000 
qualification 0.396613 0.0771516 5.14 0.000 
education 0.525011 0.0871646 6.02 0.000 
Mills ratio 0.216005 0.1473164 1.47 0.143 
Selection     
ln(age) 0.338583 0.0807227 4.19 0.000 
sex -1.549158 0.2802896 -5.53 0.000 
qualification 1.020388 0.2728658 3.74 0.000 
children under 6 0.168214 0.2368365 0.71 0.478 
region -0.751549 0.2980307 -2.52 0.012 
rho 0.762760    
sigma 0.283187    
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The interpretation of the coefficients for the wage equation thus follows that of a simple 
linear regression. As we can observe in Table 2, age, schooling and skill level have a 
positive effect on the wage, while being a woman shows a negative effect. 
It is important to say that the aim of the wage equation within the model is that of 
obtaining an efficient estimate for an eventual wage income only for those individuals 
that are observed to be inactive in the survey, in the case that, after a policy reform, one 
or more of them will change their labour market status and become wage workers. In this 
case, through these estimates, we will be able to assign an estimated wage to the 
individual that has changed his/her labour market status after the simulation run. 
For all the other individuals that are observed to receive a wage in the survey, we use 
instead the observed wage level and not the estimated one.  
Parameters of equation (B.2) were obtained through the estimation of a binomial logit 
model, assuming that the residual terms iε  are distributed according to the Extreme 
Value Distribution – Type I11. The estimation was conducted on the sub-sample of 
individuals at working age (16-64). 
Our explanatory variables include individual characteristics such as the logarithm of 
predicted real wage, sex, skill and education level, the region of residence and a variable 
accounting for the presence or not of children under 6 years old in the household. The 
model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Results are presented in Table 3. 
A binomial model states that the probability of observing the dependent variable 
assuming value one, given the explanatory variables (OCSmi = 1|Zmi), is equal to the 
cumulative distribution function of iε  (the Extreme Value Type I distribution in our 
case), evaluated at β·Zmi, that is: 
[ ] ( )miZmimimi eZFZOCS ⋅−−=⋅== ββ exp)(|1Pr .         (B.18) 
                                                 
11 The Extreme Value distribution (Type I) is also known as Gumbel (from the name of the statistician who 
first studied it) or double exponential distribution, and it is a special case of the Fisher-Tippett distribution. 
It can take two forms: one is based on the smallest extreme and the other on the largest. We will focus on 
the latter, which is the one of interest for us. The standard Gumbel distribution function (maximum) has the 
following probability and cumulative density functions, respectively: 
pdf: ( )xexxf −−−= exp)(  
CDF: ( )xexF −−= exp)( . 
 86   
Table 3 – Binary Logit Model for Labour Status’ Condition 
Dependent Variable: Activity Status 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
ln(real wage) 0.197215 0.046458 4.245037 0.0000 
sex -1.894812 0.407759 -4.646894 0.0000 
qualification 1.440805 0.425709 3.384482 0.0007 
region -0.718504 0.329501 -2.180586 0.0292 
children under 6 0.269124 0.297251 0.905378 0.3653 
education -0.763275 0.671696 -1.136341 0.2558 
Mean dependent var 0.664706 S.D. dependent var 0.473488 
S.E. of regression 0.376673 Akaike info criterion 0.901535 
Sum squared resid 23.26880 Schwarz criterion 1.012210 
Log likelihood -70.63049 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.946446 
Avg. log likelihood -0.415473   
 
 
 
The effects that the explanatory variables have on the dependent binomial variable are 
not linear, because they get channelled through a cumulative distribution function. Thus, 
by observing the values and signs of the estimated coefficients, we can say something 
about the effect that explanatory variables have on the probability that the dependent 
binomial variable takes value one (wage worker), relatively to the probability that it takes 
value zero, but not in a linear way. 
For instance, expected real wage and qualification seem to influence in a positive way 
the probability that the dependent variable takes value one (the more qualified the 
individual is, the higher is the probability for him/her to be employed), as well as the 
presence of children under 6 does, which is the opposite of what was expected, but 
anyway this result is not significant. Moreover, for men the probability of being 
employed is higher than for women, as the variable SEX, which takes value zero for men 
and one for women, shows a negative coefficient. The same can be said about the region 
of residence: people living in the first region have a higher probability of being employed 
than people living in the second one. The variable referring to education, instead, seems 
to have a negative influence on the probability of being employed, which is the opposite 
of what we expected, and anyway it is not highly significant. 
However, with the estimated coefficients we cannot perfectly predict the true labour 
market statuses that are actually observed in the survey. Thus, following the procedure 
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described in Duncan and Weeks (1998), we drew a set of error terms iε  for each 
individual from the extreme value distribution, in order to obtain an estimate that is 
consistent with the observed activity or inactivity conditions. From these drawn values, 
we select 100 error terms for each individual, in such a way that, when adding it to the 
deterministic part of the model, it perfectly predicts the activity status that is observed in 
the survey. In other words, the residual term for an individual that is observed to be a 
wage earner in the survey should be such that: 
0ˆ6ˆˆˆˆ)(ˆˆ 654321 >+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+ mimimimmimimi SCHCHAREAQSEXRWLog εββββββα , 
while, for an individual that is observed to be inactive in the survey, the same inequality 
should be of opposite sign (≤). 
After a policy change, only the deterministic part of the model is recomputed. Then, by 
adding the random error terms previously drawn to the recomputed deterministic 
component, a probability distribution over the two alternatives (being a wage worker or 
being inactive) is generated for each individual. This implies that the model does not 
assign every individual from the sample to one particular alternative, but it gives the 
individual probabilities of being in one condition rather than in the other. This way, the 
model does not identify a particular alternative for each individual after the policy 
change, but generates a probability distribution over the different alternatives12. 
 
 
 
3.2. The CGE Model 
 
The CGE model for the fictitious economy is characterized by a representative household 
who maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function with three arguments: leisure and two 
consumption goods. These commodities are also used as inputs, together with capital and 
labour, in the production process, which is operated by two firms following a Leontief 
technology in the aggregation of value added and the intermediate composite good, a 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function for assembling capital and labour into 
value added, and a Leontief function in the aggregation of intermediate goods. Both 
                                                 
12 This procedure is also described in Creedy and Kalb (2005). See also Creedy et al. (2002b). 
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factors of production, capital and labour, are mobile among sectors. The capital 
endowment is exogenously fixed, while labour supply is endogenously determined 
through household’s utility maximization (subject to fixed time endowment). The wage 
elasticity of labour supply is estimated from the household survey, in order to have 
consistency in labour supply behaviour between the two models. Investments are 
savings-driven, while government maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function to buy 
consumption goods and uses labour and capital. The public sector also raises taxes on 
household’s income and tariffs on imported goods, while it pays transfers to the 
representative household. For the foreign sector we have adopted the Armington 
assumption of constant elasticity of substitution for the formation of the composite good 
(domestic production delivered to domestic market plus imports) which is sold on the 
domestic market. Domestic production is partially delivered to the domestic market and 
partially exported, according to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. 
The small country hypothesis is assumed (the economy is price taker in the world 
market). 
 
 
Table 4 – SAM of the Economy 
 C1 C2 S1 S2 K L H G SI RoW Total
C1   57.5 15.5   95.2 61.2 30.3 23.5 283.3 
C2   17.1 23.5   312.8 48.5 14.2 76.5 492.5 
S1 283.3          283.3 
S2  492.5         492.5 
K   72.2 23.0    13.1   108.3 
L   83.2 353.8    116.4   553.4 
H     108.3 553.4  39.8   701.5 
G   12.3 17.7   249.0    279.0 
SI       44.5    44.5 
RoW   41.0 59.0       100.0 
Total 283.3 492.5 283.3 492.5 108.3 553.4 701.5 269.9 44.5 100.0  
 
Cq: consumption of good q; Sq: sector q; K: capital account; L: labour account; H: representative 
household account; G: public sector; SI: savings-investments account, RoW: Rest of the World 
account. 
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In the model there are in total 49 variables and 41 equations, which, with the 8 
exogenous variables (capital endowment, KS, time endowment, TS, public transfers, TF, 
the four world prices PWEq and PWMq, and the numeraire, PC), fully determine the 
model and allows for satisfaction of Walras’ law (we have a redundant equation). 
The calibration of the parameters of the CGE model is done on the basis of a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the economy, in such a way that the benchmark situation 
is consistent with that of the microsimulation module (for instance, in the benchmark of 
the two models we have the same average income tax rate, the same average marginal 
propensity to save, the same budget shares for consumption of the two goods, and so on). 
The SAM for the economy under study and the initial values of some other variables are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5, while the equations of the model can be found in Table 6 
below. The data in the SAM are in millions of the monetary unit we have used for the 
survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Values of Parameters for CGE Model 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Elasticity of substitution in production function 
(aggregation of capital and labour) 0.7 0.5 
Elasticity of substitution for Armington composite 
good 0.7 1.2 
Elasticity of transformation for exports and domestic 
production delivered to the domestic market -2.0 -3.0 
Initial tariff rates on imports 0.3 0.3 
 
Initial time endowment 656.69  
Wage elasticity of labour supply 
(estimated from the household survey) -0.18665  
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Table 6 – Equations for the CGE Model 
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Demand for investment goods SIIP qqq ⋅=⋅ α  C.8 
Price of imports in local currency ( ) ERPWMtmPM qqq ⋅⋅+= 1  C.9 
Price of exports in local currency ERPWEPE qq ⋅=  C.10 
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Armington FOC for imports 
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CET FOC for exports 
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Market clearing condition for labour LSLGL
q
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=
2
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Market clearing condition for capital KSKGK
q
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Market clearing condition for 
commodity q 
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 C.17 
Income definition TFPCLSPLKSPKY ⋅+⋅+⋅=  C.18 
Disposable income minus savings ( ) SYtyCBUD −⋅−= 1  C.19 
Zero profit condition in production 
function ∑
=
⋅⋅+
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1s
sqsq
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 C.20 
Zero profit condition in Armington 
function qqqqqq
XDDPDDMPMXP ⋅+⋅=⋅  C.21 
Zero profit condition in CET function qqqqqq XDDPDDEPEXDPD ⋅+⋅=⋅  C.22 
Demand of commodity q by 
government 
( )TFPCTAXREVCGCGP qqq ⋅−⋅=⋅ α  C.23 
Demand of capital by government ( )TFPCTAXREVKGKGPK ⋅−⋅=⋅ α  C.24 
Demand of labour by government ( )TFPCTAXREVLGLGPL ⋅−⋅=⋅ α  C.25 
Tax revenues ( )∑
=
⋅⋅+⋅=
2
1q
qq ERPWMtmYtyTAXREV  C.26 
Number of variables: 49 
Number of equations: 41 
Number of exogenous variables: 8 
Walras’ law satisfied 
Model homogeneous of degree one 
Exogenous variables: 
- capital endowment (KS) 
- time endowment (TS) 
- public transfers (TF) 
- world prices (PWEq and PWMq) 
- numeraire: consumer price index (PC) 
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Variables: 
 
PK         return to capital 
PL         wage rate 
Pq          Armington composite good price 
PDq       output price 
PMq       import prices in local currency 
PEq        export prices in local currency 
ER         exchange rate (numeraire) 
PC         consumer price index 
KS         capital endowment (exogenous) 
LS         labour supply (endogenous) 
TS         time endowment (exogenous) 
Xq          domestic sales-Armington 
composite 
XDq       domestic output 
Mq         imports 
Eq          exports 
Kq         capital demand by firms 
KG        capital demand by government 
Lq          labour demand by firms 
LG        labour demand by government 
Iq           demand for investment goods 
Cq          demand for consumption goods 
Cl          demand for leisure 
CGq       government commodity demand 
Y            RH's income 
S            RH's savings 
CBUD   RH's disposable income 
TF         public transfers to RH (exogenous) 
PDDq          price of domestic production delivered to domestic market 
XDDq          domestic production delivered to domestic markets 
PWEq          export prices in foreign currency (exogenous) 
PWMq         import prices in foreign currency (exogenous) 
TAXREV      tax revenue 
 
Parameters: 
 
ty              direct income tax rate 
tmq             tariff rate on imports 
mps          RH’s marginal propensity to save 
ioqs             technical coefficients 
aFq            efficiency parameter of firm q’s production function γFq            share parameter in CES production function σFq            elasticity of substitution in CES production function 
αHq           C-D power of commodity q in RH’s utility function 
αHl           C-D power of leisure in RH’s utility function 
αIq             C-D power of good q in Bank’s utility function 
αCGq         C-D power of commodity q in gov.’s utility function 
αKG          C-D power of capital in government’s utility function 
αLG          C-D power of labour in government’s utility function 
aAq             efficiency parameter in Armington function γAq             share parameter in Armington function σAq            elasticity of substitution in Armington function 
aTq             efficiency parameter in CET function γTq            distribution parameter in CET function σTq            elasticity of transformation in CET function ε_LS         wage elasticity of labour supply 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Linking the Models 
 
The basic difficulty of this approach is to ensure consistency between the micro and 
macro levels of analysis. For this reason, one may introduce a system of equations to 
ensure the achievement of consistency between the two models13. In practice, this 
consists in imposing the macro results obtained with the CGE model onto the 
microeconomic level of analysis. In particular: 
1) changes in the commodity prices, Pq, must be equal to those resulting from the 
CGE model; 
                                                 
13 This way, what happens in the MS module can be made consistent with the CGE modelling by adjusting 
parameters in the MS model, but, from a theoretical point of view, it would be more satisfying to obtain 
consistency by modelling behaviour identically in the two models. 
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2) changes in average earnings with respect to the benchmark in the micro-
simulation must be equal to changes in the wage rate obtained with the CGE 
model; 
3) changes in the return to capital of the micro-simulation module must be equal to 
the same changes observed after the simulation run in the CGE model; 
4) changes in the number of wage workers in the micro-simulation model must 
match those observed in the CGE model. 
For our model, these consistency conditions translate into the following set of 
constraints, which could be called linking equations: 
 
Consumption levels: ( )CGEqqq P
CE
C Δ+= 1  (M.1)
Logarithm of wage 
earnings: ( ) ( )[ ]CGEmimi PLLYLogYLLog Δ+⋅= 1ˆ  (M.2)( )CGEmm PKKSYK Δ+⋅= 1  (M.3)Capital income: 
CGE
m
NC
i
mi
m
NC
i
mi
EMP
WA
W
m
m
Δ=⋅
∑∑
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= =
= = 100
ˆ
24
1 1
24
1 1  (M.4)Employment level: 
 
The variables with no superscripts are those coming from the microsimulation module; 
those with the ^ notation correspond to the ones that have been estimated: in particular, 
is the wage level resulting from the regression model for individual i, member 
of household m, while  is the labour market status of individual i of household m 
deriving from the estimation of the binomial choice model. 
)ˆ( miLYLog
miWˆ
CGE
qPΔ ,  and CGEPLΔ CGEPKΔ  indicate, respectively, the change in the prices of goods, 
the change in the wage rate and in the return to capital deriving from the simulation run 
of the CGE model, while parameter CGEEMPΔ  is the employment level percentage 
change from the CGE. 
WAmi is a dummy variable taking value one if individual i of household m is at working 
age (16-64), and zero otherwise. From equation (M.4), the number of employed over the 
total number of individuals at working age resulting from the MS model must be equal to 
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the change in the employment level observed after the CGE run. This implies that the 
CGE model determines the employment level of the economy after the simulation, and 
that the MS model selects which individuals among the inactive persons have the highest 
probability of becoming employed (if the employment level is increased from the CGE 
simulation result), or either who, among the wage workers, has the lowest probability of 
being employed after the policy change (if the employment level is decreased)14. 
One possible way of imposing the equality between the two sets of parameters of system 
of equations (M) is through a change in the parameters of the selection and regression 
models. Following Bourguignon et al. (2003b), we restrict this change in the parameters 
to a change in the intercept of the two functions (B.1) and (B.2). The justification for this 
choice is that it implies neutrality of the changes, that is, changing the intercepts a of 
equations (B.1) just shifts proportionally the estimated wages of all individuals, without 
causing any change in the ranking between one individual and the other. The same 
applies for the activity status choice equation: we choose to change the intercept α of 
equation (B.2), and this will shift proportionally all the individual probabilities of being a 
wage worker, without changing their relative positions in the probability distribution, 
only to let some more individuals to become employed (or some less if the employment 
rate of the CGE model is decreased), irrespectively of their personal characteristics. This 
change in the intercept will be of the amount that is necessary to reach the number of 
wage workers resulting from the CGE model. Thus, this choice preserves the ranking of 
individuals according to their ex-ante probability of being employed, which was 
previously determined by the estimation of the binomial model. For this reason the 
change in the intercept parameter satisfies this neutrality property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 And, in this case, his/her new wage level will be determined by the regression model of wage earnings. 
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4. THE TOP-DOWN/BOTTOM-UP APPROACH 
 
This approach was developed by Savard (2003). It allows overcoming the problem of the 
lack of consistency between the micro and macro levels of the Top-Down approach by 
introducing a bi-directional link between the two models: this is the reason why this 
approach is also called “Top-Down/Bottom-Up”. According to this method, indeed, 
aggregate results from the MS model (such as consumption levels or labour supply) are 
incorporated into the CGE model, and a loop is used to run both models iteratively until 
the two produce convergent results. 
The value added of this approach is that it takes into account the feedback effects that 
come from the micro level of analysis, which are instead completely disregarded by the 
Top-Down model. The basic assumption behind this approach is that the microeconomic 
effects provided by the MS model run do not correspond to the aggregate behaviours of 
the representative households used in the CGE model, and that it is thus necessary to take 
these effects back into the CGE model to fully account for the effects of a simulated 
policy. A stylized scheme of the way in which this approach works can be observed in 
Figures 5 and 6 (Chapter 1, pages 59-60). 
The bilateral communication between the two levels of analysis is achieved through a set 
of vectors of changes, as in the Top-Down approach: from the macro to the micro level 
of analysis the communication is guaranteed by the changes in the price, wage and return 
vector and in the employment levels, as before, while from the micro to the macro level 
the communication we apply two different strategies: in one version, we will use as input 
for the CGE model a vector of changes in the aggregate consumption and in the labour 
supply levels from the MS model15; in another version of the same model, only the 
                                                 
15 The choice for consumption and labour supply as communicating variables is made following Savard 
(2003). However, as both consumption and labour supply are not exogenous in the CGE model, we have to 
change some of the initial hypothesis of the model. First, we remove the equations determining 
consumption demand by the representative household (equation C.1 in Table 6), substituting them with the 
following single equation: . In the initial hypothesis (endogenous consumption) we had 
2 endogenous variables (C
∑
=
⋅=
2
1i
ii CPCBUD
i) and 2 equations. Now we have 2 exogenous variables and one equation. As we 
need to insure the balancing of the household’s budget constraint, a variable needs now to be endogenized 
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change in the labour supply level which results from the MS model will be used as input 
for the CGE model16. The process is iterated as many times as it is necessary to come to 
a convergent point, that is, when convergence (at a certain number of decimals) is 
obtained in the aggregate variable levels of the two models. 
 
 
 
 
5. SIMULATION 
 
We will now run a policy simulation with each of the three models. The simulation will 
be an exogenous shock on the world price level of the good exported by sector 2, which 
is the labour intensive sector in our stylized economy. The world price of good 2 is 
reduced of 64% from its initial value. 
The simulation results for the most relevant macroeconomic variables are reported in 
percentage changes in Tables 7 and 8. In the tables, also the two different strategies 
adopted for the TD/BU approach are taken into account, so that we will compare the 
results coming from the introduction into the CGE model of, respectively, the 
consumption level and the labour supply coming from the microsimulation module, and 
only the labour supply. 
In general, we can say that we have very similar results for most of the macro variables 
in all the four simulations. The shock has negative effects on the economy. Indeed, as we 
can observe in Table 7, the fall in the price of the exported good for sector 2 causes a 
reduction of the production level for this sector, which reduces its demand for both 
                                                                                                                                                 ( ) ( ) ( )TFPCLSPLKSPKtympsCBUDin the following equation: ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅−= 11 . Following Savard, we 
choose to endogenize the marginal propensity to save, mps, which is now a variable that changes in order 
to satisfy the budget constraint. 
In addition, we introduce an exogenous level of labour supply into the CGE model, and just leave out the 
equation that determines the demand for leisure (equation C.2 in Table 6). This way, equation C.3 will now 
yield the demand for leisure as the time remaining after having supplied an exogenous level of labour. 
16 In this case, we only introduce an exogenous level of labour supply into the CGE model, just leaving out 
the equation that determines the demand for leisure (equation C.2 in Table 6). 
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factors of production. However, due to the depreciation of local currency, the reduction 
in the level of exports is lower than the 64% world price reduction. For the same reason, 
exports for the other production sector become convenient, so that for this sector we 
observe an increase in the level of the exported good, an increase in the production level, 
and in the demand for capital and labour. The depreciation of local currency has a 
negative effect on the level of imports, which contributes to a decrease of the amount of 
goods sold on the domestic market. 
The lower level of labour demand as a whole (the second sector is labour-intensive, as 
can be observed in the SAM, Table 4) generates a reduction in the wage rate, which 
causes a decrease in labour supply. The opposite is observed for capital, as the first sector 
is more capital-intensive. As a consequence of the change in the price of the factors, 
government increases its demand for labour input and decreases the demand for capital, 
as the latter has become relatively more expensive. 
As the income of the representative household is based chiefly on the supply of labour, 
we observe a reduction in nominal income and, as a consequence, of savings and 
consumption expenditure. The amount of consumption goods always decrease, but the 
percentage change varies according to the change in their relative price: the commodity 
produced by the second sector has become relatively more expensive, due to the negative 
shock that hit the sector. 
As investments are savings-driven, we observe also a reduction in the demand for 
investment goods (again, the investment good produced by the second sector is now 
relatively more expensive, so we observe a higher reduction for the demand of this 
good). 
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Table 7 – Simulation Results: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
 
Integrated 
Approach 
Top-Down 
Approach 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply) 
Government Surplus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wage Rate -14.87 -14.67 -14.42 -14. 64
Capital return 19.70 19.30 17.91 19.13
Consumer Price Index (num.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Exchange rate 53.83 53.76 53.83 53.70
Labour Supply -1.00 -1.18 -1.32 -1.32
Government Use of Labour 4.82 4.23 3.72 4.06
Government Use of Capital -25.45 -25.45 -24.72 -25.43
Income* -9.50 -9.39 -9.50 -9.48
Disposable Income* -9.50 -9.39 -9.50 -9.48
Consumption Expenditure* -9.50 -9.39 -7.90 -9.48
Marginal Propensity to Save 0.00 0.00 -16.22 0.00
Savings* -9.28 -9.39 -24.18 -9.48
-9.28 -9.48 -9.63 Tax Revenues -9.58
 
* For the integrated model, these changes are computed as average percentage changes across 
households. 
 
 
 
Table 8 – Simulation Results: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
 
Integrated 
Approach 
Top-Down 
Approach 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply) 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2
Commodity Prices -0.99 0.30 -1.23 0.38 -1.70 0.52 -1.27 0.39
Domestic Sales -8.69 -12.52 -8.81 -12.54 -10.21 -12.05 -8.88 -12.64
Domestic Production 27.81 -14.20 27.91 -14.31 26.77 -13.86 27.84 -14.43
Labour Demand 43.52 -13.22 43.05 -13.36 41.08 -12.94 42.88 -13.48
Capital Demand 13.07 -26.82 13.14 -26.72 12.72 -25.84 13.15 -26.76
Consumption* -8.60 -9.78 -8.26 -9.73 -6.58 -8.30 -8.32 -9.84
Investments -7.65 -8.84 -8.26 -9.73 -22.87 -24.57 -8.32 -9.84
Imports -32.92 -47.63 -33.11 -47.57 -34.37 -47.21 -33.16 -47.60
Exports 207.36 -78.38 209.23 -78.53 209.10 -78.48 209.11 -78.59
 
* For the integrated model, these percentage changes are computed as average percentage changes across households. 
 
 
 
However, a particular result needs further explanations: savings and investments in the 
TD/BU-Consumption model decrease much more than in the other three models. The 
reason for this lays in the fact that, in order to be able to introduce exogenous 
consumption levels into the CGE model, we must endogenize one variable in the 
 99 
households’ budget constraint to keep the equilibrium in this constraint. Savard’s choice 
is for the marginal propensity to save, and we follow his approach. But the consequence 
of this will be a change in the household behaviour with respect to the initial assumptions 
made for the benchmark. Indeed, the marginal propensity to save of the household will 
decrease, and thus also households’ savings. As in our model investments are savings-
driven, this will generate a further reduction of investments. We will analyse this aspect 
further in the next subsection (5.1). 
 
With respect to the microeconomic results, and mainly the changes in poverty and 
inequality, we can observe in Table 9 and 10 that the differences are generally significant 
only for the case of the integrated model. 
The underlying variable for the computation of the indices is per-capita real disposable 
income, obtained by dividing disposable income by the household specific consumer 
price index17, and then dividing it again by the number of adult equivalents resulting by 
the “Oxford” or “Old OECD” scale (see OECD, 1982). This equivalence scale calculates 
the number of adult equivalents living in a household by assigning a value of 1 to the 
first household member, of 0.7 to each additional adult and of 0.5 to each child: 
AE = 1 + 0.7⋅(#Adults – 1) + 0.5⋅(#Children). 
First of all, we observe that the Top-Down and the TD/BU-Labour Supply approach 
show almost identical results for what concerns both poverty and inequality indices. 
The TD/BU-C&LS model we observe a smaller effect on inequality, but in the same 
direction as for the other two models, and the same is true for poverty. 
The biggest difference in the microeconomic results is to be detected in the integrated 
approach, where we observe a higher increase both in the inequality and poverty indices. 
The increase in inequality for the integrated approach is also confirmed by the higher 
level of the Severity of Poverty Index, which measures the degree of inequality among 
the poor, while a higher Poverty Gap Index indicates that the gap between the income of 
the poor and the poverty line has increased (see Appendix A for more details on poverty 
indices). 
                                                 
17 The household specific price index is computed using households’ consumption shares and the change in 
prices deriving from the CGE model, as follows:   . ( )∑
=
Δ+⋅=
2
1
1
q
CGE
qmqm PCPI η
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Table 9 – Inequality Indices on Disposable per Adult Equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 
Benchmark 
Values 
Integrated 
Approach* 
Top-Down 
Approach* 
TD/BU 
Approach 
(C & LS)* 
TD/BU 
Approach 
(LS)* 
Gini Index 33.96 2.81% 1.62% 1.47% 1.60% 
Atkinson’s Index, ε = 0.5 9.60 4.51% 2.73% 2.48% 2.70% 
Coefficient of Variation 71.80 3.13% 2.29% 2.14% 2.27% 
Generalized Entropy Measures:      
I(c), c = 2 25.78 6.36% 4.64% 4.32% 4.60% 
Mean Logarithmic Deviation, I(0) 19.93 3.85% 2.05% 1.81% 2.02% 
20.55 5.17% 3.38% 3.11% Theil Coefficient, I(1) 3.34% 
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Poverty Indices on Disposable per Adult equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 
Benchmark 
Values 
Integrated 
Approach* 
Top-Down 
Approach* 
TD/BU 
Approach 
(C & LS)* 
TD/BU 
Approach 
(LS)* 
General Poverty Line   
Headcount Index, P0 39.34 16.67% 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 
Poverty Gap Index, P1 9.88 40.09% 28.48% 28.07% 28.42% 
Poverty Severity Index, P2 0.00 39.99% 29.42% 28.98% 29.36% 
Extreme Poverty Line   
Headcount Index, P0 4.92 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 33.33% 
Poverty Gap Index, P1 0.96 3.34% 3.18% 3.04% 3.15% 
0.00 -0.36% -0.34% -0.27% -0.34% Poverty Severity Index, P2
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
 
5.1. More on the TD/BU Approach 
 
In this subsection we want to investigate further what happens within the TD/BU 
approach in general, and in particular we will try to understand which is the main cause 
of the unusual deviation that is observed in the level of savings under the TD/BU-C&LS 
approach. 
At a first intuition, such a deviation could be generated either by a problem of initial data 
inconsistency between the two datasets (the SAM and the survey), or by what we will 
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refer to as “feedback effects” from the microeconomic level of analysis. With this 
concept we intend to incorporate all the effects that derive from a response (behavioural 
or not) of the agents in the MS model that is different from the one observed in the CGE 
model for the Representative Household (RH). This difference could be due either to a 
different way of modelling a particular behaviour in the two models (for instance, in the 
case of labour supply, the MS model uses a discrete and individualized concept of labour 
supply, while in the CGE model we have a continuous labour supply defined for the RH), 
or simply to the fact that in the MS model we consider single households as the unit of 
modelling, while in the CGE model we have a unique RH (as for consumption and 
savings, for instance). 
In order to check whether the problem derives from an initial data inconsistency, we will 
run the same model using a new Social Accounting Matrix, which has been built in such 
a way that it is fully consistent with the data observed in the survey appropriately 
aggregated. As we can observe in Table 11, the variables that were adjusted to survey 
data are those in the grey cells, while all the other columns and rows were then 
rebalanced to obtain full consistency18. By comparing this SAM with the original one in 
Table 4, we can observe that in our case initial data inconsistencies were not very big 
(the biggest inconsistency is observed in the savings level). 
 
 
Table 11 – SAM of the Economy made consistent with the Household Survey 
 C1 C2 S1 S2 K L H G SI RoW Total
C1   57.8 15.6   95.4 62.6 28.1 23.6 283.0 
C2   17.1 23.5   313.2 48.8 13.6 76.6 492.8 
S1 283.3          283.0 
S2  492.5         492.8 
K   73.4 23.2    13.2   109.8 
L   81.7 353.8    117.5   552.6 
H     109.8 552.6  38.7   701.2 
G   12.3 17.7   250.8    280.8 
SI       41.7    41.7 
RoW   40.8 59.4       100.2 
Total 283.0 492.8 283.0 492.8 109.8 552.6 701.2 280.8 41.7 100.2  
 
Cq: consumption of good q; Sq: sector q; K: capital account; L: labour account; H: representative household 
account; G: public sector; SI: savings-investments account, RoW: Rest of the World account. 
                                                 
18 To rebalance the SAM a least square minimization method was used. 
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With the SAM shown in Table 11, we will run the shock on the export price of sector 2 
as before (-64%). Results are reported in Tables 12 and 13 for the TD/BU-C&LS 
(consumption and labour supply levels are reported from the MS model into the CGE 
model) and the TD/BU-LS (only labour supply is reported from the micro level) 
approaches. Observing the result for savings in the TD/BU-C&LS approach, we can see 
that in our case data inconsistencies were responsible only for a 2% change in the 
marginal propensity to save and in the savings level. This means that the remaining 
change of around 13% (the difference between the change observed in the other 
approaches, around 9%, and the one observed in this approach, 22.24%) is to be 
attributed to the feedback effects from the MS model. 
Observing the results for the TD/BU-LS approach we discover instead that the change in 
labour supply that was observed after the first iteration (-1.32% instead of -1.18% of the 
first iteration) was due only to a problem of data inconsistency and not to feedback 
effects from the MS model. This means that modelling labour supply as a discrete choice 
and individually in the MS model does not affect the results of the macro model in a 
significant way, at least for what concerns our particular case. 
 
 
 
Table 12 – Simulation Results with Consistent Data: Percentage Changes 
 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply) 
Government Surplus 0.00 0.00 
Wage Rate -14.63 -14. 81 
Capital return 18.36 19.37 
Consumer Price Index (num.) 0.00 0.00 
Exchange rate 53.90 53.80 
Labour Supply -1.18 -1.18 
Government Use of Labour 4.13 4.42 
Government Use of Capital -24.89 -25.48 
Income -9.45 -9.43 
Disposable Income -9.45 -9.43 
Consumption Expenditure -8.14 -9.43 
Marginal Propensity to Save -14.13 0.00 
-22.24 -9.43 Savings 
Tax Revenues -9.57 -9.52 
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Table 13 – Simulation Results with Consistent Data: Percentage Changes 
 
TD/BU Approach 
(Cons. and LS) 
TD/BU Approach 
(Labour Supply) 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2
Commodity Prices -1.44 0.44 -1.07 0.33
Domestic Sales -9.86 -12.06 -8.89 -12.55
Domestic Production 26.77 -13.80 27.65 -14.27
Labour Demand 41.65 -12.85 43.17 -13.30
Capital Demand 12.70 -25.99 13.05 -26.76
Consumption -7.13 -8.45 -8.45 -9.73
Investments -21.11 -22.58 -8.45 -9.73
Imports -34.12 -47.30 -33.10 -47.63
207.50 -78.34Exports 207.46 -78.43
 
 
 
Once we have established that in the case of the TD/BU-C&LS approach most of the 
deviation in the savings level (13% against a 2% due to data inconsistencies) is to be 
attributed to feedback effects coming from the micro level of analysis, we want now to 
understand which is the variable or the parameter that affects mostly this deviation. 
Intuitively, as we have already seen with the TD/BU-LS approach that the different way 
of modelling labour supply does not have big effects, then this deviation in the savings 
level must be due to the fact that in the MS model we have expenditure shares and tax 
parameters that are specific to every single household, while in the CGE model there is 
only one RH group with “average” shares and parameters (in this sense ours is an 
extreme case, as we have only one RH in the CGE model). In order to understand which 
is the parameter that particularly affects the deviation in the savings level, we run the MS 
model using for all the households the RH’s shares taken from the CGE model, instead 
of the shares and parameters that are observed in the survey for each household. The 
communicating variables from the MS model to the CGE model will remain the ones 
used in the TD/BU-C&LS approach, that is consumption levels and labour supply. 
Results in Table 14 clearly indicate that the main cause of difference between the two 
models is to be detected in the income tax rate, while labour supply and expenditure 
shares account only for a small part of it (the change in the savings level remains at 22% 
in these cases). When we use all the parameters from the CGE model (labour supply 
change, income tax rate, mps and consumption shares), the deviation in the savings level 
is almost reduced to zero, as it was to be expected. 
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Table 14 – TD/BU-C&LS approach with consistent data: RH shares from CGE model used in the MS 
model (Percentage Changes, CGE Model Results) 
 only ty only ΔLS
only
ηI & mps
ΔLS, ty, 
mps & ηI
Marginal propensity to save 2.92 -14.82 -14.47 0.12 
-6.78 -22.87 -22.55 -9.33 Savings 
 
 
 
These results are not surprising, as the income tax rate in the MS model is modelled in a 
way that is not linear with respect to the income level, as the rate depends on the income 
brackets to which household income belongs. Of course this feature is not captured at all 
in the CGE model, where we have a unique tax rate for the RH that is merely 
proportional to his income. Under the TD/BU-C&LS approach, while transmitting the 
consumption level from the MS to the CGE model, we were implicitly transmitting a 
level of disposable (after tax) income that was incompatible with the one of the CGE 
model19. 
As a consequence of our modelling choices (made following Savard, 2003), all the effect 
of the mismatching between the disposable income levels of the two models is going into 
the change in the marginal propensity to save, then into the savings and investments 
levels as a consequence, but it was not transmitted in a significant way to the rest of the 
economy. Indeed, if we observe the results in Tables 7 and 8, we would be tempted to 
say that, except for these big deviations in savings and investments levels (and a lower 
difference in the level of consumption), for the rest feedback effects do not appear to 
bring about significant differences in the results. This is even more evident once we have 
eliminated the effects coming from data inconsistencies (see Tables 12 and 13 compared 
with the columns for the Top-Down approach of Tables 7 and 8). 
                                                 
19 In both our models, consumption and savings are simply modelled as fixed proportions of disposable 
income. 
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But the deviation in the savings level is quite big20, even after having eliminated the 
problem of data inconsistency, and it allows us to believe that all the effects from the 
micro level of analysis are absorbed by the change in savings (and consequently of 
investments), and only in a very small part they are transmitted to the rest of the 
economy. Thus, a doubt arises: is consumption in our case21 the right variable to pass the 
feedback effects onto the CGE model? And then, the choice of letting the marginal 
propensity to save free to vary in the CGE model was the best channel to transmit these 
feedback effects to the whole economy? 
Which is the parameter we have seen to be driving the biggest change between the micro 
and the macro level? It is income the tax rate, which is in our case the main determinant 
of disposable income. So let us try to use this parameter (conveniently “aggregated” into 
a representative one), together with the change in aggregate labour supply, as 
communicating variable from the MS model to the CGE model. We will try to use not 
only the income tax rate from the MS model, but also the marginal propensity to save 
and the consumption shares. 
Results are shown in Tables 15 and 16. As we can see by comparing these results with 
the ones in Table 7 and 8 for the Top-Down approach, feedback effects from the micro 
level of analysis can be important. In particular, in our case, we observe a different path 
for disposable income and tax revenues (due to the reduction of the income tax rate), and 
for savings and consumption, whose percentage changes are now closer to the ones of the 
MS model (see Table 17). Anyway, full consistency between the CGE and the MS model 
results is only obtained when working with consistent data and when all the parameters 
(change in labour supply, tax rates, marginal propensity to save and consumption shares) 
are transmitted to the CGE model. However, if we report all these parameters from the 
MS model into the CGE model without having previously adjusted the data, we can see 
in Tables 15 and 16 that the problem of data inconsistency comes out again and distorts 
                                                 
20 In the paper by Savard (2003), where he analyses the case of Philippines using a TD/BU-C&LS 
approach, «… results of variation of this adjustment variable [the marginal propensity to save, n.d.a.] have 
shown to be relatively small» (page 21). This probably means that the feedback effects in that case are not 
particularly important for the results of the model. 
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the results of the CGE model, and especially the level of savings (and that of investments 
as a direct consequence)22. 
 
Here we would like to focus also on another important fact: the Top-Down approach 
suffers not only from the problem of a lack of feedback effects from the micro level of 
analysis, but it is not even exempt from the problem of data inconsistency. Indeed, the 
fact that the results of the two models (the micro and the macro model) do not coincide, 
as it is in our case, could be due either to a problem of initial data inconsistency or to a 
different microeconomic behaviour of the agents in the MS model. In any case, one has 
to decide which results are the most reliable ones in the case they do not coincide. 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
 
ΔLS & ty 
(inconsistent data)
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(inconsistent data)
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(consistent data) 
Government Surplus 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wage Rate -14.70 -14. 62 -14.84 
Capital return 19.43 18.95 19.46 
Consumer Price Index (num.) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Exchange rate 53.90 53.95 54.02 
Labour Supply -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
Government Use of Labour 2.26 2.13 1.62 
Government Use of Capital -26.96 -26.69 -27.55 
Income -9.39 -9.40 -9.44 
Disposable Income -8.47 -8.48 -8.12 
Consumption Expenditure -8.47 -7.93 -8.14 
Marginal Propensity to Save 0.00 -5.53 0.25 
Savings -8.47 -13.54 -7.89 
Tax Revenues -10.95 -10.97 -11.60 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 We remember that in our case consumption is not modelled in a significantly different way in the two 
models. However, there could be other cases where the level of consumption can be an important carrier of 
feedback effects from the micro level of analysis. 
22 Indeed, if we observe the two SAMs (Table 4 and Table 11, respectively), we can see that the level of 
savings is one of the biggest sources of data inconsistency between the SAM and the survey. 
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Table 16 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (CGE Model) 
 
ΔLS & ty 
(inconsistent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(inconsistent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(consistent data) 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Commodity Prices -1.21 0.37 -1.38 0.42 -1.09 0.33 
Domestic Sales -8.75 -12.00 -9.27 -11.77 -8.92 -11.73 
Domestic Production 28.13 -13.75 27.72 -13.53 27.87 -13.42 
Labour Demand 43.37 -12.79 42.66 -12.58 43.46 -12.44 
Capital Demand 13.28 -26.30 13.11 -25.93 13.20 -26.07 
Consumption -7.35 -8.81 -6.90 -8.24 -7.45 -8.35 
Investments -7.35 -8.81 -12.33 -13.91 -6.88 -8.19 
Imports -33.09 -47.31 -33.57 -47.16 -33.20 -47.23 
210.17 -78.31 210.17 -78.27Exports 208.79 -78.11 
 
 
 
 
Table 17 – Simulation Results TD/BU Approach: Percentage Changes (MS Model) 
 
ΔLS & ty 
(inconsistent data) 
ΔLS, ty, mps & ηI 
(consistent data) 
TD  Approach 
(inconsistent data) 
 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 1 Sector 2 
Consumption -7.23 -8.28 -7.45 -8.35 -7.21 -8.28 
-7.78 -7.88 -7.78 Savings 
 
 
 
We report also results on income inequality and poverty changes after the simulation of 
the shock, for the three models described above (Tables 18 and 19). 
As we can see, no big differences are observed with respect to the results reported in 
Tables 9 and 10. This means that, at least in our case, the fact of taking into account 
feedback effects does not have a strong influence on the results on income distribution 
and on poverty change. 
In any case, these values confirm once again the fact that the integrated approach tends to 
overestimate the effects of the shock on income inequality and poverty change, even 
though at the macro level we do not observe significant deviations in the main 
macroeconomic variables (see Tables 7 and 8). 
 
 
 
 108   
Table 18 – Inequality Indices on Disposable per Adult Equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 
Benchmark 
Values 
ΔLS & ty 
(inconsistent 
data)* 
ΔLS, ty, 
mps  & ηI 
(consistent 
data)* 
Gini Index 33.96 1.63% 1.64% 
Atkinson’s Index, ε = 0.5 9.60 2.76% 2.76% 
Coefficient of Variation 71.80 2.31% 2.32% 
Generalized Entropy Measures:    
I(c), c = 2 25.78 4.68% 4.68% 
Mean Logarithmic Deviation, I(0) 19.93 2.08% 2.08% 
20.55 3.41% Theil Coefficient, I(1) 3.42% 
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
Table 19 – Poverty Indices on Disposable per Adult equivalent Real Income (MS Model) 
 
Benchmark 
Values 
ΔLS & ty 
(inconsistent 
data)* 
ΔLS, ty, 
mps  & ηI 
(consistent 
data)* 
General Poverty Line  
Headcount Index, P0 39.34 8.33% 8.33% 
Poverty Gap Index, P1 9.88 28.54% 28.92% 
Poverty Severity Index, P2 0.00 29.49% 29.89% 
Extreme Poverty Line  
Headcount Index, P0 4.92 33.33% 33.33% 
Poverty Gap Index, P1 0.96 3.20% 3.31% 
0.00 -0.35% -0.34% Poverty Severity Index, P2
 
* Percentage deviations from benchmark values. 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we tried to give an assessment of the recent developments observed in 
methods that link together CGE and microsimulation models, with a special concern for 
the different linking approaches existing in the literature. Especially, we have focused 
our attention only on static models. By using data from a fictitious economy, we have 
built three models: one that follows the full integrated approach, as in Cockburn (2001); 
another one that follows the so called Top-Down approach, as it is developed in 
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Bourguignon et al. (2003b), and the last one that follows the method developed by 
Savard (2003), also known as Top-Down/Bottom-Up model. 
On one side we can say that a simple integrated approach like the one we have 
implemented in this paper is deficient on the side of the microeconomic specification and 
behavioural responses by individual agents. Anyway, the introduction of 
microeconometric behavioural equations into a CGE model looks of hard application and 
cumbersome for computational aspects. 
On the other side, a Top-Down approach completely disregards the possible feedback 
effects coming from the microeconomic side of the economy, which could affect also the 
macroeconomic variables, as we have seen in subsection 5.1. 
In our opinion, indeed, the TD/BU modelling looks the most complete approach, as on 
one side it can include all the possible microeconometric estimates to account for 
behavioural responses by individual agents, and on the other side it also takes into 
account the feedback effects from the micro to the macro level of analysis. «…The value 
added of this approach comes from the fact that feedback effects, provided by the 
household model, do not correspond to the aggregate behaviours of the representative 
households used in the CGE model» (Savard, 2003, page 20). 
However, two main problems arise when using this approach. First of all, the way in 
which these feedback effects are reported into the CGE model can affect results in a 
fundamental way. In particular, the fact of using shares or parameters instead of absolute 
levels (as in Savard’s approach, 2003, where consumption levels are used), when 
possible, seems to lead to more consistent results, especially for the fact that when 
transmitting absolute levels from the MS model one has to change the initial hypothesis 
of the CGE model (see section 4). Secondly, eventual data inconsistencies between the 
micro and the macro datasets can also affect results seriously, and this can be overcome 
only by adjusting either one or the other dataset, thus going back to the problem of data 
reconciliation encountered with the integrated model (see section 2). However, while 
with an integrated model we encounter this problem when building the model, when we 
run a TD/BU model without previously adjusting the data, we have the problem of data 
inconsistencies that enters the results and we are not able to distinguish which is the part 
of the change that is due to feedback effects and which is the part due to data 
inconsistencies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the literature that studies income inequality and poverty, we can observe a recent 
development of models that link together a macroeconomic model (usually a CGE 
model) and a microsimulation model. The reason for this lays in the fact that poverty and 
inequality are typically microeconomic issues, while the policy reforms or the shocks 
that are commonly simulated have often a strong macroeconomic impact on the economy 
under study. Indeed, the main advantage of linking these two models is that one is able to 
take into account full agents’ heterogeneity and the complexity of income distribution, 
while being able at the same time to consider the macroeconomic effects of the policy 
reforms. 
In this paper, we build a CGE-microsimulation model for the economy of Nicaragua, 
following the Top-Down approach (see Bourguignon et al., 2003b), that is, the reform is 
simulated first at the macro level with the CGE model, and then it is passed onto the 
microsimulation model through a vector of changes in some chosen variables, such as 
prices, wage rates, and unemployment levels. The main reason for this choice is that with 
such an approach, one can develop the two models (CGE and microsimulation) 
separately, thus being able to make use of behavioural micro-econometric equations, 
which are instead of more difficult introduction into a fully integrated model (see for 
instance Cockburn, 2001, and Cororaton and Cockburn, 2005) change. 
Moreover, the so called top-down approach appears to be particularly suited to the policy 
reform we are willing to simulate with the model: the Free Trade Agreement of Central 
America with the USA is mainly a macroeconomic reform, which on the other hand can 
have important effects on the distribution of income1. 
                                                 
1 The choice of a Top-Down approach that a priori disregards the possible feedback effects from the micro 
to the macro level of analysis is justified also from the fact that the reform we simulate produces very small 
changes in the microeconomic structure of the country. For instance, the change in the parameter ty (tax 
rate on income), which would be the communicating parameter from the micro to the macro level of 
analysis (see Chapter 2 for more details on the Top-Down/Bottom-Up approach that takes into account 
these the feedback effects), is in the range of 0.28 and 0.88 for urban households, and of -0.40 and 1.52 for 
the rural ones. We believe that these small changes are not sufficient to produce a significant adjustment in 
the macroeconomic structure of the economy. Moreover, as we do not have any specific information about 
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With such a model we try to study the possible changes in the distribution of income 
deriving from the Free Trade Agreement with USA. Our analysis finds only small 
changes both in the main macroeconomic variables and in the distribution of income and 
poverty indices. 
 
The Free Trade Agreement between the countries of the American isthmus and the 
United States (CAFTA) was signed in May 2004 (in August the Dominican Republic 
joined the Treaty, known from that moment on under the name DR-CAFTA). The 
Nicaraguan Congress ratified the Agreement in October 2005, and it came into force the 
1st April 2006. 
United States are a very important trade partner for Nicaragua. According to Sánchez and 
Vos (2005), in 2000 42% of Nicaraguan exports were directed to the US market, while 
22% of Nicaraguan imports came from the USA. The majority of commercial exchanges 
between the two countries concerns agricultural products. The Trade Agreement provides 
for a gradual reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA, to be carried on in the first 
ten years that follow the introduction of the Treaty. Anyway, for most products the 
biggest reduction will be in the first year. On the other side, Nicaraguan exports toward 
USA will benefit of gradual increases in the quotas of entry into the US market2. 
The introduction of DR-CAFTA in Nicaragua was controversial. The promoters of the 
Agreement claimed an improvement in competitiveness and efficiency in production, and 
also new investment in advanced technology by USA was expected3. On the other side, 
the opposers of the DR-CAFTA are afraid that it will bring about a high number of 
losers, especially among those working in the traditional sectors, such as the agricultural 
sector and the small enterprises, which will not be able to compete with the US 
producers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the level of tax evasion in the country, the level of parameter ty as it is currently computed in the 
microsimulation model could reasonably be overestimated. Hence the reason why all the analyses we 
perform on inequality and poverty measures are based on gross income. 
2 For a more detailed description of the new trade regulation enforced with the Free Trade Agreement, see 
Sánchez and Vos (2006). 
3 The largest US investments in Nicaragua are in the energy, communications, manufacturing, fisheries, 
and shrimp farming sectors. 
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As our model is only a one-country study, we are not going to model the changes in the 
regime adopted in USA with respect to goods and commodities coming from Nicaragua, 
as well as we will not take into consideration the quotas imposed on imports from USA, 
but only the changes in the tariff rates raised on the imported goods from USA. With 
such a model we try to study the possible changes in the distribution of income deriving 
from the Free Trade Agreement with the USA. The core of the microsimulation model 
follows the discrete choice labour supply approach, and it is based on a multinomial logit 
specification, while the CGE model is basically a standard one. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section two describes the model in detail, 
for each of its modules: the microsimulation and the CGE models, and how the two 
models are linked together. The third section deals with the results of the simulation, and 
section four concludes. 
 
 
The Nicaraguan Economy 
Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. 
Almost half of Nicaraguan population lives under the poverty line, while more than 25% 
of people in the rural areas are extremely poor4. The distribution of income shows a Gini 
index which is estimated to be 43.1 (World Bank, 2006) when computed on 
consumption, and 57.9 (ECLAC estimate, 2006) when computed on income. 
Agriculture employs about 30% of the workforce and accounts for about one fifth of the 
gross domestic product. The main commercial crops are coffee, cotton, and sugarcane; 
these, together with meat, are the largest exports. 
During the 1980s Nicaragua's economy underwent a strong recession, due both to the 
civil war, which caused the destruction of much of the country's infrastructure, and to the 
economic blockade staged by the USA from 1985 onwards. 
                                                 
4 Around 46% of the population lives below the poverty line established by the 2001 Living Standards 
Measurement Survey and 15% of the population lives in extreme poverty (The World Bank, 2003). These 
indicators are even higher according to other estimates, such as those contained in the Statistical Yearbook 
published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2006). The 
differences in the estimates come from different levels of the poverty line, and from the different reference 
variable adopted (consumption or income). 
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At the beginning of the 1990s began a significant process toward macroeconomic 
stabilization. Pacification, international aid, continued foreign investment and the re-
establishing of trading relationships with US have contributed to the stabilization 
process. Moreover, important trade reforms were carried over in those years: most of the 
quantitative restrictions to imports and exports were removed, and there was a net 
reduction of tariffs on imports, together with a liberalization of the financial sector. 
At the end of the 1990s the economy suffered a slowdown, due to the financing of the 
reconstruction after the damage caused by Hurricane Mitch in the fall of 1998, and to a 
simultaneous fall in the price of coffee and an increase in the price of oil. 
Nicaragua continues to be dependent on international aid and debt relief under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
 
 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
2.1. The Microsimulation Model 
 
The main role of the microsimulation module in the linked framework is to provide a 
detailed computation of net incomes at the household level, through a detailed 
description of the tax-benefit system of the economy, and to estimate individual 
behavioural responses to the policy change. 
The data source for the building and estimation of the microsimulation model is the 
“Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Nivel de Vida” (EMNV) of 2001, 
supplied by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos and The World Bank 
(Poverty and Human Resources Development Research Group, LSMS Data). 
The survey includes information regarding income and expenditures of 4191 families, in 
which live 22810 individuals. Of these individuals, 12645 are at working age (15-65). 
Moreover, we have information on 2079 non agricultural activities and 1547 farm 
activities. 
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The microsimulation model follows the discrete choice labour supply approach5, and it is 
estimated through a multinomial logit specification (see Bourguignon et al., 2003b and 
Bussolo and Lay, 2003). Each agent can “choose” among three labour market 
alternatives: being inactive, being a wage worker or being self-employed. 
The equations of the model are the following: 
 
Regression model for log-wage 
earnings: 
( ) mimimilmimilmilmi vcXbaYLLog +⋅+⋅+= λ)()()(  (1)
“Choice” of labour market status: mimimigmigmi ZLM εβα +⋅+= )()(  (2)
Household m’s income generation 
model: mm
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i
mimim taxesYEWYLY
m −+⋅= ∑
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∑
=
⋅=
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msmsm PPCI η  Household specific consumer price index: (4)
m
m
m PCI
YY =  (5)Households’ real income: 
 
 
The first equation of the model computes the logarithm of labour income of member i of 
household m as a linear function of his/her personal characteristics (vector ) and of miX
miλ , which represents the inverse Mills ratio estimated for the selection model. The 
residual term  describes the effects of unobserved components on wage earnings. The 
equation is estimated separately for eight different labour market segments, differentiated 
according to occupation (wage worker or self-employed), gender and skill level. The 
index function l(mi) assigns individual i of household m to a specific labour market 
segment
miv
6. 
                                                 
5 The world “choice” can be misleading in our framework, as the model we use does not represent an 
actual labour market status choice, but rather the probability of being in one condition or in the other for 
each individual, who does not actually “choose” endogenously the labour market alternative. This is the 
reason why from now on we will use the word “choice” in quotation marks. 
6 In the original model implemented in Bourguignon et al. (2003b) there is a specific equation which 
estimates family income deriving from self-employment activity on the base of household’s characteristics. 
In the present work we have instead the income declared by self-employed as labour income, and we do 
not need an additional equation to compute the income deriving from self-employment activity. 
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The second equation represents the “choice” of labour status made by household 
members. Each individual at working age has to “choose” among three alternatives: 
being a wage worker, being self-employed or being inactive. We estimate the selection 
model using a multinomial logit specification, which assigns each individual to the 
alternative with the highest associated probability. In our model we have arbitrarily set to 
zero the utility of being inactive. Vector  of explanatory variables includes some 
personal characteristics of individual i of household m. The equation is defined only for 
individuals at working age, and it is estimated separately for different demographic 
groups, defined for household heads, spouses and other members. The index function 
g(mi) assigns each individual to a specific demographic group. 
miZ
The third equation is an accounting identity that defines total household net income, Ym, 
as the sum of the labour income of its members YLmi (NCm is the number of members at 
working age in household m) and of the exogenous income YEm, net of taxes. The 
variable  is a dummy variable taking value one if individual i of household m is a 
wage worker, and zero otherwise. Taxes on income are computed according to “Ley de 
equidad fiscal”, which was introduced in 2003. 
miW
Real net income in equation (5) is computed dividing nominal household income by a 
household specific consumer price index, as computed in equation (4), where msη are 
consumption shares for different goods and Ps is the price of good s. 
We have grouped the various commodities into 10 consumption goods. 
 
 
Estimation 
The aim of the first equation in the model is to obtain efficient estimates for labour 
incomes and incomes deriving from self-employment activity, but only for those 
individuals that are observed to be inactive in the survey. These estimates are used in the 
case that, after a policy reform, one or more of them will change their labour market 
status and become wage workers or go into self-employment activity. In this case, using 
these estimates, we will be able to assign a wage or a labour income to individuals that 
have changed their labour market status after the simulation run. 
 122   
For all the other individuals that are observed to receive a wage or to earn a positive 
income from their activity, we use instead the observed wage and income levels and not 
the estimated ones. 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each labour market segment, which is defined 
according to occupation, gender and skill level. An individual is considered high-skilled 
when his/her education attainment is more than primary school, and unskilled otherwise. 
We estimated the equation using a Heckman two-step procedure to correct for the 
selection bias7. Vector  includes some regional dummies, the logarithm of age, and 
the number of school years attended. In the selection equation we used a dummy 
indicating the presence or not of children under six, a dummy variable indicating the 
racial group (distinguished in white and non-white), and the number of adults living in 
the household to correct for the selection bias. The estimation results for the labour 
market segments low-skilled wage workers, women, and high-skilled self-employed, 
men, are reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
miX
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Inactive people are divided only according to gender and skill level. 
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Table 1 - Estimation results, Heckman selection model for labour income 
(low-skilled wage workers, women) 
 
Heckman selection model, two-step estimates 
Number of obs. 3126 
Censored obs. 2396 
Uncensored obs. 730 
Wald chi2 (10) 151.74 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable: logarithm of yearly wage  
 Coefficient Std. Error z P>|z| 
constant 6.120207 1.318075 4.64 0.000 
ln(age) 0.221083 0.169068 1.31 0.191 
arur -0.997838 0.442870 -2.25 0.024 
r1 -0.146869 0.253803 -0.58 0.563 
r2 -0.850731 0.271074 -3.14 0.002 
r3 -0.885224 0.377423 -2.35 0.019 
lambda 1.939433 1.187985 1.63 0.103 
Selection equation    
constant -0.172367 0.269785 -0.64 0.523 
ln(age) -0.049158 0.060533 -0.81 0.417 
arur -0.452511 0.054082 -8.37 0.000 
r1 0.144866 0.092596 1.56 0.118 
r2 -0.146336 0.094710 -1.55 0.122 
r3 -0.292587 0.103431 -2.83 0.005 
gr 0.085156 0.129487 0.66 0.511 
ch6 -0.012388 0.054211 -0.23 0.819 
nad -0.036539 0.013463 -2.71 0.007 
rho 0.878940    
sigma 2.206558    
 
arur: urban/rural area (0 urban, 1 rural); r1, r2, r3: regional dummies for the 
four regions, Managua, Pacific, Central and Atlantic regions (reference region 
Managua); gr: racial group (0 white, 1 non-white); ch6 = presence or not of 
children under 6 (0 no children under 6, 1 one or more children under 6); nad: 
number of adults living in the household; lambda: inverse mills ratio. 
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Table 2 - Estimation results, Heckman selection model for labour income 
(high-skilled self-employed, men) 
 
Heckman selection model, two-step estimates 
Number of obs. 958 
Censored obs. 488 
Uncensored obs. 470 
Wald chi2 (10) 270.65 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Dependent variable: logarithm of yearly labour income      
    Coefficient  Std. Error   z   P>|z| 
constant 8.314737 2.186083 3.80 0.000 
ln(age) 0.497086 0.566287 0.88 0.380 
arur -0.319998 0.247125 -1.29 0.195 
r1 -0.428120 0.242832 -1.76 0.078 
r2 -0.406418 0.262587 -1.55 0.122 
r3 -0.148755 0.328582 -0.45 0.651 
years of school 0.134023 0.062750 2.14 0.033 
lambda -1.695824 0.471557 -3.60 0.000 
Selection equation                         
constant -5.800225 0.488066 -11.88 0.000 
ln(age) 2.016758 0.128209 15.73 0.000 
arur 0.007804 0.132835 0.06 0.953 
r1 0.042955 0.126017 0.34 0.733 
r2 0.174041 0.137928 1.26 0.207 
r3 0.230188 0.175659 1.31 0.190 
years of school -0.044537 0.033413 -1.33 0.183 
gr -0.224695 0.229871 -0.98 0.328 
ch6 0.384146 0.097169 3.95 0.000 
nad -0.126610 0.024663 -5.13 0.000 
rho -0.815810    
sigma 2.078696    
 
See legend for Table 1. 
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Equation (2) represents the “choice” of the labour status made by individuals. Each 
individual can “choose” among three alternatives: being inactive, being a wage worker or 
being self-employed. The utility of being inactive is arbitrarily set to zero. Parameters of 
this equation were obtained through the estimation of a multinomial logit model, 
assuming that the residual terms iε  are distributed according to the Extreme Value 
Distribution – Type I8. The estimation was conducted on sub-samples of individuals at 
working age, differentiated according to their demographic group (household heads, 
spouses, and other members). The explanatory variables include some regional dummies, 
sex, logarithm of age, skill level, illiteracy and racial group, the number of household 
members and that of children under six. For spouses and other members we also used 
labour market status, skill level and illiteracy of the household head. The model is 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood. The estimation results are reported in Tables 3 to 5. 
Following the procedure described in Duncan and Weeks (1998), we drew a set of error 
terms iε  for each individual from the extreme value distribution, in order to obtain for 
each individual an estimate that is consistent with his/her observed activity or inactivity 
status. From these drawn values, we selected 100 error terms for each individual, in such 
a way that, when adding it to the deterministic part of the model, it perfectly predicts the 
activity status that is observed in the survey. 
After a policy change, only the deterministic part of the model is recomputed. Then, by 
adding the random error terms previously drawn to the recomputed deterministic 
component, a probability distribution over the three alternatives (being a wage worker, 
being self-employed or being inactive) is generated for each individual. This implies that 
the model does not assign every individual from the sample to one particular alternative, 
but it gives the individual probabilities of being in one condition rather than in the other. 
This way, the model does not identify a particular labour market status for each 
                                                 
8 The Extreme Value distribution (Type I) is also known as Gumbel (from the name of the statistician who 
first studied it) or double exponential distribution, and it is a special case of the Fisher-Tippett distribution. 
It can take two forms: one is based on the smallest extreme and the other on the largest. We will focus on 
the latter, which is the one of interest for us. The standard Gumbel distribution function (maximum) has the 
following probability and cumulative density functions, respectively: 
pdf: ( )xexxf −−−= exp)(  
CDF: ( )xexF −−= exp)( . 
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individual after the policy change, but it generates a probability distribution over the 
different alternatives9. 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Estimation results, multinomial model, household heads (RRR) 
Multinomial logistic regression 
(labour market status = inactivity is the base outcome) 
Number of obs. 3590 
LR chi2 (22) 797. 50 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1103 
Log likelihood -3217.29 
Labour market status: Wage worker  
 RRR Std. Error z  P>|z| 
arur 0.856107 0.113767 -1.17 0.242 
r1 1.204847 0.203082 1.11 0.269 
r2 0.919470 0.163786 -0.47 0.637 
r3 1.140500 0.236109 0.64 0.525 
sex 0.164213 0.019620 -15.12 0.000 
ln(age) 0.101116 0.022915 -10.11 0.000 
qual 1.668111 0.241817 3.53 0.000 
alfa 0.904310 0.125660 -0.72 0.469 
gr 1.005275 0.283091 0.02 0.985 
lnc 0.999180 0.125738 -0.01 0.995 
nch6 0.875273 0.059414 -1.96 0.050 
Labour market status: Self-employed   
arur 1.365137 0.170192 2.50 0.013 
r1 1.287282 0.218066 1.49 0.136 
r2 1.510400 0.264805 2.35 0.019 
r3 1.902738 0.384524 3.18 0.001 
sex 0.184854 0.020611 -15.14 0.000 
ln(age) 0.397288 0.087407 -4.20 0.000 
qual 0.880234 0.128972 -0.87 0.384 
alfa 0.935067 0.119069 -0.53 0.598 
gr 0.782463 0.206958 -0.93 0.354 
lnc 1.191989 0.142684 1.47 0.142 
nch6 0.877780 0.055559 -2.06 0.039 
 
arur: urban/rural area (0 urban, 1 rural); r1, r2, r3: regional dummies for the four 
regions, Managua, Pacific, Central and Atlantic regions (reference region 
Managua); sex: gender dummy (0 man, 1 woman); qual: skill level (0 primary 
school or less, 1 more than primary school); alfa: dummy variable for illiteracy (0 
literate, 1 illiterate or semi-literate); gr: racial group (0 white, 1 non-white); lnc: 
logarithm of number of household members; nch6: number of children under 6. 
 
                                                 
9 This procedure is also described in Creedy and Kalb (2005). See also Creedy et al. (2002b). 
 127 
 Table 4 - Estimation results, multinomial model, spouses (RRR) 
Multinomial logistic regression 
(labour market status = inactivity is the base outcome) 
Number of obs. 2572 
LR chi2 (30) 1324.38 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2344 
Log likelihood -2163.44 
Labour market status: Wage worker  
 RRR Std. Error z  P>|z| 
arur 0.441348 0.067240 -5.37 0.000 
r1 1.236323 0.228341 1.15 0.251 
r2 0.972160 0.189136 -0.15 0.885 
r3 0.830216 0.188088 -0.82 0.411 
sex 0.033707 0.010730 -10.65 0.000 
lage 1.675376 0.236386 3.66 0.000 
qual 2.658774 0.421025 6.18 0.000 
alfa 0.688802 0.129472 -1.98 0.047 
gr 1.351889 0.421050 0.97 0.333 
lnc 1.136499 0.201381 0.72 0.470 
ch6 0.788947 0.106655 -1.75 0.080 
sh1 1.017216 0.217309 0.08 0.936 
sh2 0.695049 0.153931 -1.64 0.100 
qual_hhh 1.096629 0.171393 0.59 0.555 
alfa_hhh 0.633085 0.124560 -2.32 0.020 
Labour market status: Self-employed   
arur 0.550564 0.062605 -5.25 0.000 
r1 1.625452 0.278943 2.83 0.005 
r2 0.868100 0.155040 -0.79 0.428 
r3 0.998334 0.195205 -0.01 0.993 
sex 0.110186 0.034215 -7.10 0.000 
lage 1.710129 0.196716 4.66 0.000 
qual 0.904985 0.129851 -0.70 0.487 
alfa 0.612875 0.078585 -3.82 0.000 
gr 0.741322 0.158286 -1.40 0.161 
lnc 1.300308 0.180817 1.89 0.059 
ch6 0.765705 0.085410 -2.39 0.017 
sh1 0.485880 0.088480 -3.96 0.000 
sh2 0.997432 0.176471 -0.01 0.988 
qual_hhh 1.215565 0.169844 1.40 0.162 
alfa_hhh 0.894089 0.115555 -0.87 0.386 
 
See legend for Table 3. ch6: presence or not of children under 6 (0 no children 
under 6, 1 one or more children under 6); sh1, sh2: dummy variables for the 
occupational status of the household head (inactive, wage worker or self-
employed, reference category inactivity); alfa_hhh: dummy variable for literacy 
of the household head (0 literate, 1 illiterate or semi-literate). 
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 Table 5 - Estimation results, multinomial model, other members (RRR) 
Multinomial logistic regression 
(labour market status = inactivity is the base outcome) 
Number of obs. 4992 
LR chi2 (32) 1721.62 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1634 
Log likelihood -4408.04 
Labour market status: Wage worker  
 RRR Std. Error z  P>|z| 
arur 0.824444 0.072712 -2.19 0.029 
r1 0.979827 0.107931 -0.19 0.853 
r2 0.918551 0.107773 -0.72 0.469 
r3 0.711421 0.097806 -2.48 0.013 
sex 0.204095 0.015428 -21.02 0.000 
lage 6.759236 0.881377 14.65 0.000 
qual 0.957752 0.084746 -0.49 0.626 
alfa 0.699411 0.080142 -3.12 0.002 
gr 0.880421 0.170281 -0.66 0.510 
lnc 0.887087 0.100894 -1.05 0.292 
ch 1.205024 0.148301 1.52 0.130 
ch6 1.430704 0.130579 3.92 0.000 
sh1 0.977419 0.096661 -0.23 0.817 
sh2 0.787106 0.074041 -2.54 0.011 
qual_hhh 0.724914 0.073728 -3.16 0.002 
alfa_hhh 1.385381 0.123121 3.67 0.000 
Labour market status: Self-employed   
arur 1.276138 0.123260 2.52 0.012 
r1 1.344980 0.214562 1.86 0.063 
r2 2.176651 0.349789 4.84 0.000 
r3 1.921958 0.337287 3.72 0.000 
sex 0.150325 0.013125 -21.7 0.000 
lage 2.516042 0.383694 6.05 0.000 
qual 0.710553 0.072736 -3.34 0.001 
alfa 0.914365 0.104452 -0.78 0.433 
gr 1.328942 0.301983 1.25 0.211 
lnc 1.100904 0.144585 0.73 0.464 
ch 1.304911 0.183973 1.89 0.059 
ch6 0.947604 0.096573 -0.53 0.597 
sh1 0.651611 0.091971 -3.03 0.002 
sh2 2.897396 0.328958 9.37 0.000 
qual_hhh 0.700602 0.090371 -2.76 0.006 
alfa_hhh 1.030809 0.097232 0.32 0.748 
 
See legend for Table 4. ch: dummy variable for presence of children under 15 
(0 no children, 1 one or more children). 
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2.2. The CGE Model 
 
The main characteristics of the CGE model are the following. 
There are two representative households, divided according to their residence in urban or 
rural areas. Both maximize utility according to a Linear Expenditure System (LES) 
system. They obtain income from their supply of labour and capital, and they also 
receive transfers from the government and remittances from abroad. 
Domestic production is carried on by 38 production sectors, which are producing 38 
commodities following a Leontief technology in the aggregation of value added (capital 
and aggregate labour) and the intermediate aggregate. The aggregation of intermediate 
inputs is done according to a Leontief technology, while capital and labour are 
aggregated into value added according to a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function.  
Labour demand is divided into eight different labour types, distinguished according to 
sex, qualification level and occupation (wage workers or self-employed) of the workers. 
These labour types are then aggregated to form a “labour aggregate” according to a CES 
function. The price of each labour type is set at the level of its marginal productivity. 
Investments in the economy are savings-driven. 
The public sector consumes goods, saves, and raises taxes on households’ income, on 
firms’ output and sells, on consumption of certain goods and tariffs on imports. It also 
pays subsidies to exports, and transfers to firms and households. The equilibrium of 
public budget constraint is reached through the change in public savings. 
For the foreign sector the Armington assumption holds, and domestic production and 
imports are aggregated through a CES function. Domestic production is divided into 
supply of exports and supply of domestically produced good for the internal market 
following a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. 
A stylized scheme of the production structure and of the foreign sector design is reported 
in Appendix B. 
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Calibration 
The calibration of the model is done on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Nicaragua for the year 2000 (see Sánchez and Vos, 2005 for details). 
Some parameter values were taken from the existing literature. Sánchez and Vos (2005) 
is the source for the values of the substitution elasticities in the production function, in 
the Armington function (aggregation of the composite good sold on the internal market), 
and in the CET function (aggregation of internal production intended to the internal 
market and exports)10. Sánchez and Vos (2005) also estimated the values of income 
elasticity of consumption demand using the data of the EMNV 2001. The values for the 
Frisch parameter were taken from Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977). 
For what concerns the elasticity of substitution among the eight different labour types, 
we implemented a sensitivity analysis, using different values of elasticity. We report the 
results of the simulation for the different values considered in this sensitivity analysis 
(see Tables 7 to 18). 
 
 
 
2.3. Linking the Two Models 
 
The basic difficulty of the Top-Down approach is to ensure consistency between the 
micro and macro levels of analysis. Thus, it is necessary to introduce a system of 
equations to ensure the achievement of consistency between the two models11. In 
practice, this consists in imposing the macro results obtained with the CGE model onto 
the microeconomic level of analysis. In particular, the changes in the commodity prices, 
Pq, must be equal to those resulting from the CGE model; the changes in average 
earnings with respect to the benchmark in the micro-simulation module must be equal to 
the changes in the wage rate obtained with the CGE model, as well as the change in the 
                                                 
10 Sánchez and Vos (2005) used the values estimated in Sánchez (2004) for a similar model for Costa Rica, 
carrying on a sensitivity analysis for some parameter values. 
11 This way, what happens in the MS module can be made consistent with the CGE modelling by adjusting 
parameters in the MS model, but, from a theoretical point of view, it would be more satisfying to obtain 
consistency by modelling behaviour identically in the two models. 
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return to capital in the micro-simulation module must be equal to the one observed after 
the simulation run in the CGE model. In addition, the changes in the number of wage 
workers in the micro-simulation model must match those observed in the CGE model. 
In our model, these consistency conditions translate into the following set of constraints, 
which can be called “linking” equations: 
 
Household specific consumer price index: ( )CGEsNG
s
msmsm PPPCI Δ+⋅⋅= ∑
=
1
1
η  (L.1)
Logarithm of wage earnings: ( ) ( )[ ]CGEmimi PLLYLogYLLog Δ+⋅= 1ˆ  (L.2)( )CGEmm PKKSYK Δ+⋅= 1  (L.3)Capital income: 
CGE
l
MS
l EMPEMP Δ=Δ  (L.4)Employment level: 
 
 
The variables with no superscripts are those coming from the microsimulation module; 
those with the ^ notation correspond to the ones that have been estimated: in particular, 
is the wage level resulting from the regression model for individual i, member 
of household m, while  is the labour market status of individual i of household m 
deriving from the estimation of the multinomial model. 
)ˆ( miLYLog
miWˆ
CGE
sPΔ ,  and CGEPLΔ CGEPKΔ  indicate, respectively, the change in the prices of goods, 
the change in the wage rate and in the return to capital deriving from the simulation run 
of the CGE model, while  and  are the employment level percentage 
changes for the CGE model and the microsimulation model for labour type l. 
CGE
lEMPΔ MSlEMPΔ
From equation (L.4), the number of newly employed (or inactive) of labour type l 
resulting from the MS model must be equal to the change in the employment level of 
labour type l observed after the CGE run. This implies that the CGE model determines 
the employment level of the economy after the simulation, and that the MS model selects 
which individuals among the inactive persons have the highest probability of becoming 
employed (if the employment level is increased from the CGE simulation result), or 
either who, among the wage workers or self-employed, has the lowest probability of 
being employed after the policy change (if the employment level is decreased)12. 
                                                 
12 And, in this case, his/her new wage level will be determined by the regression model of wage earnings. 
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One possible way of imposing the equality between the two sets of parameters of system 
of equations (L) is through a change in the parameters of the selection and regression 
models. Following Bourguignon et al. (2003b), we restrict this change in the parameters 
to a change in the intercepts of functions (1) and (2). The justification for this choice is 
that it implies a neutrality of the changes, that is, changing the intercepts a of equation 
(1) just shifts proportionally the estimated labour income of all individuals, without 
causing any change in the ranking between one individual and the other. The same 
applies for the labour market status selection equation: we choose to change the intercept 
α of equation (2), and this will shift proportionally all the individual probabilities of each 
alternative, without changing their relative positions in the probability distribution, only 
to let some more individuals become employed (or some less if the employment rate of 
the CGE model is decreased), irrespectively of their personal characteristics. This change 
in the intercept will be of the amount that is necessary to reach the number of wage 
workers or self-employed resulting from the CGE model. Thus, this choice preserves the 
ranking of individuals according to their ex-ante probability of being employed, which 
was previously determined by the estimation of the multinomial model. For this reason 
the change in the intercept parameter satisfies this neutrality property. 
 
 
 
 
3. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 
The simulation of the introduction of DR-CAFTA into the Nicaraguan economy consists 
of a reduction of tariff rates on imports from the US. 
As we are working with a static model, we cannot model the scheduled gradual change in 
the tariff rates, which is planned to be distributed along the ten years following the 
introduction of the Trade Agreement. As our model does not have any dynamic 
characteristic, it will be able capture the effects of the Treaty in the short-medium run, 
say about five years. Thus, the simulation we implemented will take into account the 
reduction in the tariff rates which is intended to take place after the first five years of 
effectiveness of the Treaty. This choice is expected to have no big influence on the 
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results of the model, as the main tariff reduction for most of the commodities will take 
place in the first year after the introduction of the Agreement. 
As our model is only a one-country study, we are not going to model the changes in the 
regime adopted in USA with respect to goods and commodities imported from 
Nicaragua. So, for instance, we are not going to take into account the access quotas 
imposed on these imports from Nicaragua to USA. These quotas are represented by 
limits to the importable quantities of some goods (in particular, beef, peanuts, cheese and 
sugar), but they are planned to reach an unlimited amount for beef and peanuts after the 
fifteenth year of enforcement of the Treaty, while for cheese they will be more than 
doubled after sixteen years. The unique quota which is expected to remain quite low is 
the one imposed on sugar, which will reach an amount 30% superior than the one 
imposed in the first year of enforcement of the Agreement. 
The general reduction in the first five years after the introduction of the Treaty is about 
thirty percent of the previously adopted tariffs. The reductions adopted for the specific 
commodities and services are reported in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 - Tariff change in the first five years after the introduction of DR-CAFTA 
Commodity or service group Percentage change 
Coffee -0.536 
Other agricultural products -0.543 
Animals and animal products -0.667 
Forestry and wood extraction -0.308 
Fish and other fishing products -0.956 
Mining - 
Meat and fish -0.180  
Sugar* 0.178 
Milk products -0.050 
Other industrial food products -0.407 
Beverages and tobacco -0.231 
Textiles, clothes, shoes and leather products -0.221 
Textiles, clothes, shoes and leather products (Zona Franca) -0.221 
Wood products and furniture -0.191 
Pulp, paper and paper products, printing -0.380 
Refined petrol, chemical products, rubber and plastic products -0.147 
Glass and other non metallic products -0.123 
Common metals and their products -0.320 
Machinery and transport equipment -0.129 
Motor vehicles trade and repair -0.846 
Average reduction -0.314 
 
* The raise in the tariff of this good is due to the fact that the quota imposed on 
the quantity of sugar was transformed in tariff in the first year. 
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As the supporters of the agreement with US expected an increase in the capital 
investments from USA in Nicaragua, we also considered an exogenous change in the 
initial capital endowment of different amounts (2, 5 and 10 %, respectively). 
The percentage changes resulting from the simulation for a selected set of variables are 
reported in Tables 7 to 18. 
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to take into account different possible values 
for the elasticity of substitution of labour demand at the stage of aggregation of the eight 
different types of labour, which are divided according to sex, qualification level and 
occupation (wage workers or self-employed) of the workers, as explained in the 
description of the CGE model. 
 
 
Table 7 - Simulation results, macroeconomic variables, elasticity of substitution for labour inputs 0.3 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Wage rate -0.269 -0.211 -0.278 1.594 
Real wage rate -0.026 -0.018 0.054 2.126 
Capital return -0.211 -0.073 -0.346 -4.066 
Consumer price index -0.243 -0.193 -0.332 -0.521 
Capital endowment 0.000 2.000 5.000 10.000 
Public savings -1.161 7.879 20.087 28.818 
Tax revenues -0.754 1.855 5.062 8.221 
Public expenditure -0.360 -0.160 -0.141 0.562 
Aggregate employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Imports 0.136 -0.532 -0.239 0.280 
Exports 0.277 0.451 3.382 8.331 
Sales on the domestic market -0.232 -0.149 -0.247 1.015 
Domestic production -0.274 -0.212 -0.279 1.592 
Investment 0.005 -0.021 -0.141 -2.159 
High-skilled workers employment level 0.004 -0.046 -0.051 -0.027 
Low-skilled workers employment level -0.004 0.046 0.051 0.027 
Male workers employment level -0.005 -0.029 -0.029 0.049 
Female workers employment level 0.005 0.029 0.029 -0.049 
Wage workers employment level 0.157 0.038 -0.009 0.141 
Self-employed workers employment level -0.157 -0.038 0.009 -0.141 
Wage rate high-skilled -0.278 -0.121 -0.181 1.672 
Wage rate low-skilled -0.260 -0.301 -0.376 1.516 
 
Sim1: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA (see Table 6). 
Sim2: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 2% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim3: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 5% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim4: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 10% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
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Table 8 - Simulation results, sectoral changes (elasticity of substitution for labour inputs 0.3) 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Agricultural sectors  
Domestic production 2.774 -1.157 -3.697 -4.109 
Sales on the domestic market 3.280 -1.180 -4.198 -5.128 
Exports to USA 6.320 -0.876 -0.232 2.005 
Exports to other countries -2.082 -1.702 0.297 2.648 
Imports from USA -1.968 -0.145 1.574 2.623 
Imports from other countries 7.438 -5.087 0.075 1.004 
Industrial sectors  
Domestic production -3.504 -0.064 0.764 5.107 
Sales on the domestic market -1.630 -0.017 0.514 3.046 
Exports to USA -6.198 3.289 9.818 20.038 
Exports to other countries -5.090 -0.250 2.592 7.932 
Imports from USA 0.887 -2.833 -14.811 -17.900 
Imports from other countries 0.110 0.064 3.235 4.643 
Textile sectors  
Domestic production 0.986 -5.519 -11.585 -15.303 
Sales on the domestic market 1.537 -4.381 -9.337 -14.614 
Exports to USA 0.841 -8.619 -18.890 -21.642 
Exports to other countries 0.649 -7.383 -15.803 -18.609 
Imports from USA 1.996 -6.155 -14.148 -19.597 
Imports from other countries 1.653 -6.498 -14.497 -19.936 
Exporting sectors  
Domestic production 8.721 3.073 7.421 9.877 
Sales on the domestic market 10.724 10.247 23.936 28.422 
Exports to USA 5.380 4.846 12.002 16.662 
Exports to other countries 7.682 0.077 0.569 2.397 
Exports (all) 6.657 2.200 5.659 8.748 
Imports from USA 2.133 -7.048 -16.243 -21.763 
Imports from other countries 8.985 7.975 18.933 22.996 
Imports (all) 8.276 6.421 15.294 18.366 
 
· Agricultural sectors: coffee, sugar cane, corn, other agricultural products, 
animals and animal products, products of the forest and wood extraction, 
fishing. 
· Industrial sectors: mining, energy, water, meat and fish, sugar, milk 
products, other food, beverages, tobacco, textiles (local and Zona Franca), 
wood products, paper, refined oil products, chemical and plastic products, 
glass, metal, machinery and equipment, construction. 
· Textile sectors: textiles (local and Zona Franca). 
· Exporting sectors: all sectors with initial ratio exports/production greater 
than 50% (coffee, tobacco, textiles -only Zona Franca, transport services). 
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Table 10 - Simulation results, macroeconomic changes (elasticity of substitution for labour inputs 0.7) 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Wage rate 0.057 0.092 0.649 1.561 
Real wage rate 0.070 0.497 0.818 2.936 
Capital return -0.042 -1.035 -1.301 -6.444 
Consumer price index -0.013 -0.403 -0.168 -1.335 
Capital endowment 0.000 2.000 5.000 10.000 
Public savings 0.432 6.386 23.009 44.283 
Tax revenues -0.003 1.807 6.374 11.644 
Public expenditure -0.093 0.113 0.298 0.075 
Aggregate employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Imports 0.134 0.806 -0.364 3.039 
Exports 0.272 3.210 3.124 14.019 
Sales on the domestic market 0.088 -0.073 0.346 1.189 
Domestic production 0.048 0.090 0.647 1.537 
Investment 0.078 -0.177 0.199 0.620 
High-skilled workers employment level -0.002 -0.157 -0.038 0.337 
Low-skilled workers employment level 0.002 0.157 0.038 -0.337 
Male workers employment level -0.049 0.109 -0.154 0.318 
Female workers employment level 0.049 -0.109 0.154 -0.318 
Wage workers employment level 0.060 -0.066 -0.046 0.389 
Self-employed workers employment level -0.060 0.066 0.046 -0.389 
Wage rate high-skilled 0.067 0.407 0.734 0.901 
Wage rate low-skilled 0.047 -0.223 0.564 2.222 
 
Sim1: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA (see Table 6). 
Sim2: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 2% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim3: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 5% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim4: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 10% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
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Table 11 - Simulation results, sectoral changes (elasticity of substitution for labour inputs 0.7) 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Agricultural sectors  
Domestic production 1.602 -3.424 -4.130 -3.045 
Sales on the domestic market 2.260 -4.090 -3.930 -6.140 
Exports to USA -15.866 4.579 -1.032 17.177 
Exports to other countries -5.222 -0.128 -3.670 5.739 
Imports from USA -23.624 -0.489 -0.566 -14.752 
Imports from other countries -5.402 4.078 4.475 6.586 
Industrial sectors  
Domestic production -1.534 1.479 3.121 0.501 
Sales on the domestic market -1.107 0.791 1.548 1.021 
Exports to USA 5.808 5.196 8.520 17.506 
Exports to other countries 2.212 5.354 5.983 1.145 
Imports from USA -2.775 -23.814 -26.493 -13.117 
Imports from other countries 1.647 6.864 5.777 3.969 
Textile sectors  
Domestic production 5.713 -5.089 -2.465 -26.377 
Sales on the domestic market 5.185 -6.468 -1.311 -27.392 
Exports to USA 8.359 0.282 -8.791 -24.329 
Exports to other countries 7.111 -2.227 -5.820 -25.371 
Imports from USA 7.476 -2.380 -5.900 -26.145 
Imports from other countries 7.131 -2.669 -6.280 -26.384 
Exporting sectors  
Domestic production 1.274 6.660 5.905 34.624 
Sales on the domestic market 8.076 14.503 20.272 61.429 
Exports to USA 3.693 9.964 11.441 37.070 
Exports to other countries -1.463 3.318 0.161 23.162 
Exports (all) 0.833 6.277 5.183 29.354 
Imports from USA 9.225 1.657 -8.694 -21.648 
Imports from other countries 9.463 13.159 17.851 50.293 
Imports (all) 9.439 11.969 15.105 42.851 
 
· Agricultural sectors: coffee, sugar cane, corn, other agricultural products, 
animals and animal products, products of the forest and wood extraction, 
fishing. 
· Industrial sectors: mining, energy, water, meat and fish, sugar, milk 
products, other food, beverages, tobacco, textiles (local and Zona Franca), 
wood products, paper, refined oil products, chemical and plastic products, 
glass, metal, machinery and equipment, construction. 
· Textile sectors: textiles (local and Zona Franca). 
· Exporting sectors: all sectors with initial ratio exports/production greater 
than 50% (coffee, tobacco, textiles - only Zona Franca, transport services). 
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Table 13 - Simulation results, macroeconomic variables, 
elasticity of substitution for labour inputs equal to value added aggregation sectoral elasticities 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Wage rate 0.197 0.172 0.399 0.813 
Real wage rate 0.173 0.483 0.406 1.236 
Capital return -0.082 -0.900 -0.386 -2.106 
Consumer price index 0.024 -0.309 -0.007 -0.417 
Capital endowment 0.000 2.000 5.000 10.000 
Public savings 0.759 9.952 23.589 30.675 
Tax revenues 0.305 2.748 6.666 8.967 
Public expenditure 0.085 0.122 0.410 0.771 
Aggregate employment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Imports 0.288 1.313 0.728 0.068 
Exports 0.591 4.254 5.376 7.894 
Sales on the domestic market 0.223 0.047 0.357 0.597 
Domestic production 0.188 0.169 0.390 0.797 
Investment 0.081 0.277 0.157 -1.990 
High-skilled workers employment level -0.027 -0.146 -0.148 -0.354 
Low-skilled workers employment level 0.027 0.146 0.148 0.354 
Male workers employment level -0.021 -0.115 -0.128 0.143 
Female workers employment level 0.021 0.115 0.128 -0.143 
Wage workers employment level -0.072 -0.127 -0.179 -0.375 
Self-employed workers employment level 0.072 0.127 0.179 0.375 
Wage rate high-skilled 0.254 0.468 0.706 1.532 
Wage rate low-skilled 0.139 -0.123 0.092 0.094 
 
Sim1: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA (see Table 6). 
Sim2: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 2% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim3: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 5% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
Sim4: reduction of tariff rates on imports from USA and 10% reduction of initial 
capital endowment. 
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Table 14 - Simulation results, sectoral changes, 
elasticity of substitution for labour inputs equal to value added aggregation sectoral elasticities 
(percentage deviations from benchmark values) 
 
 Sim1 Sim2 Sim3 Sim4 
Agricultural sectors  
Domestic production 3.613 -6.414 -6.367 -7.150 
Sales on the domestic market 4.681 -5.978 -0.927 -1.100 
Exports to USA -20.053 -8.085 -37.486 -42.262 
Exports to other countries -7.365 -4.892 -22.812 -24.609 
Imports from USA -33.527 1.091 2.940 4.747 
Imports from other countries -4.675 -0.614 -1.355 -0.622 
Industrial sectors  
Domestic production -1.623 2.460 3.030 5.484 
Sales on the domestic market -1.162 1.266 0.704 1.923 
Exports to USA 8.536 10.957 26.881 36.899 
Exports to other countries 3.041 8.609 15.385 19.393 
Imports from USA -2.395 -25.514 -34.416 -40.961 
Imports from other countries 2.085 8.054 9.342 9.996 
Textile sectors  
Domestic production 9.145 1.516 -1.092 -10.006 
Sales on the domestic market 7.794 1.394 -1.261 -8.856 
Exports to USA 13.848 2.192 -1.298 -17.184 
Exports to other countries 11.799 1.777 -1.104 -13.775 
Imports from USA 11.399 2.155 -1.262 -14.233 
Imports from other countries 11.054 1.812 -1.606 -14.595 
Exporting sectors  
Domestic production 2.149 5.895 6.392 9.272 
Sales on the domestic market 11.256 17.710 37.849 52.240 
Exports to USA 5.917 10.246 16.334 22.094 
Exports to other countries -1.497 1.024 -6.356 -8.347 
Exports (all) 1.804 5.130 3.746 5.206 
Imports from USA 14.188 3.553 0.937 -15.084 
Imports from other countries 13.587 16.982 36.799 47.538 
Imports (all) 13.649 15.593 33.090 41.060 
 
· Agricultural sectors: coffee, sugar cane, corn, other agricultural products, 
animals and animal products, products of the forest and wood extraction, 
fishing. 
· Industrial sectors: mining, energy, water, meat and fish, sugar, milk 
products, other food, beverages, tobacco, textiles (local and Zona Franca), 
wood products, paper, refined oil products, chemical and plastic products, 
glass, metal, machinery and equipment, construction. 
· Textile sectors: textiles (local and Zona Franca). 
· Exporting sectors: all sectors with initial ratio exports/production greater 
than 50% (coffee, tobacco, textiles - only Zona Franca, transport services).  
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The results show a very little answer of the economy to the tariff change. This outcome is 
not completely surprising, because the tariff levels which were in force previous the 
introduction of the DR-CAFTA were already quite low. Moreover, other studies found 
not only for Nicaragua but also for other countries in the region the same small answer to 
trade liberalization13. 
The sole reduction of tariffs on imports will cause a very small increase in total domestic 
production which in the best hypothesis will be of 0.2%. However, if we consider a small 
value for the elasticity of substitution among different labour inputs (elasticity fixed at 
0.3), the change in domestic output is even negative. The negative response of output in 
this case is alleviated when considering a positive shock in the initial capital endowment, 
but this shock has to be of significant amount to cause a positive change in output (10% 
change in capital endowment). 
However, if we try to have a closer look to the sectoral effects of the reform (see Tables 
8, 11 and 14), and considering only the tariff reduction, we can observe that traditional 
sectors such as the agricultural and textile sectors are increasing their production, while 
the capital intensive (industrial sectors) sectors lose. On the contrary, when we take into 
account also the capital shock (simulations 2, 3 and 4), the direction of these results is 
inverted, so that we have the capital intensive sectors gaining and the traditional sectors 
(agricultural and textile sectors) that decrease their production level. 
In all cases, however, the overall increase in production seems to be driven by the growth 
of the exporting sectors, which are gaining in all the simulations. 
Anyway, the reduction of the tariff rates on imports does not generate significant losses 
for the government, as tax revenues do not decrease of high amounts. When the elasticity 
of substitution for labour is considered at the same level of the one used for value added 
aggregation, tax revenues even increase, due to the higher production and consumption 
levels in the economy. This increase becomes even bigger when we introduce a positive 
shock to capital endowment. 
Taking into consideration the positive shock to capital endowment, the changes 
considered are in general of a higher amount, but anyway in the best hypothesis of a 10% 
                                                 
13 See for instance Sánchez (2005), Vos et al. (2004), and the book edited by Ganuza et al. (2004), which 
contains sixteen country-studies on different countries in Latin and Central America on the consequences 
of the trade liberalization carried on during the last decades in this region. 
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change in the capital stock, the resulting change in domestic production will be around 
1.5%. 
In the first scenario (reduction of tariff rates on imports only), the change in labour 
demand apparently favours unskilled workers, and women in particular, except for the 
case with a low elasticity of substitution, where a small increase in the demand for 
qualified workers is experienced. The change in the employment levels of wage workers 
and self-employed depends similarly on the adopted value of the elasticity of 
substitution. Anyway, all the changes occurring in the employment levels of the different 
labour inputs are very small. 
When the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high (higher than 0.3), real wage is 
observed to increase, as well as real income does, thus increasing consumption levels for 
both rural and urban households. 
 
For what concerns the microeconomic results, that is the changes in income distribution 
and poverty, we can observe in general very small changes in the underlying indices. 
Taking into account only the reduction in tariffs on imports, poverty rates at a national 
level decrease in all the counterfactuals. On the contrary, income inequality is rising 
(even if of a very little amount), especially when we consider separated indices for urban 
and rural areas. Poverty seems to decrease more in urban than in rural areas. 
This result of an increasing income inequality in both urban and rural areas confirms 
what was already found by Vos et al. (2004) for most of Latin and Central American 
countries in the case of trade liberalization. 
When we take into account the positive shock on capital, then income inequality is 
observed to decrease. Anyway, the negative changes resulting in both income inequality 
and poverty indices remain very small (and in some cases they are even positive, such as 
in the case with constant elasticity of substitution in labour inputs equal to the elasticities 
used in value added aggregation), and especially in rural areas, where poverty is 
observed to have its greatest incidence. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The small positive results deriving from our analysis show that the introduction of the 
Free Trade Agreement with US in Nicaragua cannot be seen as the unique solution to the 
high poverty rates and the unequal income distribution of the country. In the best 
hypothesis the consequent increment in production would be of around 1.5%. This result 
is not surprising, as the tariff levels in force before the introduction of the DR-CAFTA 
were already quite low, after the process of trade liberalization carried on during the 
1990s in all Central and Latin America’s countries. 
The main impact of the Treaty is to be found in the increase of exports, which, according 
to the supporters of the Agreement, are expected to be the leading engine of future 
development and economic growth in the country. Anyway, this increment in the amount 
of exported good is able to increase domestic production of only 1.5 percentage points in 
the best scenario. 
It is true however that in our model we did not take into account the possible 
improvement in productivity generated by the new investments in advanced technology 
coming from the US, which could have given a major boost to the economy. Anyway, 
the dynamic model developed by Sánchez and Vos (2006), which includes also a positive 
shock on factor productivity, finds again small responses of the economy to trade 
liberalization, and to the Trade Agreement with the USA in particular. 
The DR-CAFTA alone seems to be unable to bring about big changes in the structure of 
the economy, and especially for what concerns poverty and inequality reduction. It 
should at least be accompanied by other policies supporting lower incomes, especially in 
rural areas. One possible future implementation of the model presented here could be the 
design and the analysis of such a policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis we analyse and investigate the method of linking Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models to Microsimulation (MS) models which has recently 
developed in the literature that studies developing countries. 
CGE models are useful instruments for the study of a reform or a shock that has 
economy-wide effects, and in particular of those reforms/shocks that can produce 
structural and sectoral changes on the whole economy. Anyway, one of the limits of 
CGE models is that, as they generally follow the representative household approach, they 
are often unable to capture within-group distribution and some specific individual agents’ 
behaviour. This is however of particular importance when we want to carry out income 
inequality and poverty analysis. 
On the other hand, microsimulation (MS) models are accurate instruments in the 
representation of the tax-benefit system, and in the analysis of individual behaviour (such 
as labour supply or consumption) in response to a change of the tax-benefit system. In 
this respect, microsimulation models are very helpful and precise in the study of income 
distribution and poverty issues, as they work at a very detailed level, that is at the level of 
the individual or of the single household. The main drawback of these models is that they 
carry out only partial equilibrium analyses, thus not being able to capture the general 
equilibrium impact of a reform of the tax-benefit system. Moreover, if we want to 
analyse the distributional and poverty effects of a reform which takes place at the 
macroeconomic level (as it could be for instance a reform of the trading system), this is 
simply not doable with a microsimulation model. However, this kind of studies can be 
very important for poverty and inequality issues, especially in the case of developing 
countries where structural shocks and macroeconomic reforms are more likely to take 
place. 
Linking CGE and MS models allows to overcome simultaneously the limits of both 
models and to obtain a more comprehensive instrument for the analysis of the effects of 
policy reforms and structural shocks on poverty and inequality. The modelling tool 
resulting from the link of the two models is indeed able to account for full agents’ 
heterogeneity and microeconomic behaviour at the individual or household level, 
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structural changes of the economy and general equilibrium effects of economic policies 
at the same time. 
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Figure 1 – CGE and Microsimulation Models 
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In the first chapter of the thesis we have tried to give an assessment of the recent 
developments observed in methods that link together CGE and microsimulation models, 
with a special concern for the different linking approaches existing in the literature for 
developing countries. There are three main approaches that are currently used in the 
literature: the integrated approach, which integrates the household survey into the CGE 
model, and the layered approach (Top-Down and TD/BU approaches), which instead 
develops the two models separately. 
 
In the second chapter we have made a comparison of these three approaches. To do this 
we have built three models for the same economy and we investigate the different results 
coming out from the three different approaches. We have seen that most of the 
differences in the results coming out from the three main approaches arise when working 
with layered models (Top-Down and TD/BU approaches) rather than with integrated 
models. 
We have observed that an integrated approach can be deficient on the aspect of the 
microeconomic specification and behavioural responses by individual agents. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the introduction of microeconometric behavioural equations 
into a CGE model looks of hard application and cumbersome for computational aspects. 
On the other side, a Top-Down approach completely disregards the possible feedback 
effects coming from the microeconomic side of the economy, which could in principle 
affect also the macroeconomic variables. 
In our opinion the TD/BU modelling seems to be the most complete approach, as on one 
side it can include all the possible microeconometric estimates to account for behavioural 
responses by individual agents, and on the other side it also takes into account the 
feedback effects from the micro to the macro level of analysis. However, two main 
problems arise when using this approach. First of all, the way in which these feedback 
effects are reported into the CGE model can affect results in a fundamental way. In 
particular, the fact of using shares or parameters instead of absolute levels of endogenous 
variables, when possible, seems to lead to more consistent results. Secondly, eventual 
data inconsistencies between the micro and the macro datasets can also affect results 
seriously. This can be overcome only by adjusting either one or the other dataset, thus 
going back to the problem of data reconciliation encountered with the integrated model. 
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However, while with an integrated model we encounter this problem when building the 
model, when we run a TD/BU model without previously adjusting the data, we have the 
problem of data inconsistencies that enters the results and we are not able to distinguish 
which is the part of the change that is due to feedback effects and which is the part due to 
data inconsistencies. 
Bourguignon et al. (2001) and Bourguignon et al. (2003b) also provide strong arguments 
for working with layered rather than integrated models. These arguments are most 
persuasive when, as in their work for Indonesia, it is regarded as very important to 
simulate realistically variation in labour supply and occupational choice responses to 
changing prices, wages and employment conditions. 
A reasonable conclusion may be that integrated models are best for some purposes and 
layered models for others. The integrated models, indeed, appear cleaner and more 
transparent, and they show a better reliability under the point of view of the theoretical 
consistency between the two levels of analysis. They may have the drawback of not 
being able to fully capture even the direction and the relative magnitude of distributional 
and of other effects in terms of a full microeconomic analysis. 
Layered models, in contrast, perhaps have an advantage when the concern is about short-
term distributional impacts in a setting where realism is at a premium and theoretical 
niceties are not so important. 
In general, however, when building such models one has also to take into account the 
practical advantages and drawbacks of the various approaches (see Figure 2): for 
instance, the layered approach requires time and effort in the building of the entire 
model, as one has to go through two different modelling techniques and two different 
databases. On the other side, one of the main advantages of the integrated approach is its 
simplicity and easiness of implementation. Its simplicity allows what is instead still 
missing in the framework of a layered approach: dynamics. Indeed, while with integrated 
models recursive dynamics is already introduced in a few examples, such as the model 
by Annabi et al. (2005) for Senegal, one of the main things still missing up to now in a 
layered framework is a dynamic featuring, which in the future will need further effort. 
This is of course of difficult implementation, both on the side of modelling (both models 
should be dynamic) and on that of data requirements. In particular, either panel survey 
data or a good database to compute transition probabilities (see in more detail Chapter 1, 
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Section 2.2, page 39 on dynamic microsimulation techniques) are required for the 
building up of a dynamic microsimulation model. But this is not all. How the linking 
should be made is also an open question which until now did not receive a precise and 
detailed answer yet. A first attempt in this direction was made by Bibi and Chatti (2006) 
with their dynamic layered model for Tunisia. 
 
 
In our applied analysis (Chapter 3), we develop a CGE-MS model for Nicaragua using a 
Top-Down approach. The model is used to simulate the effects of the Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States on income distribution and poverty in Nicaragua. 
The main reason why we opted for a layered approach is that we wanted to estimate 
behavioural labour supply responses at the level of individuals. We did this through the 
estimation of a discrete choice labour supply model. This kind of switching regime 
equation is of cumbersome implementation into a CGE model, and in any case this 
would have implied the introduction of thousands of additional agents into the model, as 
in our survey there are 12645 individuals at working age. 
The fact that we did not take into account the feedback effects from the micro into the 
macro level of analysis with a TD/BU approach is justified from the fact that the reform 
we simulate produces very small changes in the microeconomic structure of the country. 
We believe that these small changes are not sufficient to produce a significant adjustment 
in the macroeconomic structure of the economy. 
Our analysis confirms the importance of using microsimulation techniques and survey 
data within the framework of a general equilibrium model. This way, indeed, it is 
possible to have a detailed insight into the distribution of incomes. In our applied study, 
for instance, we observe a small response of inequality at a national level, but if we 
disaggregate this result further, we can see that there is a systematic decrease of 
inequality in the urban areas, while in the rural areas inequality generally increases. The 
advantage of having such a model is that this process of disaggregation of the results has 
in principle no limits, until we reach the individual household level, so that we can study 
the effects of the reform on poverty and inequality in a very detailed way. 
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Figure 2 – Linking CGE and MS Models: Three Different Approaches 
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The main impact of the Treaty is to be found in the increase of exports, which, according 
to the supporters of the Agreement, are expected to be the leading engine of future 
development and economic growth in the country. Anyway, this increment in the amount 
of exported good is able to increase domestic production of only 1.5 percentage points in 
the best scenario. A small positive response of the economy to trade liberalization is also 
found in other studies, and especially in the work done by Sánchez and Vos (2006), who 
developed a dynamic CGE model for Nicaragua which also includes a positive shock on 
factor productivity that could be generated by the new investments in advanced 
technology coming from USA. 
However, the results deriving from our analysis show that the introduction of the Free 
Trade Agreement with USA in Nicaragua cannot be seen as the unique solution to the 
high poverty rates and the unequal income distribution of the country. Indeed, even if we 
observe a systematic decrease of inequality in the urban regions, in the rural areas 
inequality generally increases. 
Thus, the DR-CAFTA alone seems to be unable to bring about big changes in the 
structure of the economy, and especially for what concerns poverty and inequality 
reduction. It should at least be accompanied by other policies supporting lower incomes, 
especially in rural areas. 
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APPENDIX A – Some Inequality and Poverty Indices 
 
Here, we will give details of some inequality and poverty measures we have used during 
the analysis. 
 
 
Gini index 
The Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly used indicators of income inequality. 
It is defined as: 
∑∑ −=
i j
ij yyN
G 22
1
μ  
where μ is the arithmetical mean of the incomes, N is the size of the population, and  
and  are the incomes of agents i and j, respectively. Thus, the second factor at the right 
hand side represents the sum of the differences (in modulus) computed over all pairs of 
incomes. In the literature, however, we can also find different (although equivalent) 
definitions. In particular, it can be derived from the Lorenz curve, which plots the 
cumulative share of total income earned by households ranked from bottom to top (see 
below), in the following way: 
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)(21 dppLG ,               (A.1) 
where L(p) is the Lorenz curve. The previous formula thus measures the area that is 
laying between the curve and the diagonal as a fraction of the total area under the 45° 
line. In terms of Figure A.1 below, this means: 
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If the Lorenz curve coincides with the 45° line, which represents the situation of perfect 
equality, then the integral in equation (A.1) will take the value of ½, and the Gini index 
will equal zero. 
The Gini index can thus take values between zero (perfect equality) and one (maximum 
level of inequality, that is, when all the income in the economy is owned by only one 
individual: Ny μ=max ). Thus, the smaller is the index, the smaller is the inequality in the 
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economy. The Gini index is very useful because it allows the ordering of different 
income distributions according to their level of inequality. 
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Figure A.1 – Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient 
 
 
 
Lorenz curve 
The Lorenz curve is defined according to the following expression: 
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1)/()( ,  for j = {1, 2, …, N}. 
In the continuous the expression becomes: 
∫ ⋅=⇒=
y
dxxfxpLyFp
0
)()()( μ , 
 162   
where y is the income in the point we want to compute the curve, p is the cumulated 
probability of income, and μ is mean income. 
This curve therefore shows the relationship between a particular percentage of the 
population, say j = h/N, and the proportion of total income that it perceives. Based on an 
analysis of the stochastic dominance of Lorenz curves, one could eventually infer, among 
different economies, which one has a more equitable distribution. 
 
 
Atkinson’s index 
Atkinson’s index is one of the few inequality measures that explicitly incorporate 
normative judgments about social welfare (Atkinson, 1970). The index is derived by 
calculating the so-called equity-sensitive average income ( ), which is defined as that 
level of per capita income which if enjoyed by everybody would make total welfare 
exactly equal to the total welfare generated by the actual income distribution. It is 
sometimes also called equally distributed equivalent income. It is given by: 
ey
( ) ( )eN
i
e
i
e
y
N
y
−
=
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅= ∑
1/1
1
1
1
μ , 
where  is the proportion of total income received by individual i, and e is the so-called 
inequality aversion parameter, which measures the degree of society’s inequality 
aversion. It indeed reflects the strength of society's preference for equality, and can take 
values ranging from zero to infinity. When e > 0, there is a social preference for equality 
(or an aversion to inequality). As e rises, society attaches more weight to income 
transfers at the lower end of the distribution and less weight to transfers at the top. e → 0 
implies neutrality with respect to inequality, so that inequality is not perceived as a 
problem. Suppose instead that e → ∞, then it means that there are Rawlsian preferences 
in the society, that is, that individuals have a preference for perfect equality. Typically, in 
the literature the most common values that are used for e include 0.5 and 2. 
iy
The Atkinson index ( ) is then given by: eI
μ
e
e
yI −= 1 , 
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where µ is the actual mean income. The more equal the income distribution, the closer 
 will be to µ, and the lower the value of the Atkinson index. For any income 
distribution, the value of  lies between 0 and 1. 
ey
eI
 
 
Coefficient of variation 
The coefficient of variation is a measure of the dispersion of data around the mean. It is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, that is: 
μ
σ=CV . 
The coefficient of variation is a dimensionless number that allows comparison of the 
variation of populations that have significantly different mean values. It is often reported 
as a percentage (%) by multiplying the above calculation by 100. 
 
 
Generalized Entropy coefficients 
The family of Generalized Entropy indices satisfies a desirable property for inequality 
indices, that is, all the indices belonging to this family can be decomposed into a within-
group and a between group contribution. The formulas for the indices are: 
 
Generalized entropy index: ∑
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Parameter c reflects different perceptions of inequality, with lower values indicating a 
higher degree of inequality aversion. A value of c greater than one means that differences 
at the high end of the welfare distribution are assigned more importance than those at the 
low end. 
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For the second index, known as Mean Logarithmic Deviation, a value of zero represents 
perfect equality and higher values denote increasing levels of inequality, within a given 
administrative unit. The parameter value 0 means that differences at the low end of the 
welfare distribution are assigned more importance than those at the high end. 
Finally, Theil coefficient (or "information theory" measure) has a potential range from 
zero to infinity, with higher values (greater entropy) indicating more unequal distribution 
of income. If instead everyone has the same (i.e., mean) income, then the index equals 0. 
If one person has all the income, then the index is equal to ln(N). The parameter value 1 
means that differences are equivalently treated at all points in the welfare distribution. 
The Theil index has the advantage of being additive across different subgroups or regions 
in the country. Indeed, it is the weighted sum of inequality within subgroups. For 
example, inequality within the United States is the sum of each state's inequality 
weighted by the state's income relative to the entire country. 
If the population is divided into m certain subgroups and sk is the income share of group 
k, Tk is the Theil index for that subgroup, and μk is the average income in group k, then 
the Theil index of the population is: 
∑∑
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Therefore, one can say that a certain group "contributes" a certain amount of inequality 
to the whole. 
 
 
Poverty indices 
We will give details of the poverty indices we have used during the analysis. 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) have suggested a useful class of poverty indices that 
takes the following form: 
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where Zp denotes the poverty line, Yi the expenditure or income of the i-th poor 
household (or individual), N the total number of households and q the number of 
households whose expenditures or incomes are below the poverty line. Of course, the 
choice of the poverty line is of great importance in the determination of the index, and it 
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may reflect different judgements about the researcher’s choice for an appropriate level of 
welfare. 
From the general formula above, one can compute different kinds of poverty measures 
by simply varying the value of α: 
• If α = 0 ⇒ 
N
qP =0  
P0 is also called “Headcount ratio”, as it measures the incidence of poverty as the 
proportion of total population lying below the poverty line. 
• If α = 1 ⇒ ( )∑
=
=−⋅=
q
i p
ip IP
Z
YZ
N
P
1
01
1  
This index gives a good measure of the intensity of poverty, as it reflects how far the 
poor are from the poverty line. Indeed, it quantifies the extent to which the income of the 
poor lies below the poverty line. Hence the reason why it is also called “Income or 
Poverty gap ratio”. 
• If α = 2 ⇒ ( )∑
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This measure is also known as “Poverty Severity Index”, as it gives an indication of the 
degree of inequality among the poor. The greater is the inequality of distribution among 
the poor and thus the severity of poverty, the higher is P2. 
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APPENDIX B – Structure of Production and Foreign Sector 
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Figure B.1 – The Structure of Production and the Foreign Sector 
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